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Static analysis tools search software looking for defects that may cause an ap-
plication to deviate from its intended behavior. These include defects that compute
incorrect values, cause runtime exceptions or crashes, expose applications to security
vulnerabilities, or lead to performance degradation. In an ideal world, the analysis
would precisely identify all possible defects. In reality, it is not always possible to
infer the intent of a software component or code fragment, and static analysis tools
sometimes output spurious warnings or miss important bugs. As a result, tool mak-
ers and researchers focus on developing heuristics and techniques to improve speed
and accuracy. But, in practice, speed and accuracy are not sufficient to maximize
the value received by software makers using static analysis. Software engineering
teams need to make static analysis an effective part of their regular process.
In this dissertation, I examine the ways static analysis is used in practice
by commercial and open source users. I observe that effectiveness is hampered,
not only by false warnings, but also by true defects that do not affect software
behavior in practice. Indeed, mature production systems are often littered with true
defects that do not prevent them from functioning, mostly correctly. To understand
why this occurs, observe that developers inadvertently create both important and
unimportant defects when they write software, but most quality assurance activities
are directed at finding the important ones. By the time the system is mature, there
may still be a few consequential defects that can be found by static analysis, but
they are drowned out by the many true but low impact defects that were never
fixed. An exception to this rule is certain classes of subtle security, performance, or
concurrency defects that are hard to detect without static analysis.
Software teams can use static analysis to find defects very early in the process,
when they are cheapest to fix, and in so doing increase the effectiveness of later
quality assurance activities. But this effort comes with costs that must be managed
to ensure static analysis is worthwhile. The cost effectiveness of static analysis also
depends on the nature of the defect being sought, the nature of the application,
the infrastructure supporting tools, and the policies governing its use. Through
this research, I interact with real users through surveys, interviews, lab studies, and
community-wide reviews, to discover their perspectives and experiences, and to un-
derstand the costs and challenges incurred when adopting static analysis tools. I
also analyze the defects found in real systems and make observations about which
ones are fixed, why some seemingly serious defects persist, and what considerations
static analysis tools and software teams should make to increase effectiveness. Ulti-
mately, my interaction with real users confirms that static analysis is well received
and useful in practice, but the right environment is needed to maximize its return
on investment.
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Why do software programmers make mistakes? Sometimes, mistakes occur
because the problem is complex and the programmer forgets important constraints
or dependencies. Sometimes mistakes occur because of a deficiency in the program-
mer’s understanding of the language. But often, mistakes are just silly errors, com-
parable to typos a writer might make when composing an essay. And while many
silly errors cause the compiler to fail, or the program to crash quickly, some errors
can escape notice for some time, while causing the program to behave incorrectly.
Consider the code fragment in Figure 1.1, which was inserted into Glassfish1
on March 2, 2010. Observe that the method does not advance past line 185 unless
the local variable firstLevelEntries is null (because of the return statement).
This means that the condition on line 187, which dereferences firstLevelEntries,
will always throw a Null-Pointer Exception (NPE) if it is executed. This cannot
be the intent of the programmer, so we can infer that this method must contain a
mistake.
This process of inferring the presence of this mistake can be done automati-
cally using several systematic analysis techniques. One approach is to scan forward
through the method, keeping track of whether a value may be null or non-null. If
a value known to be null is dereferenced, we can quickly conclude that a mistake is
1http://glassfish.dev.java.net/
1
Source: GlassFish | org.glassfish.osgijavaeebase.OSGiBundleArchive 
183 private Collection<String> getSubDiretcories(String path) {
184 final Enumeration firstLevelEntries = b.getEntryPaths(path);
185 if (firstLevelEntries != null) return Collections.EMPTY LIST;
186 Collection<String> firstLevelDirs = new ArrayList<String>();
187 while (firstLevelEntries.hasMoreElements()) {
188 String firstLevelEntry = (String) firstLevelEntries.nextElement();
189 if (firstLevelEntry.endsWith("/") firstLevelDirs.add(firstLevelEntry);
190 }
191 return firstLevelDirs;
192 }  
Figure 1.1: Null-Pointer Dereference in GlassFish
present.
This systematic analysis can be done by a software program, called a static
analysis tool. The word “static” refers to the fact that the tool examines programs
without executing them.
In practice, inferring the presence of a mistake is not sufficient; we need to
understand what the problem is, and decide if it matters. To do this, we need a
deeper understanding of the semantics of the program. From the method signature,
we can tell that the purpose of the method is to return a list of string paths, rep-
resenting the subdirectories of the input path2. We also observe that the program
fragment extracts an enumeration of entries from the input path and either iter-
ates through this enumeration, or returns an empty list. With this information, we
can quickly infer that the developer accidently used the wrong operator on line 185
(inequality ! = instead of equality ==); the empty list should be returned when
2despite the spelling error in the method name
2
firstLevelEntries is null, and the iteration should occur when it is not null, and
not vice versa.
Observe that even though the analysis flags a potential null dereference on
line 187, the real mistake is using the wrong comparison operator on line 185. It
would be more user friendly for the analysis to say, “You used the wrong operator,”
instead of leaving the user to figure this out. But this would require the analysis to
understand the purpose of this method, which is difficult to do without requiring
the user to provide lots of descriptive metadata. Indeed it is possible to construct an
identical code fragment with very different semantics. For example, it could be that
the comparison is actually correct, and the mistake is a missing assignment of a non-
null value to the target variable after the comparison but before it is dereferenced.
So in general, static analysis can scan the code looking for violated properties (in this
case, dereferencing a value on the branch in which it is null), but cannot necessarily
identify the root mistake.
Observe also that this mistake does not always result in a Null-Pointer Excep-
tion. If firstLevelEntries is not null, the program does not crash, but returns
an incorrect value. Hence it is possible for this mistake to go undetected for some
time, and even after the incorrect behavior is noticed, a debugging effort may be
needed to trace the problem to this line. In this example, the mistake was fixed
29 days later when the developer received an alert from a static analysis tool called
FindBugs [62, 64].
This example illustrates the potential of static analysis to quickly find mis-
takes. And static analysis is not just limited to occasional typos; it can also flag
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bad practices, confusing logic, unsafe code, or programs that exhibit poor perfor-
mance properties.
This example also illustrates some of the limitations of static analysis. Static
analysis algorithms do not usually understand the intended functionality and use
cases of a program, and hence cannot necessarily determine if a mistake is important
or feasible. More generally, analyzing any software to determine all its correctness
properties is an undecidable problem. In practice, static analysis algorithms make
simplifying assumptions, and focus on classes of problems that can be detected
tractably. But even with these simplifications, many static analysis implementations
run into speed or accuracy constraints that affect their usefulness. In particular, it is
possible for an analysis to report some issues that are not actually mistakes, known
as false positives. Conversely, an analysis may miss some mistakes that are real
problems; these are called false negatives.
To deal with these challenges, some researchers and commercial vendors con-
tinue to develop increasingly sophisticated static analysis techniques that can run
faster, and be more precise. Other researchers focus on tweaking existing analysis
techniques based on problems observed in practice. Here, the goal is to minimize the
number of false positives so that users perceive each warning generated as valuable.
Despite these improvements, some users are still skeptical of the value of static
analysis and question whether it improves software quality and developer productiv-
ity in practice. Part of the problem is that other quality assurance activities—such
as unit testing and code review—can find a greater scope of problems. In addition,
using static analysis incurs some significant costs in practice. For example, when a
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static analysis is first run on an established software project, it often finds numerous
issues in legacy code that has not been edited for a while. Users generally conclude
that these issues are unlikely to be important since that part of the software has
been functioning correctly for some time, but they need to take steps to deal with
these problems anyway, lest they drown out more important issues that result from
more recent changes. In addition, users may find that simply changing the code in
response to a static analysis warning may lead to regressions, and hence need to
spend time considering the implications of every change before making it. Apart
from these challenges, users may find that they need to spend much time engaged
in manual repetitive tasks to deal with static analysis warnings, such as recording
issues in a bug tracking system, assigning issues to the correct person, or suppressing
issues in obsolete code.
To deal with these problems, organizations need to adopt effective strategies
that enable them to address issues found by static analysis early, and to maximize
their return on investment. In this dissertation, I present some of the experiences of
real organizations, and describe insights generated from interacting with users and
studying software artifacts. For example, I describe the reasons some are slow to
adopt tools, explain why some seemingly serious defects can persist for a long time
in a codebase, and identify the contexts in which static analysis is worthwhile.
To conduct this research, I rely on surveys, interviews, lab studies, reviews of
static analysis warnings by professionals, and a number of studies which examine
software artifacts directly looking for clues. Some detailed results, datasets and
relevant code from the studies in this dissertation are archived online at:
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http://findbugs.cs.umd.edu/inpractice/.
In the next section, I provide some basic definitions of terms I will use through-
out this dissertation. In Section 1.2, I explain why static analysis and other quality
assurance activities are necessary by considering the impacts of defects in practice.
I go on to describe some of the key promises and challenges associated with using
static analysis in Section 1.3. Finally, I present my main thesis and summarize my
findings in Sections 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.
1.1 Some Definitions
In the literature, various definitions are used to describe software defects.
Many researchers do not explicitly define defects, but imply that they lead to un-
desirable program behavior. Others use a more general definition that includes any
kind of flaw. One definition in the literature is: “A defect is any unintended char-
acteristic that impairs the utility or worth of an item, or any kind of shortcoming,
imperfection, or deficiency” [43].
In our research, we emphasize the fact that not all mistakes are equally bad,
and the context of a problem influences whether it is important or not. We use the
following definitions:
A defect is an implementation fragment or design feature that, when re-
vealed to the software team immediately after it is created, along with an
explanation of why it might be a mistake, the team would generally choose
to fix.
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A bug is a defect that causes undesirable program behavior. This could
include incorrect results, degraded performance, or vulnerability to security
threats.
These definitions make the notion of a defect more subjective, but also place
the emphasis on users and their priorities. Some users (and teams) will want to
address style issues like incorrect indentation or missing comments, while others
will not consider these to be defects. Also, the emphasis on showing the problem to
the software team soon after the defective feature is created assumes that software
teams are more willing to fix problems during the early parts of the software process,
and less willing to change the code after it has been deployed.
In addition to these definitions for software problems, we also need some defi-
nitions that are specific to static analysis tools:
A warning is a message from a static analysis tool, highlighting one or more
potential defects in the software. Warnings are also sometimes called alerts.
A bug pattern is an idiom that represents a class of defects that are similar.
Bug patterns are also sometimes called rules.
1.2 Software Defects In Practice
Software defects and failures are expensive, both for users who experience
losses, and for software developers who spend resources mitigating problems. A
2002 report from NIST estimated that the annual economic cost to the US of inad-
equate software quality control ranged from $22 to $60 billion [132]. A study from
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Carnegie Mellon University found that disclosures of security flaws hurt the stock
price of the software company involved [85]. The negative effects of defective soft-
ware are not limited to economic indicators. Increasingly software systems are used
in safety critical systems, where defects can result in injury or loss of life. A famous
example is the Therac-25 disaster, where a software error in a medical device led to
patients receiving fatal overdoses of radiation [86]. Software defects also have polit-
ical consequences. USA Today reports that a software system to manage the 2010
US Census was behind schedule and riddled with defects. As a result, the census
process needed to be modified and “risks ballooning costs, delays and inaccuracies”
[108].
Software systems are becoming more pervasive, and customers are more ex-
posed to them. Devices like automobiles and refrigerators that previously did not
contain software, now use software to monitor components and even connect to the
Internet [75]. Other devices like mobile phones have seen their software become
more complex and feature rich. If left unchecked, the problem of software defects
will only grow and impact more users.
Organizations seeking to get a handle on this problem need to have good
software development practices, effective quality assurance activities, and rigorous
testing. The 2002 NIST report mentioned earlier calls for use of software quality
metrics and testing infrastructure to identify problems early [132]. These tech-
niques are effective for ensuring an application meets its requirements, but can be
expensive to implement, and do not exhaustively exercise the program. Some safety-
critical systems, such as aircraft flight control, benefit from using formal verification
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methods to ensure that the underlying implementation precisely matches a given
specification [105]. But this approach cannot overcome flaws in the specification,
does not scale to general large applications, and it requires more technical expertise
than average developers have.
Compared to some of the quality assurance techniques briefly discussed so
far, static analysis appears to be relatively inexpensive, easy to use, and it can
exhaustively search the code for problems. On the other hand, it is limited in the
scope of problems it can detect, and sometimes identifies defects that do not matter.
Still, static analysis may help to reduce the cost of finding software defects, and
hence have a real impact on the experiences of customers of an increasing number
of products.
1.3 Static Analysis: Promise and Challenges
The primary benefits of static analysis tools are that they find problems in
software without executing it, and they can search software exhaustively, eliminating
some classes of problems. But this exhaustiveness can also lead to some challenges.
We refer to an analysis that can identify all instances of a particular problem as a
sound analysis. The problem with sound analysis is that it often yields instances
that are not real defects, due to constraints on the precision of the analysis. I discuss
some of the challenges associated with sound analysis in Section 1.3.1. Even if the
analysis identifies a real programming mistake, its warning may not be of interest
to developers because the problem may be infeasible, unlikely, or have only minor
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consequences. I discuss some of these scenarios in Section 1.3.2.
Other benefits of static analysis are that many tools are relatively fast, and
can build on the wisdom of experts to identify problems developers may not be
aware of. Many tools can be extended to find new classes of defects and some tools
analyze binaries, which is useful when source code is unavailable.
Despite these benefits, we have observed several challenges that arise when
users interact with tools in practice, and that limit their widespread adoption. Some
of the warnings produced by static analysis are difficult for users to understand,
especially when the variables and values involved occur in several different methods.
In addition, sometimes warnings occur in code that has not been touched for a
long time, or that is owned and maintained by someone other than the analyst.
Other times the warning may not represent a quality dimension an organization is
interested in. For example, internationalization warnings may not be relevant for
applications that only expect to run in one locale or encoding. When deploying
a static analysis tool in large projects with many developers, the analysts may be
overwhelmed by the large number of initial warnings found the first time a tool is run,
and may postpone addressing them to focus on more pressing needs. Furthermore,
large organizations often have to figure out how to integrate warnings from different
tools into one consistent interface.
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1.3.1 Sound Analysis and False Positives
To illustrate the challenges of a sound analysis, consider the Java code fragment
in Figure 1.2 (which is based on a blog post by Mark Dixon [37]). In constructing a
test case, the developer places a JUnit assertion inside a thread. This is problematic,
because exceptions thrown in an auxiliary thread are not propagated to the main
thread. If the assertion fails, JUnit will not record the assertion error and the test
will NOT fail as it should.
Suppose I set out to write a static analysis to flag every case where an assertion
is made in a separate thread. In the example in Figure 1.2, the analysis correctly
detects an assertion made in a separate thread from the main test thread. But
consider the slightly modified example in Figure 1.3. Here, the developer constructs
a Runnable, which is usually executed in a separate tread. But in this case, the
Runnable is executed within the main thread (with the call to r.run()). Hence the
assertion failure in this example will be detected by JUnit, and the code is defect
free.
The challenge in these examples is that if I want my analysis to be sound,
then I must flag any case where a threading construct such as Thread or Runnable
is used, unless I can demonstrate that the code will be run in the main thread. In
general, this is not always practical, and my analysis may issue a false warning for
code fragments like Figure 1.3.
In practice, most modern commercial static analysis tools use various heuristics
to reduce the number of false warnings, with the consequence that some classes of
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 
1 public void test() {
2 Thread t = new Thread() {





8 }  
Figure 1.2: Assertion failure in separate thread is not seen by JUnit 
1 public void test() {
2 Runnable r = new Runnable() {





8 }  
Figure 1.3: Assertion failure is seen by JUnit because it occurs in main thread
defects are found using unsound analysis. For these classes, static analysis tools
focus on finding as many useful defects as possible, rather than on eliminating all
possible defects. As some researchers from Coverity3, a commercial static analysis
vendor, recently stated: “Unsoundness let us focus on handling the easiest cases
first, scaling up as it proved useful” [23]. Even though these tools cannot guarantee
the absence of most classes of problems, users still receive the benefit that all defects




1.3.2 Infeasible, Unlikely or Low Impact Defects
Even if a static analysis tool is able to avoid false positives, not all problems
flagged are of interest to developers. The root problem stems from a mismatch
between what static code analyzers do and what developers ultimately care about.
Static code analyzers look for silly mistakes in code, confusing code, or violations
of good practice or desired safety properties. Developers are ultimately looking for
incorrect behavior, and there are many instances where the problems identified by
static analysis do not cause incorrect behavior.
Figure 1.4 illustrates this with an example in which the programmer checks the
value in a byte array b. The programmer assumes the value checked is an unsigned
value (from 0 to 255) and wants distinct behavior for values in or out of the range
[32,128]. In fact, the values in a byte array are signed (from -128 to 127) and
hence the check b[offset] > 128 is always false and may be flagged by a static
code analyzer as a nonsensical operation. However all the values in an unsigned
byte that are greater than 128 are negative numbers in a signed byte, and these
are caught by the first check b[offset] < 32. Indeed, assuming the programmer’s
Source: Sun JDBC API | sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcObject 
85 if ((b[offset] < 32) || (b[offset] > 128)) {
86 asciiLine += ".";
87 }
88 else {
89 asciiLine += new String (b, offset, 1);
90 }  
Figure 1.4: A coding mistake that does not cause incorrect behavior
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goal is to separate basic printable ASCII characters from unprintable and extended
ASCII codes, this code behaves correctly.
The decision to fix problems like this depends on many factors including how
old the code is, what stage in the development process it is found, and the culture
of the organization. Many organizations want to at least review most problems,
incurring the cost of doing so rather than risk potential future high cost and embar-
rassment. Many others, in the face of time-to-market pressures, prefer to only see
problems that might lead to incorrect behavior.
Even if a defect provably causes incorrect behavior, it may be unlikely in prac-
tice. For example, in Figure 1.5, static analysis can identify the repeated conditional
test on line 165. The second comparison of offx to null is completely redundant,
and is unlikely to have been inserted intentionally. Of course, it is still up to the
human reader to decide if this aberration is associated with incorrect behavior, or
is just a silly but harmless mistake. In this case, there is a strongly correlated vari-
able offy that is used everywhere offx is used. So we might guess that the second
comparison on line 165 should be offy != null.
The impact of this defect is that if one of these variable is null, and the other
is not, the wrong branch will be taken, resulting in incorrect behavior. But if
both variables are always null, or non-null at the same time, this defect will have
no effect on the behavior of the program. Since both variables are initialized by
reading correlated attributes from an XML document (on lines 81-82), it seems very
unlikely that the negative scenario will ever arise in practice. Still, examples like this
illustrate the potential of static analysis to find obscure scenarios that are unlikely
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Source: Open Laszlo | org.openlaszlo.compiler.ResourceCompiler 
81 String offx = element.getAttributeValue("offsetx");
82 String offy = element.getAttributeValue("offsety");
161 ...
162 if (!sources.isEmpty()) {
163 if (tagName.equals("preloadresource")) {
164 mEnv.getResourceGenerator().importPreloadResource(sources,
name, file);
165 } else if ((offx == null) && (offx == null)) {
166 mEnv.getResourceGenerator().importResource(sources, name, file);
167 } else {
168 mEnv.getResourceGenerator().importResource(sources, name, file,
169 new Offset2D(offx, offy));
170 }
171 ...  
Figure 1.5: Repeated Conditional
to come up during testing.
Even when a defect is feasible and causes incorrect behavior, its consequence
may be minor in practice. For example, in Figure 1.6, static analysis can quickly
detect that listeners is dereferenced on the branch in which it is guaranteed to
be null (on line 268). As with Figure 1.1, the defect is not the dereference, but an
incorrect comparison operator on line 267.
When we find defects like this in production code, we have to ask why no one
has detected it yet. Has this problem not caused an exception, leaving a stack
trace that quickly leads to a simple fix? It is easy to be drawn to the Null-
Pointer exception that is thrown if listeners is null, but the semantics of the
class suggest that listeners is probably never null in practice. (It is initialized in
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Source: Sun JDK 1.6.0, b105 | sun.awt.X11.XMSelection 
265 public synchronized void removeSelectionListener(
266 XMSelectionListener listener) {
267 if (listeners == null) {
268 listeners.remove(listener);
269 }
270 }  
Figure 1.6: Null-Pointer Dereference
addSelectionListener() which is probably always called before removeSelection-
Listener().) So the real impact of this defect is that the method parameter,
listener, is never removed from the collection, and continues to receive events
from this class. While this behavior violates the requirements of the class, it does
not necessarily have bad consequences. Perhaps listener ignores the events, or its
actions in response to events are inconsequential. Perhaps this class is only used in
scenarios where listeners are added, but never removed. It is even possible that the
class is only used in scenarios where removing listeners is the wrong thing to do,
and the only reason why the program works is because of this defect!
Prudent organizations will want to find and resolve all the warnings highlighted
in the last three examples. But when there are thousands of these low impact
issues—a distinct possibility since static analysis may be used to explore every nook
and cranny of the software—organizations need to weigh the cost of addressing all
of them with the value that is gained. In general, static analysis has questionable
value if it does not present users with issues that they want to fix, even if they are
true defects. To illustrate this, consider the compiler warnings that are generated
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every time a program is compiled. In many contexts, thousands of warnings are
generated, and engineers have developed the habit of completely ignoring them.
Some organizations set aside a dedicated period, usually after a major release, to go
through and clean up some of these warnings. But many times the warnings are just
ignored and taken as a fact of life. This experience suggests that if static analysis
tools do not discriminate more between defects, and exclude issues that users are
unwilling to fix, their overall value will decrease. In this dissertation, I explore this
and other observations by studying the practice of real users, and exploring the
artifacts left over from software development activities.
1.4 Thesis and Contributions
My research is built around a number of small studies which lead me to new
insights, or confirm existing ideas about the way static analysis tools are used. I
summarize some of these insights and ideas in the next two sections. My main ideas
can be summarized with the following thesis statement:
Static analysis is useful, and can find interesting software defects. But
in practice, some found defects are not important, because they do not
cause the software to misbehave. Furthermore, some classes of important
defects are regularly caught by other, more expensive quality assurance
activities before the affected code gets to production. Hence it is not suf-
ficient to simply use static analysis tools — organizations need to adopt
effective strategies to automatically identify important warnings early,
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in order to maximize their return on investment. And static analysis
tools need to provide features to support these strategies, helping orga-
nizations create a plan, inform and educate stakeholders, and measure
progress and metrics.
I support this thesis statement by conducting studies to discover the opportu-
nities and pitfalls associated with static analysis in practice, including some of the
first studies to report on the experiences of real users of a modern static analysis
tool and compare the opinions of hundreds of professionals reviewing defects in a
commercial organization. The primary contributions of this research are as follows:
• I describe the experiences, motivations and challenges of real users seeking to
adopt static analysis, and present the results of community-wide reviews of
real defects.
• I provide insights on why seemingly serious defects may persist in a code base
for a long time without causing problems, only to be later found by static
analysis.
• I make observations about which defects are fixed in practice by projects that
use static analysis and those that do not, and tackle the question of how to
account for natural changes in the code, called code churn, that make the data
noisy.
• I review real defects and some associated bug reports, and make observations
that challenge the way static analysis tools approach the problem of flagging
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potential null-pointer dereferences.
• I identify some best practices associated with the successful and cost-effective
adoption of static analysis.
• I propose and conduct preliminary research on a framework to make it simpler
to extend static analysis tools to find project-specific or API-specific defects,
by providing examples or mockups of the defects.
1.4.1 Studying Static Analysis In Practice
We usually evaluate static analysis tools in terms of what defects they find,
efficiency and accuracy. Tool vendors and researchers turn to benchmarks to demon-
strate that their tools meet accuracy, performance and soundness constraints [59,
91, 34]. Traditionally, these practitioners assert the effectiveness of their tools by
emphasizing the few false positives output by the tool. But, as I mentioned ear-
lier, even warnings that are true positives may not be important. Furthermore, the
designation of a warning as a false positive is often subjective.
If the ultimate goal of this endeavor is to encourage developers to adopt tools
and use them effectively, then we need to better understand how they impact users
and software processes. Controlled user studies can help us measure usability and
performance characteristics of tools, and get feedback from users about their inter-
action with tools. This feedback can lead to improvements to the tool’s interface.
For example, in one study, researchers observed that users had some difficulty un-
derstanding warnings from a static analysis tool for deadlock and race detection,
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because the warning trace crossed numerous method boundaries [77]. They were
able to improve user outcomes by enhancing the user interface to superimpose mul-
tiple methods into a concise format, and by using checklists.
Controlled user studies are helpful for exploring the direct interaction between
users and tools, but are limited when the goal is to consider all the factors that
influence successful adoption of static analysis tools. Ultimately, to comprehend
how tools impact users and software processes, we need to understand how they are
used in practice. This is the focus of my research. As part of my research, I have
sought to understand the overall value of static analysis tools. What proportion
of analysis warnings actually signal incorrect behavior in practice and can these be
found by other quality assurance methods at comparable cost? I have also studied
the defects that occur in practice, and the choices developers make about which
ones to fix. In other words, which warnings matter? I have also investigated the
practical considerations, tradeoffs, costs and challenges that organizations deal with
when they choose to use static analysis tools. I can use this research to question
why tools are not used more often, and validate or invalidate the assumptions made
by tool vendors and other researchers. Ultimately, I wish to identify best practices
that increase successful adoption of static analysis tools.
In some ways this research is similar to efforts to improve spell checkers in word
processors or spreadsheets by studying the habits of users. Unlike spell checkers
though, static analysis tools demand more human investment and infrastructure to
identify and remediate significant warnings.
My research practice alternates between direct interactions with users which
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yield mostly qualitative and anecdotal information, and substantial studies of code
artifacts and bug reports which yield mostly quantitative data. Analyzing large
software artifacts reveals significant trends that may generalize, but tells us little
about why these trends are observed. We fill this gap by directly interacting with
users and organizations. Conversely, lab studies and user interviews help us generate
hypotheses which we can then investigate quantitatively.
1.4.2 Research Limitations and Challenges
The primary difficulty when studying tools in practice is getting access to real
users, software, and defects. The engineers and organizations we recruit to study
have other priorities, and only limited willingness to assist us in our research. Many
commercial users were reluctant to participate, in part to protect the proprietary
nature of their code, and in part to avoid publishing information about the number
of defects they shipped in previous releases. As a result, while we had ready access to
many open source projects, we had limited access to commercial code bases, which
are needed because of their potentially different characteristics. We also had limited
access to static analysis tools other than FindBugs. Early on, many vendors were
very protective, not wanting their tool to end up in the hands of researchers who
may criticize its performance. As vendors have started appreciating the importance
of understanding the performance of tools in practice, more have become willing to
participate in open research.
Another challenge is that many trends associated with static analysis warnings
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in code bases are noisy. Warnings come and go as the developers update the code,
and their presence or absence may not be significant. In addition some projects
may have more or less of a particular kind of warning based on the type of problem
being solved, or the habits of the developers, and this may not be correlated with
the underlying quality of the code. In general, it is hard to extract significant trends
when analyzing the history of warnings in a code base.
Some of these challenges led us to focus more on extracting anecdotal or qual-
itative insights, not just constructing scientific experiments. These insights can
inform the way we build tools, prioritize warnings, and integrate static analysis into
software processes.
Most of my studies have been conducted using FindBugs [62, 64], an open
source static analysis tool for Java from the University of Maryland, which has been
downloaded more than a million times and is used by companies such as Google,
EBay, Amazon, Sun, and Oracle. I have surveyed about a thousand FindBugs users,
visited organizations that use FindBugs, interviewed several dozen developers, and
conducted lab studies with students. I have also manually inspected hundreds of
warnings in various code bases, developed techniques to automatically mine software
repositories and bug reports, and made technical contributions to FindBugs’ anal-
ysis. Given FindBugs’ strong focus on defects associated with code quality, I have
rounded out my research by working with static analysis tools that have a stronger
focus on code security, including tools from Fortify Software [128] and Coverity [66].
22
1.5 Summary and Discussion
Through my research, I have observed that static analysis does find important
defects, and users respond positively when asked about the value of the warnings
they receive. Users indicate that static analysis finds subtle defects that are oth-
erwise hard to detect, and educates them on correct programming practices. In
reviews of warnings output by FindBugs, users recommend fixing most of the warn-
ings. At the same time, some warnings are not considered defects by users, some
defects have a low impact in practice, and many of the important defects are also
captured by good quality assurance practices. Users have also found that they need
to make a nontrivial investment in static analysis to deploy warnings to develop-
ers early without impeding their productivity, baseline or triage warnings in old
code, integrate the results of multiple tools into a common interface, and filter out
unwanted bug patterns. With these benefits and pitfalls in mind, organizations
have started experimenting with different policies and infrastructure requirements
to identify the scenarios in which static analysis is cost effective.
I present some background on static analysis tools and techniques in Chapter
2. I also provide some background on how researchers study software artifacts to
extract insights about the software development activity.
In Chapter 3, I discuss a number of studies that probe the opinions and per-
spectives of static analysis users. One of my earliest studies was a survey of FindBugs
users, followed by phone interviews with some participants. Through these stud-
ies, I observed that many users had not yet established formal processes for using
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FindBugs. Instead, many use it in an ad hoc way, manually running the analysis
whenever they remember to do so. But in practice, users need to run static analysis
tools automatically to get the most value out of them. Some users accomplished
this by including FindBugs in a continuous build system, by displaying warnings
on a web page, by sending out nightly emails to developers with new warnings, by
displaying warnings as part of the code review system, or by displaying warnings in
the IDE. These approaches all exhibited varying levels of effectiveness. Some users
also reported integrating FindBugs into a bug tracking system to make it easier to
report warnings.
During the phone interviews, many users indicated that they wanted to adopt
more formal policies and integrate static analysis tools into their software process,
but they cited several barriers preventing them from doing so. One was the large
number of initial warnings displayed the first time the tool is run on an established
code base. These need to be “baselined” so users can focus on the (relatively few)
warnings in recently written code. Another challenge was the need to integrate the
results of multiple static analysis tools into one consistent interface for consumption
by developers. Often a custom integration solution was needed for each organization.
Another challenge was to customize the tool, filtering out unwanted bug patterns,
and creating detectors for project-specific bug patterns.
The survey results also indicated that different users emphasized different cat-
egories of bug patterns. This suggests that the relevance and importance of a bug
pattern depends on the user’s context. For example, an organization running many
applications on a production server may not care too much about null-pointer excep-
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tions, because these can simply be logged and the application restarted. A desktop
application, on the other hand, can be severely impacted by null pointer exceptions.
Users need to understand their context, and develop threat models that inform the
importance of bug patterns, especially for security warnings. Of course, despite
this dependence on the user’s context, some bug patterns, such as SQL injection
vulnerabilities, are always bad.
In addition to surveys and interviews, I have conducted some studies that
enable me to observe users evaluating warnings directly. In some small lab studies,
I made basic observations about user interaction including how long it took to
review each issue, how consistently independent reviewers evaluated the same issue,
and what factors concerning the interface may have influenced their review. In these
studies, users consistently identified certain bug patterns as severe, and others as low
impact, and were not influenced by factors such as displayed priority, presentation
order, or even the insertion of bogus warnings. These studies were a precursor to
a larger industrial-based study in which hundreds of engineers reviewed thousands
of FindBugs warnings in a commercial code base. Through this study, developers
confirmed that they preferred to fix most of the issues they reviewed, and their
perspectives matched the bug rankings in FindBugs.
These user studies are important because they enable me to interact with real
users and learn from their challenges and experiences. But user opinions are subjec-
tive, and it is necessary to also study more objective measures of the impact of static
analysis. In Chapters 4 to 6, I describe some studies that involve manual review
and automatic analysis of various artifacts of the software development process, in-
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cluding code repositories and issue tracking databases. It is through these studies
that I observed that not all true defects are important. Some seemingly fatal defects
end up being low impact because they occur in dead code, or are masked by sur-
rounding code. I discuss some of these scenarios in more detail in Section 4.1. This
means that it is not sufficient for tools to minimize false positives. Tools find many
stupid mistakes, but not all are important problems, and users are looking for the
“intersection of stupid and important.” It is not easy for tools to determine which
warnings are important, but we can rely on some heuristics to improve outcomes.
One interesting bug pattern, illustrated in Figure 1.7, is the infinite recur-
sive loop. In this illustration, the method calls itself recursively unconditionally.
A defect like this is surely always serious because it instantly results in a Stack-
OverflowException. But whenever we find this defect in production, it is usually in
dead code. The infinite recursive loop is an example of what we call a “loud” bug
pattern. They are very obvious, clearly incorrect, and usually result in exceptions
or crashes when executed. However in practice, when found in code that has been
in production for some time, they are usually not serious. This is because, if they
were causing problems, they would probably have been noticed. By contrast, some
more “silent” bug patterns can cause subtle software misbehavior that is difficult to
debug. I discuss loud and silent defects in Section 4.2.
These two observations—low impact defects, and the distinctions between loud
and silent bug patterns—help explain why some defects can persist for a long time
without causing any noticeable problems in the software. But a more general ex-
planation comes from a phenomenon we have observed, which we call The Survivor
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 
private final boolean isEnabled;
public boolean isEnabled() {
return this.isEnabled();
}  
Figure 1.7: An Infinite Recursive Loop
Effect. When software is written, developers make many mistakes including some
that matter, and some that do not. Over time both classes of defects will be reduced
as the developers test, review, and deploy the software. But most quality assurance
activities are directed more at the defects that matter. So if static analysis is run
on deployed software, it is likely to find many of the defects that do not matter.
There may still be some important defects left that were not caught by other qual-
ity assurance activities, but these are often drowned out by the long list of defects
presented at this stage. Furthermore, it is expensive to fix defects found at this
stage. In studies of detailed snapshots of student code, described in Chapter 5, I
observe many instances of students expending time and effort to solve a problem
that is found by static analysis. They often eventually fix the problem, but not
before using up energy that would have been saved if they had the static analysis
warning. The benefit of static analysis is that it can find problems early when they
are cheap to fix. I discuss the survivor effect in more detail in Section 4.3.
In my research, I also occasionally focus on null pointer defects, because many
static analysis tools focus on catching potential null pointer dereferences. One ob-
servation derived from reviewing some of these warnings is that not every potential
null pointer dereference is a defect. There are many cases where the developer ex-
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pects the value to always be non-null. Checking for null in all these places is too
cumbersome and makes the code hard to read. Hence if the dereferenced value
is null at runtime, this is likely because of a defect elsewhere in the code. This
observation leads to another insight: many null pointer exceptions are not due to
mishandling potentially null values, but due to separate logic errors which manifest
as null pointer exceptions. I confirmed this by reviewing several dozen bug reports
(from an open-source project) containing null pointer exceptions. This observation
explains some of the limitations for static analysis tools finding potential null pointer
dereferences.
The pervasiveness of null pointer exceptions makes some wonder if it is a
mistake to allow null values in the first place [61]. But in memory safe languages
like Java, sometimes one would prefer a null pointer exception, because it causes the
program to fail fast during development if there is a bug. I discuss this and other
considerations associated with null pointer errors in Chapter 6.
Ultimately for static analysis in practice, finding defects is not enough. Users
need a warning management infrastructure to prioritize which issues to address,
suppress unwanted issues, audit issues collaboratively with others on the team, and
analyze the history of warnings. The next generation of FindBugs includes features
to encourage collaborative auditing of warnings (using a cloud database to store
reviews). Users will also be able to hookup FindBugs to external bug tracking
systems and source browsers. FindBugs already provides features to allow users to
analyze the history of warnings, though our survey indicated that few users were even
aware of these features, and even fewer used them. I discuss the factors associated
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with cost effective usage of static analysis in Chapter 7.
Looking forward, there are some challenges that need to be addressed to more
fully exploit the potential of static analysis. Once challenge is making tools easier
to extend, so users can quickly identify custom project-specific or API-specific bug
patterns. Currently, in order to extend tools, users need to understand the various
internal analyses, or learn a tool-specific specification language. In Chapter 8, I
explore an approach to enable users to specify new bug detectors by providing
examples (and counter-examples) of the defects they want to find. This approach
does not require the user to learn any new languages or understand the analysis
engine. The user’s specifications are in the same language, and use the same API-
calls as the rest of the program, so the user can continue to take advantage of
features of their IDE, such as refactoring. This discussion will serve as the basis for
future research.
Another challenge is the perception of static analysis by developers. Some de-
velopers retain a negative perception of static analysis, due to the tendency of early
tools to emit many spurious warnings, and despite the advances of more modern
tools that minimize false positives. With the emergence of agile programming, we
have observed that many developers are considerably more willing invest time in
writing and maintaining unit tests than they are in reviewing old static analysis
warnings. While testing can potentially find more kinds of problems than static
analysis, users need to be encouraged to spend appropriate amounts of time on
static analysis to retain its benefits.
One persistent challenge to the advancement of static analysis is the lack of
29
cooperation and openness between competing vendors. Many tool vendors do not
want others to know what defects they find, because they are concerned others will
quickly develop the technology to find the same defects. But to advance static
analysis, practitioners need to develop new technologies to find more difficult bug




The goal of this chapter is to briefly introduce important terms and concepts.
This section assumes a basic understanding of common programming language id-
ioms and software development processes.
2.1 Defects found by Static Analysis
The best way to understand what static analysis tools do and why they are
limited is to jump into some examples. Here are 2 examples that illustrate why
static analysis cannot always infer the intent of the programmer: 
if( argument != null || argument.length() != 0 ) {
...
}  
Figure 2.1: Will throw a NullPointerException if argument is null
 
PrintWriter log = null;
if (anyLogging) log = new PrintWriter(...);
if (detailedLogging) log.println("Log started");  
Figure 2.2: May throw a NullPointerException
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate some scenarios where a Java NullPointerExcep-
tion may be thrown. In the if-statement, argument is only dereferenced when it
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is null. Of course, it is possible that argument is never null and so the exception
never occurs. Still we can assume without fully understanding the semantics and
context that this code likely does not represent the programmers intent and should
be changed. In Figure 2.2 (taken from [63]) on the other hand, it is not clear if there
is a problem. A NullPointerException will be thrown if log is not initialized before
it is dereferenced, which happens if anyLogging is false and detailedLogging is
true. It may not be possible to decide if this can happen at compile time, and a
tool reporting this as defective code may be issuing a false alarm.
This leads us to an important consideration when designing or evaluating
tools – is the underlying analysis is sound or complete? A sound analysis finds
every defect in the targeted class, and sometimes (often) includes false warnings. A
complete analysis ensures every warning found is a real error (i.e., does not return
any false alarms), but it may not find every problem in the targeted class. A sound
and complete analysis cannot exist for non-trivial programs and defect classes, and
these two properties are often traded off for each other [83]. Most analyses aim to
be sound, but many modern static analysis tools are neither sound nor complete
in general. Instead they aim to find as many problems as possible, while using
heuristics to minimize the number of false warnings. One such tool is FindBugs,
which will flag Figure 2.1 but not Figure 2.2 [63].
Sometimes programmers are asked to assist tools by providing more semantic
information using annotations. In Figure 2.3(a), a C function which performs some
operations on a character buffer assumes that both the buffer and its length are
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passed in by the programmer1. If the length is incorrectly specified, this could make
the application vulnerable to a buffer overflow attack. This serious security flaw
plagues many C and C++ applications because of functions in the standard library
that can introduce this vulnerability if used incorrectly. One solution, advanced
by Microsoft in their static analysis tool PREfast [83], is to annotate the function
with enough semantic information so a tool can check the relationship between
the parameters. Figure 2.3(b) illustrates these annotations using the Microsoft’s
Standard Annotation Language (SAL). The annotation out ecount(cchBuf) on
buf indicates that parameter cchBuf should be the length of buf. PREFast scans
the code to see if this constraint is met whenever FillString is invoked, and outputs
a warning if it is not.
2.2 Tools, Interfaces and Interaction Methods
We should point out that “static analysis” can refer to a wide range of program
analysis activities, from static type checking to bug finding to program verification
[33]. Static type checking is probably familiar to most programmers because it is
built into many languages and enforced by compilers that prevent programmers from
using typed data values in incompatible ways. In our research, we generally focus on
bug finding tools (which look for program behavior that potentially deviates from
the programmers intent) and property checking tools (which try to exhaustively
verify that a program has a desired property).
1Example from http://blogs.msdn.com/michael howard/archive/2006/05/19/602077.aspx
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(a) function without annotation 
void FillString( TCHAR∗ buf, size t cchBuf, char ch) {




(b) annotated function 
void FillString( out ecount(cchBuf) TCHAR∗ buf, size t cchBuf, char
ch) {




Figure 2.3: Using annotations to inform a static code analyzer
We have already mentioned two bug finding tools: FindBugs [62, 64] which is
open source, and PREfast [83]. FindBugs searches for potentially erroneous Java
code idioms called bug patterns. It includes dozens of bug detectors that scan the byte
code and output warnings or alerts. Bug patterns are organized into categories and
warnings are assigned priorities (e.g., High, Normal, Low) based on the confidence
of the analysis. Other popular open source bug finding tools are PMD [4] and Jlint
[3], and some commercial tools are Grammatech CodeSonar [53], Coverity Prevent
[66], Klocwork [81], Fortify Source Code Analyzer (SCA) [128] and Ounce (now part
of IBM) [65].
Some tools like Fortify SCA and Ounce have a particular focus: finding security
problems. The output from these tools is intended to support security audits and
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code reviews. Unlike other bug finding tools, these tools do not generally minimize
false positives because they aim to identify all vulnerabilities that may be exploitable
[33].
Static analysis tools provide a diverse array of interfaces for interaction with
users. Perhaps the most basic mode is as a command line tool that analyzes software
when manually invoked. Even more convenient is when tools provide plugins to
popular build systems like ANT or Maven so that they can be invoked as part of
the build process with minimal configuration effort. Tools invoked using one of these
modes may output results to the screen but more often save the results in some data
format (e.g., XML, HTML or plain text) so that they can be processed or viewed
by third party applications. These results may be sent automatically to developers
using email, or by posting on a website or bug database. An emerging paradigm
is to present results on a dashboard associated with a continuous integration server
such as Hudson [76] or Cruise Control [8], which developers already use to regularly
build and test the code base.
A different paradigm is to present warnings using a standalone graphical user
interface (GUI) or as part of a custom view in an integrated development environ-
ment (IDE). These modes facilitate doing advanced tasks like filtering out entire
classes of warnings corresponding to unimportant defects, or assigning issues to spe-
cific developers or to be ignored. One argument for using the IDE mode is that
warnings can be presented to the developer as soon as the problematic code is typed
by using subtle but conspicuous markers in the editing space. The counter-argument
is that this mode may affect the responsiveness of the IDE (for complicated anal-
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yses) or irritate developers by highlighting issues prematurely (before they finish
typing all they want to express semantically).
One expectation is that the mode of interaction affects the way developers use
tools and the facilities they employ. For example, if a developer interacts through an
IDE plugin that makes it easy to filter out entire classes of warnings, that developer
may be more likely to tune the analysis tool to meet their needs than a developer
that has to manually edit XML configuration files. Similarly developers that view
warnings on a continuous integration dashboard that they check regularly may be
more likely to respond to these warnings (by fixing or suppressing) than developers
that have to remember to manually run the static analysis tool every once in a while.
2.3 Mining Software Artifacts
Modern software development processes rely on a number of tools to facilitate
collaboration between all members of a team. These tools include software reposi-
tories that maintain every version of every file created during the process, and bug
databases that store all communications associated with a defect’s remediation from
the moment the defect is reported to the moment a fix is verified. Other tools are
build servers and continuous integration dashboards for tracking the success of com-
pilation and unit testing for each snapshot of the code repository, code coverage and
other metric reporting tools, forums and wikis for discussion and documentation,
and calendars for scheduling.
Each of these tools captures a part of the story of the software development
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effort from conception to deployment. I use the phrase “software mining” to refer
to any effort to search or examine the information captured in these tools for the
purpose of discovering trends, making prescriptions or diagnosing problems.
A concerted effort and community has formed around mining software repos-
itories in particular, because these resources often contain the most detailed, auto-
matically acquired information about the development process. Interesting trends
can be identified by visualizing the repository, cross-matching the different data
types collected (such as authors and timestamps), or comparing information in
repositories with data collected from other tools such as bug tracking databases. I
include some of these interesting trends in my discussion on mining software repos-
itories in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 3
User Perspectives and Experiences
In casual interactions with users of FindBugs, I often receive positive feedback
about the bugs FindBugs has found, or the programming principles the user has
learned from using it. On the other hand, it is not clear that these users use
FindBugs as regularly as they write unit tests, for example. Throughout this project,
I have sought to interact more formally and directly with users to learn about
their experiences and opinions. How effectively are they using FindBugs, and what
limitations are holding them back from fully adopting it?
In this chapter, I describe three sets of studies that shed some light on user
perspectives and experiences. Early in this research project I surveyed about 1,000
FindBugs users and observed that most did not have formal processes for using static
analysis. I also interviewed over a dozen of the participants by phone and learned
about some of the challenges they had integrating FindBugs into their software
process. These studies are discussed in Section 3.1.
In some follow-up studies, described in Section 3.2, I observed students in a
controlled lab setting as they reviewed some preselected warnings from two static
analysis tools. I captured basic information about how long each review took, and
how consistently independent reviewers evaluated particular issues. These studies
were a precursor to a large study in which hundreds of engineers reviewed thousands
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of warnings in an industrial code base. With such a large number of reviews, we
were able to quantify the opinions of the users and aggregate the results by bug
pattern, age and severity to find trends. This study is discussed in Section 3.3.
In general, these studies suggest that static analysis tools should be run auto-
matically, otherwise users are unlikely to run them regularly. Popular approaches
for doing this include integrating warnings into code reviews, continuous or nightly
builds, or the Integrated Development Environment (IDE). Each of these approaches
has its limitations. And even with infrastructure in place to automatically present
warnings to developers, organizations still have to decide how to deal with the large
number of initial warnings, how to integrate results from multiple tools into a com-
mon interface, and how to customize tools to filter out irrelevant bug patterns and
add project-specific ones.
Another lesson is that the relevance of a warning often depends on the nature
of the application. Desktop applications have different priorities from server-based
applications, for example. And entertainment applications such as video games have
different tolerances from safety critical software such as an airplane’s flight control
system. Of course, some warnings are always bad, and all warnings are cheaper to
fix when shown to the developer earlier in the development process.
3.1 User Survey and Interviews
From November 2007 to November 2009, I conducted an online survey to learn
about the experiences of FindBugs’ users, and collected 1045 responses. This was
39
a wide ranging and exploratory survey to generate feedback from users about how
and how much FindBugs was used, how it was integrated into the software devel-
opment process, which bug pattern categories were important, and which features
of FindBugs were used. I also conducted about 18 informal phone interviews with
consenting survey respondents in the US and Europe to better understand their
context and to get more detailed information about their experiences, challenges
and suggestions. Ultimately, the survey and interviews helped to provide some in-
sight on the value that static analysis tools may bring to the software development
process, and what obstacles prevent their adoption. Some results from these studies
have been reported in previously published work [13, 12].
3.1.1 Methodology
The survey was prepared and delivered using Survey Monkey, a popular web-
based provider of survey solutions used by many companies and researchers1. I
targeted FindBugs users by advertising on the FindBugs web site and through its
mailing lists.
There was no preset limit on the number of participants, nor was there a
preselected invitation list. This means I cannot measure a response rate (which
might indicate how much the survey can be generalized), and there may be some
self-selection bias [24, 120]. In other words, some users with strong opinions may
be more likely to provide feedback than other users. But the goal was to get as
many responses as possible, particularly for the qualitative questions. And since
1http://surveymonkey.com
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there were over 1,000 responses, some of the quantitative trends observed are likely
significant. To encourage user participation, we offered prizes in the form of T-shirts
and coffee mugs from the FindBugs store to randomly selected respondents. User
responses were handled confidentially so that individual users cannot be identified
in any reports. This research involving human participants was approved by the
Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland.
The main body of the survey includes 27 multiple choice or simple numeric
questions and 2 essay questions. This organization makes it easier to quantify and
analyze most of the responses, and reduces the burden on participants. Many of the
multiple choice questions include a choice labeled “Other (please specify)” to allow
users to provide more qualitative information. The survey begins by asking for basic
demographic information such as the level of the user’s education and experience,
the nature of the user’s code, and the type of organization the user is affiliated with.
Highlights from these questions are discussed in Section 3.1.2. The final multiple
choice question presents the users with a number of statements, and asks them to
indicate how strongly they agree or disagree with each using a Likert scale [87]. The
essay questions ask users to specify any customizations they have made to FindBugs,
and for additional feedback about what they like or dislike about FindBugs, and
how it affects their software development process.
At the end of the survey, participants indicated if they would be willing to be
contacted for further interviews. I contacted some of the consenting participants
and arranged phone interviews. Each interview lasted about 30 minutes, and was
a free-flowing conversation about how users discovered FindBugs, how their orga-
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nization handled quality assurance, and what their priorities were. The interviews
were recorded with the permission of participants, and later partially transcribed to
preserve the main points for future review and analysis.
As part of the effort to construct the survey and prepare for the interviews,
I conducted some pilot surveys and interviews with users in the Northern Virginia
Java Users Group2 and the Fraunhofer Center at the University of Maryland3. These
pilots helped to refine some of the questions in the final survey, and indicated that
the study results would be difficult to analyze if not reduced to simpler multiple
choice questions.
The following sections highlight some of my main observations.
3.1.2 Survey Demographics
Table 3.1 shows the basic demographic statistics from the survey. The results
indicate that many participants were experienced industry professionals. Users had
an average of 10 years of professional experience working on software projects, and an
average of 3 years of experience using automatic fault detection tools like FindBugs.
The top primary roles users identified were Software Developer, Software Architect,
Project Manager and Consultant/Specialist. Many users also indicated that they
had secondary and tertiary roles as Quality Assurance/Testing and Build Engineers.
Only a handful of responses were from researchers or students. This skew towards




Table 3.1: Survey Demographic Statistics
Experience Organization Size
Average Professional Experience 10 years 1 to 50 employees 28%
Average Experience with Fault Detection Tools 3 years 50 to 200 employees 16%
Average Experience with FindBugs 2 years 200 to 1,000 employees 17%
Primary Role or Job Function 1,000 to 10,000 employees 20%
Software Developer 56% 10,000 or more employees 19%
Software Architect 21% Project Age
Project Manager 7% Less than 6 months 26%
Consultant/Specialist 6% 6 months to a year 22%
Affiliate Organization Sector 1-2 years 27%
Technology and Communications 49% 2-5 years 42%
Finance and Insurance 11% Over 5 years 25%
Services 9%
Education 7%
Percentages are of the respondents who answered the question.
For project age, users may select more than one option.
professionals.
It is also interesting to note the industries that participants represent. Unsur-
prisingly, most participants worked in technology and communications companies,
but there was also a strong showing from the finance sector, where critical software
flaws can lead to high profile failures or security breaches.
The responses were distributed uniformly among organizations of different
sizes, with around half of the responses from small to mid-size organizations, and
half from large organizations with more than 500 employees.
The sizes and ages of code bases subjected to static analysis varied widely.
10% of respondents reported running FindBugs on code bases larger than 1 million
lines of code and the plurality of respondents (42%) reported that their code bases
were 2 to 5 years old.
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3.1.3 Is FindBugs Useful?
Many users expressed strong positive sentiments about FindBugs, both through
the opinion-based multiple-choice questions and the open-ended essay questions. Ta-
ble 3.2 summarizes a question in which users were asked to agree or disagree with
several statements. Most users agreed or strongly agreed that their investment in
FindBugs was worthwhile, that it had found serious problems, and that warnings
were easy to understand and fix. The statement that FindBugs has found serious
problems that users fixed is particularly interesting, because it suggests that users
perceive that they are getting real value out of it. Whether this translates into
consistent and regular usage is another matter, which I discuss in Section 3.1.4.
The results in Table 3.2 also show that only half of the users agree or strongly
agree that FindBugs was speeding up the quality assurance process, but another
30% were indifferent to this question. Static analysis may speed up the quality
assurance process by identifying problems sooner or enabling faster code reviews,
but it may also slow it down by giving developers additional work.
We also asked users if the presence of static analysis affected other parts of
their quality assurance process. Only a few users (18%) felt that project managers
rely too much on the number of bugs reported when measuring code quality, and
even fewer users (8%) said that FindBugs reduced the number of unit tests they
write. However a large number of users were indifferent on both questions (52% and
39% respectively) so these results may not be representative of survey respondents.
I also received qualitative feedback that strongly indicates that users found
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Table 3.2: Percentage of users who Agree or Strongly Agree with statements about
FindBugs
Our investment (in time) in FindBugs has been worthwhile 90%
FindBugs has found serious problems in projects I or my team have
worked on
81%
FindBugs warnings and bug descriptions are easy to understand 75%
FindBugs warnings have generally been easy to fix 67%
FindBugs speeds up our quality assurance process 50%
Project managers rely too much on “number of bugs” reported by
tools like FindBugs when measuring code quality.
18%
FindBugs has had the (unintended) effect of reducing the number
of unit tests we write
8%
FindBugs valuable. For example, one user commented:
We have a project where FindBugs found some serious problems in highly
critical safety related software, issues that might have caused it to run less
efficiently or wrong. FindBugs saved our collective (butts). It’s as simple as
that.
One recurring theme was the educational value users said they received from
FindBugs. It taught them things about Java they did not know previously. One
manager I interviewed insisted that junior developers use FindBugs regularly, just
so they can learn good practices and understand some nuances about the language.
Not all comments were positive. Some users complained about the perfor-
mance of FindBugs in the IDE, or about how difficult it is to extend FindBugs with
new plugins.
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During interviews, we tried to find out how users heard about FindBugs and
what motivated them to start using it. Many users heard about FindBugs through
presentations at the annual Java One conference4 or through online videos, podcasts
and articles.
The motivations for using FindBugs varied widely. Some users reported that
even brief trials running the tool taught them new things about Java and its potential
pitfalls. Some of these respondents used FindBugs to ensure compliance with coding
standards and to educate new developers. Many users highlighted the fact that
FindBugs found real correctness problems, not just style issues, as reason to choose
FindBugs over other tools like CheckStyle or JLint.
One user was an outside consultant called in at the end of each major phase to
do quality control. He ran FindBugs as a first step to look for clusters of problems
and sniff out problematic trends. He expressed an unusual concern that if develop-
ers use FindBugs regularly, they would “tune” the code base to the tool, perhaps
removing low priority warnings that could identify potentially defective modules.
On the other hand, if the problems found and fixed improve software quality, then
the organization and clients are well served.
Another user worked on an Agile software development team [60] that empha-
sized test-driven development and ran static analysis tools only at the end of each
iteration. His perspective was that static analysis was useful for finding potential
future problems that did not immediately manifest in tests. For example, Find-
Bugs flags the practice of calling a non-final method from a constructor. This is a
4http://java.sun.com/javaone/
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Table 3.3: Lack of formal policies for using FindBugs
Our developers only occasionally run FindBugs manually 60% of users
No policy on how soon each FindBugs issue must be human reviewed 81%
Running FindBugs is NOT required by our process, or by management 76%
FindBugs warnings are NOT inserted into a separate bug tracking database 83%
No policy on how to handle warnings designated “Not A Bug” 55%
potential problem only if the class is subclassed.
Few users reported doing any initial cost-benefit analysis to measure the return
on investment in FindBugs. In some cases, adoption was pushed by one champion
who was convinced it would bring value. This champion would lead the effort
to integrate FindBugs into existing processes, or do the initial work to filter out
unwanted bug patterns. One user recently joined his company and found that a
previous effort to use FindBugs had failed as developers stopped running it daily.
So he pushed to automatically run it as part of the continuous build, taking some
of the onus off developers.
3.1.4 Users Lack Formal Processes
One of the most revealing observations from our survey was that most respon-
dents did not seem to have any formal policies for using FindBugs and other static
analysis tools (Table 3.3). Their organizations just expected developers to run tools
once in a while, and they had not really considered questions like: “who decides if
a warnings should be fixed?” or “how should we filter out false alarms?”.
Some teams did identify the need for a way to suppress warnings that are
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Table 3.4: Handling issues designated “Not A Bug”
Filter out using FindBugs filters 25% of users
Suppress using @SuppressWarnings 17%
Close in a bug tracker or database 5%
No policy 55%
not bugs or that are low impact issues (Table 3.4). FindBugs’ filter files5 were the
most common method, followed by source level suppression using annotations (such
as @SuppressWarnings). In the interviews, one user explained that source level
suppression using annotations was attractive because the suppression information
is readily available to future code reviewers. Other users had the practice of fixing
all issues identified by FindBugs to make the issues go away. Some did this because
they did not want new issues to be drowned out, and others did this because they
felt it made the code cleaner. As one user put it: “the effort to reformulate source
code to avoid FindBugs warnings is time well spent.”
Another survey question focused on who decides that an issue should be fixed
(Table 3.5). In many cases, the person who writes the code is responsible for review-
ing the warning, deciding if it is relevant, and resolving the issue. Other approaches
include having peer reviews or team reviews. Warnings found in older code can be
hard to fix and require approval from management. One question all this raises is
whether two different individuals will interpret warnings the same way (and hence
make similar review judgments). If reviewers often reach different conclusions, then
5FindBugs’ filter files are XML files that contain references to specific bug patterns, packages,
classes, methods, or fields, which can be included or excluded from analysis results.
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Table 3.5: How do you or your project team decide when a warning is “Not A Bug”?
The reviewer makes this decision independently 38% of users
The reviewer makes this decision for trivial cases, but
nontrivial cases go to a team or to management
17%
At least two reviewers must agree 6%
The issue must be reviewed by a team or management 5%
No policy 31%
organizations may need to be more careful about how they choose reviewers. I have
explored this question with some lab studies and a warning review (described in
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively) which indicate that independent reviewers are
usually consistent with each other. This suggests organizations can save money by
not requiring multiple independent reviews for most issues.
During interviews I tried to understand why adoption of FindBugs was unsuc-
cessful in some cases. One reason given is that developers were discouraged by the
large number of warnings presented the first time the tool is run on existing code.
Developers are often resistant to changing code that has been in production for a
while and may perceive the warnings in low regard because they refer to problems
that have not manifested during execution. Organizations in this situation needed
to either filter out warnings older than a certain time period, or make a concerted
effort to remediate certain bug patterns all at once.
Another problem that sometimes came up was that users did not know how
to write custom bug detectors and found the prospect of learning to do so daunting.
Some users expressed that they did not know what problems FindBugs catches
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(the list of bug detectors is quite long), and hence they were worried that writing
a custom detector might be reinventing the wheel. FindBugs does not generally
use sound analyses so the absence of a warning does not imply the absence of the
problem.
Finally, we interviewed at least one developer who expressed that FindBugs
was imposed on his team by management and a separate security team. This im-
position came about because an earlier developer error had caused a major security
breach in one of the organization’s web applications (the organization was a State
Department of Health). One of the responses was to make developers review all
warnings regularly and document the ones they did not fix. The security team
saw this requirement as a first layer of defense, but the developer expressed some
reservation because he felt that few of the warnings were serious bugs.
3.1.5 Issues Users Care About
FindBugs classifies warnings for each bug pattern into high, medium, or low
priority groups depending on the severity of the issue and the confidence of the
analysis. Part of the goal is to reduce the number of false positives among issues
that receive a high priority label. Our survey indicates that most users review at
least the high priority warnings in all categories (Table 3.6). This is the expected
outcome, since high priority warnings are intended to be the sorts of problems any
user would want to fix. A surprising number of users also review lower priority
warnings (though the review categories vary from user to user). This indicates
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Table 3.6: Proportion of users that review at least high priority warnings for each
category
Bad Practice 96% of users Malicious Code Vulnerability 86%
Performance 96% Dodgy 86%
Correctness 95% Internationalization 57%
Multithreaded Correctness 93%
that while high priority warnings are relevant to most users, lower priority warnings
may or may not be relevant depending on the user’s context. One could even
imagine providing preconfigured settings for different contexts that emphasize or
deemphasize certain bug patterns based on whether the subject application is a web
application or desktop application.
During interviews some users, particularly those building web applications,
were more interested in security related issues (such as SQL injections) but at least
one user indicated that input validation was their primary defense and this made
many security warnings obsolete. FindBugs does not have many detectors dedicated
to security issues, so most users were relying on FindBugs to find issues related to
correctness such as dereferences of potentially null variables. Users also reported
looking for synchronization issues and race conditions, problems that can manifest
in multithreaded environments.
3.1.6 Summary
The survey and interviews provide the first clues that users are getting some
value out of FindBugs, including some educational value because it informs them
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of good programming practices. But this study also indicates that some users are
struggling to integrate FindBugs into their regular software development process.
These users confirm that just using static analysis in an ad hoc way does not seem
to be sufficient because developers may forget to run it regularly, or new warnings
may be drowned out by stale issues that have not been resolved or suppressed.
These users also confirm that they are actively trying to make the initial investment
to establish infrastructure that will enable them to baseline old issues, file some
new issues automatically in their issue tracking systems, or aggregate the results of
multiple static analysis tools into one interface. The observations from this survey
inform some of the questions I ask throughout my research. I will return to some of
the responses from the survey at relevant points in future chapters.
3.2 Lab Based Controlled Studies
The surveys and interviews indicated that users perceive that FindBugs’ warn-
ings are generally valuable and worthwhile reviewing. But all warnings are not equal,
and it would be interesting to observe user perceptions of different specific warnings.
To facilitate this discovery, I conducted a number of studies that bring users into
direct interaction with FindBugs and other static analysis tools. I describe some
lab studies involving a few participants in this section, and a larger study involving
hundreds of professionals in Section 3.3.
The lab studies enabled us to observe students interacting with static analysis
tools in a controlled environment. These studies were partly done in preparation for
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larger studies conducted with hundreds of engineers in their working environments,
and hence had numerous goals. One goal was to see how long it would take to
review each warning and decide if it is worth fixing, if it is low impact, or if it is
not a problem. This enables us to make a rough estimate of the cost of using static
analysis.
Another goal is to determine if multiple independent reviewers agree about
the significance of each warning. Sometimes when researchers and tool vendors talk
about warnings, we assume that the rightness or wrongness of the warning is clear.
But separate users may place a different value on each warning, even disagreeing
about whether the problem is plausible. Differences may also come about because
users make errors in judgement. These studies enable us to improve our intuition
about user consistency.
The process of observing users as they interact with tools may also reveal
insights about the practice and rigor of reviewers. What resources do they rely on
to understand a warning and decide if it is a problem? And what sorts of mistakes
do reviewers make in deciding that a warning is not a bug, or that it is a bug? What
if we insert a fake warning? Will users be careful enough to detect this deception?
In a similar vein, we want to investigate what biases may influence a reviewer,
including the priority label assigned by the static analysis tool, and the order in
which warnings are presented. Some users may trust that the analysis is correct,
and not feel the need to manually verify its assertions. Other users may be skeptical,
and refuse to accept that there is a bug unless they can prove it to themselves.
Of course, student reviewers in a lab do not precisely represent the decisions
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made in the real world, where professionals worry about the cost of fixing warnings.
One way to improve this limitation is to ask reviewers to make some of the consid-
erations engineers make in practice, including whether the alleged problem is likely
to occur often or only rarely, and whether the problem is in deployed client software
(and hence a software patch will need to be released), or just in local code under
development. We attempt this in one of the lab studies by providing users with a
checklist for them to go over as they review each warning.
The first lab study focuses on capturing the review time, and consistency of
independent reviewers. This study is described in Section 3.2.1, and reported in more
detail in [13]. The second study introduces a checklist, and focuses on observing how
different factors (including order, priority, and bug pattern) correlate with reviewer
evaluations. In this study, we randomized the order and priority of the warnings,
and even inserted some fake warnings. This study is described in Section 3.2.2, and
reported in more detail in [15].
Ultimately, the goal in both these studies is to make qualitative observations
about the users’ interactions with tools.
3.2.1 Study 1: Review Times and Consistency
This study involved two static analysis tools: FindBugs and Fortify Source
Code Analyzer. Fortify SCA is a commercial static analysis tool that specializes in
finding potentially exploitable security vulnerabilities in source code. We recruited
12 students (10 graduate and 2 undergraduate) from the University of Maryland’s
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Computer Science Department, using email, fliers and word of mouth. We did not
require our users to have any prior experience using static analysis tools, and none
of them had used the tools they were reviewing. Users had between 1 and 10 years
of programming with Java (the average was 6 years) and between 0 and 5 years
of using the Eclipse IDE (the average was 3 years). The first six users reviewed
warnings from FindBugs while the next six reviewed Fortify SCA warnings.
Both tools were run on DSpace6 (version 1.4.2), an open source web based
application for accessing and managing text, audio, video and other resources gen-
erated during research and teaching. DSpace was one of the benchmarks in the
2008 Static Analysis Tool Exposition7 organized by the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST). Both FindBugs and Fortify SCA participated in the
exposition.
Participants were asked to review 23 FindBugs warnings (including correct-
ness, bad practice and multi-threaded correctness warnings) or 21 Fortify SCA warn-
ings (including warnings on HTTP Response Splitting, SQL Injections and Race
conditions). Users were asked to rate warnings on a 3 level scale using labels native
to the tools. For FindBugs the levels were “Must Fix,” “Low Impact,” and “Not
a Bug.” For Fortify SCA the levels were “Exploitable,” “Suspicious,” and “Not an
Issue.”
The studies were conducted using the Eclipse IDE and corresponding plugins




a view or rating a warning) using a customized version of the HackyStat8 Eclipse
plugin [74], which transparently collects data about user activities and sends it to a
central repository.
The experiment was divided into four parts: a tutorial, a practice session in
which participants reviewed four warnings, a timed main session and a background
survey. During the practice session, participants were asked to “think out loud” as
they performed the review to provide qualitative information about what decisions
they were making and why. During the main session participants reviewed the
assigned issues starting with the highest priority warnings, mimicking the way tools
usually present the warnings to users.
During the tutorial, participants viewed a web page which described the tools
with illustrations and outlined the tasks the user was expected to perform. In
particular, the tutorial showed users how to navigate through warnings, designate
a rating to each one, and add comments. The tutorial for Fortify SCA was longer
because it included more detailed information about HTTP Response Splitting,
SQL Injection and Race Conditions. These descriptions and examples were adapted
from the information provided by Fortify SCA. In addition the Fortify SCA tutorial
included a checklist of steps for users to follow. I designed the checklist based on
the documentation provided by Fortify. The checklist was intended to reduce the
complexity of some of the tasks and to ensure participants consider all relevant
factors before choosing a designation. An example of a checklist for SQL Injections
is shown in Figure 3.1. Participants were encouraged to ask any questions they had
8http://hackystat.org
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Use the following Checklist to determine if a segment of code is an SQL injection
1. Does data enter the program from an untrusted source? If NO, then not an SQL injection
2. Is the data used to construct an SQL query? If NO, then not an SQL injection
3. Is the data validated between its entry and where the constructed SQL statement is
executed? If YES, then GOTO 3.a., otherwise GOTO 4
(a) Is the data validated using blacklisting (removing or escaping potentially mali-
cious characters)? If YES, then code is still vulnerable to SQL injection because
blacklisting is not as effective
(b) Is the data validated using white listing (only allow certain predetermined inputs)?
If YES, then not an SQL injection
4. Do you see any other security mechanism to prevent SQL injection? If YES, then use
your best judgment to determine if the security mechanism is effective
Figure 3.1: SQL Injection Checklist
to the experimenter.
3.2.1.1 Results and Observations
Table 3.7 shows the review times for FindBugs and Fortify SCA. The times for
each tool are sorted from shortest to longest. Users spent an average of 98 seconds
reviewing each FindBugs warning. This average drops to about 87 when the last
(outlier) is excluded. Users spent about 120 seconds for each Fortify SCA issue. It
was interesting to note that the review times were not very long for either tool in
this simple study, and in particular that Fortify SCA reviews were not much longer
than FindBugs despite its increased complexity.
In Table 3.8 we measure how much reviewers agree with each other in des-
ignating a warning to a level on the 3-level scale for their tool. For example, all
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Table 3.8: Level of Agreement among six reviewers
Tool Total Warnings 6 agree 5+ agree 4+ agree
FindBugs 23 7 12 21
Fortify SCA 21 3 6 11
6 reviewers made the same decision for 7 of the FindBugs warnings, but only 3 of
the Fortify SCA warnings were unanimous. The results indicate a greater level of
agreement among FindBugs users which may reflect that the warnings are simpler
to understand.
One interesting exception occurred during the practice session and is illus-
trated in Figure 3.2. Here, a switch statement is missing breaks and each case falls
through to the next one. FindBugs flags this as a bug but 4 users concluded that the
programmer intended the fall through to initialize all variables. The other 2 users
reviewed this as Must Fix, and may have not noticed the programmers possible
intent. Of course, the programmer in this example should probably insert com-
ments indicating that breaks were omitted intentionally if in fact this is the case. In
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 




// Full date and time
hours = Integer.parseInt(fromDC.substring(11, 13));
minutes = Integer.parseInt(fromDC.substring(14, 16));
seconds = Integer.parseInt(fromDC.substring(17, 19));
case 10:
// Just full date
day = Integer.parseInt(fromDC.substring(8, 10));
case 7:
// Just year and month
month = Integer.parseInt(fromDC.substring(5, 7));
case 4:
// Just the year




Figure 3.2: Switch statement with no breaks. Some users concluded this
was not a bug while others declared this a Must Fix
another case, FindBugs flagged a possible null pointer dereference that would only
occur if an earlier exception was thrown. The programmer provided a comment that
the exception “should never happen,” but 4 users still concluded that the warning
was a “Must Fix” while the other 2 reviewed this as Not an Issue.
With Fortify SCA warnings, we noticed that some of the disagreement may
have resulted from reviewers getting confused as they went through the trace. In
one case half the users rated a HTTP Response Splitting warning as Exploitable
while the other half rated it as Not an Issue. The comments indicate that some of
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those who thought it was not an issue concluded that the offending variable was
sanitized using the URLEncoder.encode method, but in fact a different variable was
sanitized.
A brief survey administered after each study captured more feedback about
the user’s experience. In the survey 5 of the 6 FindBugs users indicated that they
generally understood the warnings or that they were familiar with the problems
from previous experience, while 4 of 6 users indicated that it was not difficult to
decide if a warning represented a bug. But users were split over whether it was easy
to distinguish between “Must Fix” and “Low Impact” bugs. Some of these users
complained that they were not familiar with the code and could not investigate too
deeply, so it was hard to decide the real impact of the warning.
In the Fortify SCA survey, 5 of 6 users indicated that they understood the
warnings, but most still thought it was difficult to decide if a warnings was a bug.
In addition 5 of 6 users found it hard to distinguish between “Exploitable” and
“Suspicious” issues. Some users said they were conservative, rating as Exploitable
any issue for which a reasonable chance of failure existed.
Both FindBugs and Fortify SCA provide a clickable trace for each warning that
contains links to relevant parts of the code. FindBugs trace links to affected fields
and classes and the line where the warning occurs. Fortify SCA’s traces contained
a call hierarchy tracing the cause of each issue from the source (e.g., where a taint
enters the program) to the target where the vulnerability is exposed. Fortify SCA’s
traces were much longer than those in FindBugs and users relied more on the traces
in Fortify SCA to understand the warnings. One observation is that users often
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looked beyond the trace, referring to the type hierarchy or just doing a text search
to find out more about variables and types. Some users indicated that even after
going through the trace to confirm the warnings, they did not know whether to
trust the tools. Such users would spend some time trying to find a clue that might
suggest that the tool was wrong. One Fortify SCA user indicated that they were not
confident enough to rate any issues as Not an Issue (there was also one FindBugs
reviewer that did not rate any warnings as Not a Bug).
3.2.2 Study 2: Factors Influencing Review
This study focused on how some factors may influence a reviewer’s judgment
about the severity of a warning and the reviewer’s willingness to fix it. We looked
for correlations between these factors and reviewer responses to a checklist. Some
factors we could consider are:
• Displayed Priority: Is the reviewer more likely to take a warning more seriously
if the tool assigns a higher priority label or color to it?
• Order: Is a reviewer more skeptical about the initial warnings or the warnings
near the end of the review?
• Bug Pattern: Are certain types of warnings inherently more interesting to
reviewers?
• Context: Is the reviewer examining modules that have already been deployed
or modules that are still under development?
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• Impact: The impact of an unfixed issue could range from warning messages
sent to a log file, to serious logical errors.
• Perception (of the tool): Do reviewers assume that a tool’s analysis is correct
or do they try to verify assertions made by the tool? For example, if a tool
declares that a variable is null at a critical point in the code, do users inspect
the code to verify this or assume that the tool is correct?
If factors other than the bug pattern of an issue are influencing the reviews
of an issue, then organizations may need to consider these factors when adopting
policies to govern the use of static analysis. In this study, we considered the influence
of displayed priority, order of presentation, bug pattern and context. The only factor
we controlled directly is the bug pattern. The priority labels next to each warning,
and the order in which the warnings were presented was randomized. We focused on
FindBugs warnings associated with possible null pointer exceptions because these
tend to be unambiguous, but we were still able to consider a wide range of bug
patterns (see Table 3.9).
To review each warning, participants completed a checklist (shown in Table
3.10). The first checklist question tests the reviewer’s understanding of the FindBugs
warning. Our past research has indicated that most FindBugs warnings should be
easy to understand, but some users may feel they need more information (through
unit tests). This question also gives users the opportunity to quickly identify those
warnings they think are bogus, and hence avoid answering the other checklist ques-
tions. Users who do not understand the warning also skip the remaining checklist
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Table 3.9: Bug Patterns used in controlled study
Bug Pattern # of Issues
NP (Always Null): A NullPointerException is always thrown
when the referenced line is executed
3 (1 Fake)
NP (Null On Some Path): There is a path through the code
that, if executed, is guaranteed to throw a NullPointerException
2 (1 Fake)
NP (Null Parameter Dereference): A method call passes
null to an unconditionally dereferenced parameter
2
NP (Unwritten Field): An uninitialized field is read 1
PZLA: Prefer to return a zero-length array instead of null 1
RCN (Redundant Check for Null): Check of a value that is
known to be non-null. May indicate a logic error.
4 (1 Fake)
questions.
The four checklist questions that follow give reviewers multiple scales for mea-
suring the severity of the warning and the level of their response. Reviewers indicate
severity in terms of how often the issue occurs and how the issue affects code behav-
ior. Reviewers indicate the level of their response by indicating whether they would
fix the bug (and in what contexts) and whether they would filter this bug pattern
out of future reviews.
The checklist responses all range from strong responses (e.g., substantial de-
viation) to weak responses (e.g., minor deviation) to negative responses (e.g., no
deviation). This design is useful when we analyze the results because it allows us to
compare the different checklist questions (by considering only strongest responses,
for example).
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Table 3.10: Checklist Questions for each Issue
Issue Understanding: Which of the following statements best describes your understanding of
the problem?
• I have enough information to understand this problem
• I need to write a test case to better understand this issue
• I think this is a bogus issue which cannot occur and does not affect code behavior
• I do NOT understand this issue
Issue Occurrence: Under what circumstances can the behavior described by this issue occur?
• Under normal, intended use
• Only in situations that do not appear to be among intended use cases
• I do NOT think it can occur at all
Code Behavior: What is the apparent impact of the issue on the behavior of the code?
• It behaves in a way clearly at substantial odds with the intended behavior
• It does NOT behave as intended, but difference does NOT appear to be substantial
• No apparent difference in behavior
Fix Decision: What do you recommend? (Select all that apply)
• Definitely change the code to fix the problem
• Change the code only if risk of impacting deployed code is not high
• Change the documentation to make code clearer
• No changes necessary, code is OK
Filtering Decision: Would you want a static analysis tool to show you issues like this?
• Yes, definitely, even in old code
• OK, particularly in new code, or if there aren’t a lot of them
• I’d rather not bother looking at such issues
Finally we introduced some bogus warnings to see if reviewers would catch
these or trust the tool’s analysis. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrate some of the bo-
gus warnings that we inserted. In Figure 3.3, FindBugs incorrectly asserts that
argument will always be null when it is dereferenced in the if-statement. But careful
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inspection of the closed-circuit disjunction should convince the reader that argument
is dereferenced ONLY when it is NOT null. Still some reviewers may assume Find-
Bugs got its analysis correct, especially those who have reviewed a similar warning
in which the dereferenced variable was null due to programmer error. 
637 private void handleUidl( String argument ) {
638 //Return all messages unique ids
639 if( argument == null || argument.length() == 0 ) {
640 ...
642 }
643 }  
FindBugs: “Null pointer dereference of argument on line 639”
Figure 3.3: Bogus Warning – FindBugs incorrectly asserts that the deref-
erence of argument in the if-statement will throw a NullPointerException
Figure 3.4 is a more subtle and ambiguous bogus warning. FindBugs asserts
that the null-check on line 133 is redundant because listenAddress is known to be
non-null (because it was dereferenced on line 117). The FindBugs analysis misses the
assignment to listenAddress on line 132 which may return null (FindBugs does not
do interprocedural analysis so it usually cannot assert that this return value is non
null). But the FindBugs warning does not expressly state where listenAddress
is known to be non-null, so the reviewer may assume that FindBugs is doing an
interprocedural analysis to determine the nullness of the value on line 132. The
question is does the reviewer trust this interprocedural analysis (and hence remove
the redundant null-check), or does the reviewer conclude that the analysis may be
wrong. (Of course, the reviewer is free to drill down into the method call to try and
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 
116 InetAddress listenAddress = ...
117 if (listenAddress.isSiteLocalAddress())
118 isLocalRun = true;
119 try {
131 } catch (IOException e) {
132 listenAddress = getLocalHostAddress();
133 if( listenAddress != null ) {
134 address = listenAddress.getHostAddress();
135 }
136 }  
FindBugs: “Redundant nullcheck of listenAddress on line 133, which is known to be
non-null”
Figure 3.4: Bogus Warning – FindBugs incorrectly asserts that
listenAddress is known to be non-null because it was dereferenced
on line 117
make this determination.)
As with the last study, we recruited 12 students (11 graduate students and
1 undergraduate), 2 of which had experience with FindBugs. All participants saw
the same warnings and other variables were randomized. The application under
review was Java Email Server9 (Version 1.6.1) a SMTP and POP3 email server. The
application was modified to insert more warnings including some fake warnings. All
the inserted code was derived from real warnings seen in other applications.
Also as in the last study, participants were given a tutorial, followed by a
practice review, an untimed main session and a brief survey.
9http://ericdaugherty.com/java/mailserver/
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Table 3.11: Issue Understanding vs Bug Patterns
NP PZLA RCN Fake
Understand Real Bug 63 12 30 25
Understand with Test Case 4 0 2 2
Bogus Warning 5 0 3 9
Don’t Understand 0 0 1 0
NP = Potential Null Pointer Dereference
PZLA = Prefer zero-length array
RCN = Redundant Check for Null
3.2.2.1 General Results
Most of our analysis focus on the four review questions, not on the issue
understanding question. As Table 3.11 shows, most users understood most of the
issues. In the case where a user rated an issue as a bogus warning, the negative
response is automatically entered for the four review questions. One observation is
that the 3 fake warnings received a bogus warning only 9 out of 36 times. But as
our discussion in Section 3.2.2.3 will reveal, reviewers did not appear to be fooled by
the fake warnings based on their responses to the other checklist questions. The low
count on the issue understanding question likely indicates that users misunderstood
the question and assumed it only referred to how much they understood the static
analysis warning.
3.2.2.2 Consistency of reviews
There are two types of consistency we are interested in. One is the consistency
across reviewers for each checklist question; in other words, how much do reviewers
67
agree with each other when they review an issue. The second is the consistency
across checklist questions; in other words, do reviewers tend to give a strong response
on one question but a weak or negative response on another question for the same
issue.
To consider the consistency across reviewers, we count the number of times
they agree for each question and issue in Table 3.12. (For example, the table shows
that 8 reviewers agreed on the issue occurrence decision question for the first issue.)
In 30 of the 52 cases, 8 or more reviewers agreed, and all issues had at least one
question in which 8 or more reviewers agreed. But only three issues had 8 or more
agreements for all questions (issues 2, 7 and 8). This highlights the idea that the
consistency across reviewers for a particular issue depends on what question they
are trying to answer. For example, all users agree that issue 10 (a redundant check
for null) does not cause deviation from intended behavior, but are split on whether
to fix or filter this issue.
Table 3.12 also supports our investigation into the consistency across check-
list questions by shading each cell to indicate which answer reviewers are agreeing
on. The dark shade represents agreement at the strongest level, the light shade
represents agreement at the middle level, and the absence of shading represents
agreement at the weakest level. The results show agreement at the strongest level
for most questions among the real issues and agreement at the weakest level for the
fake issues (issues 2, 4 and 11, at the bottom of the table). The exception is with
the redundant check for null issues (10 - 13) where users rate the issues as normally
occurring, but give weak responses to the other questions.
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Table 3.12: Level of Agreement for Each Issue
Issue # Occurs Behavior Fix Filter
1 8 7 8 8
3 6 9 11 10
5 8 10 8 7
6 5 7 7 8
7 8 8 8 8
8 10 12 10 11
9 10 5 7 7
10 7 12 6 6
12 5 8 6 6
13 8 7 8 6
2 10 11 10 9
4 8 8 7 4
11 6 12 7 7
Another way we measure consistency across checklist questions is to count the
number of reviews in which all four questions got exactly the same level of review.
Out of 156 reviews, 82 (or 53%) presented exactly the same level of response for all
four questions, and 123 (or 79%) had all questions at the same level or off by one.
Another measure we use is Pearson’s correlation coefficient for each pair of
questions for all reviews (see Table 3.13). To enable this, we encode the checklist
responses numerically from 3 to 1 with 3 representing strongest responses. While
this is not a perfect measure, the high positive correlations do suggest that most
reviews were consistent across questions.
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Table 3.13: Correlation Coefficients for Checklist Responses
Occurs Behavior Fix Filter
Occurs 1 .69 .75 .75
Behavior 1 .80 .80
Fix 1 .75
Filter 1
3.2.2.3 Factors Affecting Reviews
In this section we consider how different bug patterns, displayed priorities and
presentation orders affect the reviews of issues. One way to do this is to consider
the number of strong responses for each factor level relative to the number of strong
responses across all factor levels.
Consider Table 3.14, where the columns represent different bug pattern groups
and the rows represent the number of strong responses for each checklist question.
The last column (labeled Agg) aggregates the number of strong responses across all
bug patterns for each question. For example, 83 out of 156 reviews (53%) gave strong
responses to the Issue Occurrence question. We go on to calculate the proportion of
reviews giving strong responses for each bug pattern group. For example, 44 out of
72 reviews (61%) for the NP bug pattern group gave strong responses to the Issue
Occurrence question. To test the significance of this relative to the overall strong
response rate of 53%, we do a chi test comparing the number of strong responses
(44) and remaining responses (28) to the expected value for these two quantities
(based on the overall rate). In Table 3.14, we indicate the result of the chi test with
a blue-shaded (+) or a red-shaded (-) if the ratio for the bug pattern is significantly
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Table 3.14: Strongest Checklist Reviews vs Bug Pattern Groups
NP PZLA RCN Fake Agg
# of Reviews 72 12 36 36 156
Normally Occurs 44 10 20 9 83
chi-test (p < 0.05) N (+) N (-) 53%
Substantial Deviation 53 3 9 4 69
chi-test (p < 0.05) (+) N (-) (-) 44%
Always Fix 52 3 10 5 70
chi-test (p < 0.05) (+) N (-) (-) 45%
Always Show 52 5 10 8 75
chi-test (p < 0.05) (+) N (-) (-) 48%
greater than or less than the ratio for all bug patterns respectively, or with N if
there is no significant difference. The chi test is limited because the size of some
factors is quite small, but this allows us to visualize some general trends. We are
also assuming the factor levels are independent of each other.
The results in Table 3.14 indicate an effect due to the bug pattern group:
NP issues were more likely to receive strong responses while RCN and Fake issues
were less likely to receive strong responses. We can further break down the NP bug
group into distinct bug patterns. Table 3.15 shows that the Always Null and Read
of Unwritten Field patterns had many strong responses, while the Null on Some
Path and Dereference of Null parameter had fewer strong responses. The low count
of strong responses for Fake issues indicates that users were not fooled by the fake
issues and did not assume the analysis was correct.
Table 3.16 shows another analysis, this time with the priority label displayed
next to each issue. The results indicate that while the rate of strong responses was
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Table 3.15: Strongest Checklist Reviews vs NP Patterns
Always Null on Param Unwritten
Null Some Path Deref Field
# of Reviews 24 12 24 12
Normally Occurs 13 8 13 10
chi-test (p < 0.05) N N N (+)
Subst. Deviation 16 10 15 12
chi-test (p < 0.05) (+) (+) N (+)
Always Fix 19 8 15 10
chi-test (p < 0.05) (+) N N (+)
Always Show 18 7 16 11
chi-test (p < 0.05) (+) N N (+)
Table 3.16: Strongest Checklist Reviews vs Displayed Priority
High Normal Low
# of Reviews 58 46 52
Normally Occurs 28 27 28
chi-test (p < 0.05) N N N
Substantial Deviation 28 23 18
chi-test (p < 0.05) N N N
Always Fix 29 22 19
chi-test (p < 0.05) N N N
Always Show 29 24 22
chi-test (p < 0.05) N N N
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slightly higher for issues with a high priority label, the difference does not appear
to be significant. Similarly, when we construct a table in which columns represent
all strong responses for a particular index in the presentation order, we observe no
significant difference due to ordering.
3.2.2.4 Comparison with Expert Participants
We compared the results from the student participants to results from more
experienced participants. These experienced reviewers are real FindBugs users,
recruited from a FindBugs-interest mailing list, and asked to perform the study re-
motely using a Java Web Start interface to access the warnings and submit their
reviews. In other words, the more experienced users were not in a controlled envi-
ronment, but their opinions are solicited to compare with the student users.
The Java Web Start interface had some limitations. Users could not drill down
into the source code to get more details and some users had trouble starting the
interface. This expert review served as a test drive of the automated review system
that we used in our larger study, described soon in Section 3.3.
The patterns observed among experts was generally similar to that of regular
participants. In other words, NP warnings were rated more strongly, and users were
not fooled by fake warnings. (The experts’ study did not randomize the order or
displayed priority.) Reviews were also consistent among participants.
Experts gave strong responses at a slightly lower rate than regular participants,
though this was not statistically significant except for the Issue Occurrence question.
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On the other hand, experts selected the “Always Show” filtering decision at a slightly
higher rate, though also not statistically significant.
3.2.2.5 Qualitative Feedback from Reviewers
Most participants indicated in the post experiment survey that the warnings
were generally easy to understand and were not new to users. This is not surprising
since the warnings selected, and FindBugs warnings in general, tend to refer to
simple errors. Users were more split about whether it was easy to decide if an issue
was a bug or if it should be fixed. Half the users said it was easy to decide both of
these properties, while the rest disagreed or were indifferent. One user commented
that for some warnings (like the redundant null check warnings) it was difficult to
decide whether to fix or not, because he was concerned about possible side effects in
other parts of the code. Half the users also indicated that the displayed priority did
not influence their review, though some users complained that the color coding for
priority labels (red, orange and yellow) made it hard to distinguish between them.
3.2.2.6 Threats to Validity
Lab studies like this always have an external validity problem; it is unclear
how much the results generalize. This is particularly pronounced in studies of static
analysis warnings because, as our results indicate, the choice of bug patterns af-
fects the responses received. We also believe that in practice some of the checklist
responses would be impacted by factors not considered in this study including the
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policies of the reviewer’s organization.
3.2.3 Summary
Users consistently identified certain bug patterns as severe, and others as low
impact. The difference of opinions between users was not great, though some users
erred in some of their reviews. So though some users may disagree about the severity
of a problem, this disagreement was not pronounced in our study. We will have an
opportunity to compare this outcome with the results of a larger study in the next
section.
Users reviewed warnings fairly quickly, which indicates that it would not be
too costly to ask engineers in a real company to review FindBugs warnings in their
own code. Indeed, engineers may review warnings faster because they are more
familiar with the code. These results may not generalize to other static analysis
tools and contexts.
Most users did not appear to make any mistakes in their understanding of
the warnings. When mistakes occurred, it may have been because the error path
went through many procedures, or the user was not rigorous enough. This problem
of rigor may not occur if the user is reviewing code they wrote, but it is certainly
possible for static analysis to mislead a third party reviewer, especially if some
unusual aspect of the code is inserted intentionally and no comment is provided.
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3.3 FindBugs Community Reviews
Now we shift gears and try to draw significant quantitative trends from hav-
ing hundreds of reviewers evaluate thousands of warnings. Ideally, we would like to
observe users as they review warnings, and control for various factors. But to con-
duct a large review, we have to rely on professionals whose main priority is ensuring
that their code is high quality, not conducting a research study. Furthermore, many
potential users may have various confidentiality concerns. In particular, software
companies generally do not want information about their bugs being published.
Hence we have to propose activities that support the needs and goals of a large
organization, while also allowing us to extracted some (limited) information that
can inform our research.
Apart from giving us significant trends, these reviews also provide an opportu-
nity to demonstrate the value of static analysis to developers and managers. Some
professionals are skeptical about static analysis tools, and believe that most warn-
ings are not worth fixing. But this perception may not hold if they spend time
reviewing warnings in code they have written and find interesting problems.
3.3.1 The Google FindBugs Fixit
FindBugs has been used in some capacity at Google for several years. Early
incarnations of the process at Google integrated FindBugs warnings into a tool called
BugBot, along with warnings from other tools. This system would periodically
analyze the code base, and display warnings on a web interface that was available
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to all developers. As Google sought to improve its process, the static analysis
champions adopted a service model for a brief period. During this period, warnings
were centrally triaged and important defects were forwarded to the appropriate
developers. This approach allowed the static analysis team to get a sense of which
warnings were important to developers, and to reprioritize warnings accordingly.
By the end of this process, they had created an internal ranking for warnings. But
this approach did not scale as Google’s code base grew. So it was abandoned and
an effort to push warnings into the code review process was started. We discuss
the process Google has employed in more detail when we discuss best practices in
Section 7.4.
By Fall of 2008 the full vision had not yet been realized, and had run into
some roadblocks. There were still thousands of unreviewed warnings in the code
base, and it was clear that FindBugs was receiving limited use. In addition, there
were many skeptics about the value of static analysis, and many of the warnings
were perceived to be low priority. The system fell into disuse, and the engineers
supporting the system were reassigned to other tasks.
So what was the problem with the experience up to that point? Perhaps the
warnings from FindBugs were not of high enough value or relevance to users. Or
perhaps more infrastructure support was needed to make static analysis worthwhile.
In particular, warnings needed to be more readily available to developers, so they
could review them without significant additional effort beyond their normal workflow
to run the static analysis or organize the warnings. The presence of many low
priority issues also indicates that the ranking process for warnings needed to be
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refined. Finally, the system needed better integration with existing bug reporting
system and source code repositories, so that users could easily investigate warnings
and assign them to other developers.
Despite these disappointing outcomes, we still believed FindBugs could provide
value to the development process. We decided to coordinate with some engineers
and managers to pursue a relaunch of FindBugs, with the following goals:
• Perform a broad review of which issues Google engineers thought were worth
reviewing, and keep a persistent record of the classifications of individual is-
sues. We used the techniques implemented in FindBugs and described in [129]
to track issues across different builds of the software so that we could identify
issues that were new and track reviews of previously seen issues.
• Deploy a new infrastructure that would allow for very efficient review of issues
matching specified search criteria. Engineers could search for issues within a
particular project, issues that were introduced recently, issues that have a high
bug rank, and other reviews of a particular issue.
• Allow FindBugs to be run in continuous builds in a way that could be checked
against records of which issues were new and which had already been examined
and marked as unimportant. This would allow projects to choose to have their
continuous builds fail when a new, high priority and unreviewed FindBugs
issue was introduced into their code base.
• Integrate FindBugs with Google’s internal bug tracking and source code ver-
sion control system, so that developers could easily file bugs, see the status of
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bugs that had already been filed against issues, and see the version history of
a file.
• Collect copious data from the use of FindBugs so that we could evaluate how
it was being used.
On May 13-14, Google held a global fixit for FindBugs. Google has a tradition
of company-wide engineering fixits [100], during which engineers focus on some
specific problem or technique for improving its systems. A fixit might focus on
improving web accessibility, on internal testing, on removing TODO’s from internal
software, etc. The primary focus of the FindBugs fixit was to have engineers use
the new infrastructure, evaluate some of the issues found, and decide which issues,
if any, needed fixing.
Most of the infrastructure developed for the Google FindBugs fixit was con-
tributed to the open source FindBugs effort. Significant parts of it are specific to
Google’s internal system (such as integration with Google’s internal bug tracking
tool), but some of these capabilities have been extended into a general framework
that can be used by other companies and by open source efforts.
3.3.2 Planning the Fixit
The Google fixit was primarily an engineering effort rather than a controlled
research study. Engineers from dozens of offices across Google contributed to this
effort. Developers were free to choose to review any of the issues, and were given no
guidance on how to classify warnings. And while the primary focus of the fixit was
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Table 3.17: User Classifications
Must Fix Should Fix I Will Fix
Needs Study Mostly Harmless Not a Bug
Bad Analysis Obsolete code
over a two day period, a number of engineers had early access to the system, and
usage continues, at a lower rate, since the fixit. Nevertheless, this effort provided a
rich dataset of user opinions, as well as information on which issues were fixed. The
results reported in this chapter cover all the data collected through the end of June
2009.
During the fixit, users ran FindBugs from a web interface which launched a
Java Web Start instance that contained all the warnings and was connected to a
central database. Users could classify each issue using one of the classifications in
Table 3.17, and could also enter comments. Reviews were stored in the database
each time the user selected a classification. Users could also easily create an entry in
Google’s bug tracking system; many fields were populated automatically to facilitate
this task.
The FindBugs infrastructure is designed to encourage communal reviews –
each user reviewing an issue can see reviews on that issue from other users. However,
during the two day fixit, the interface was modified slightly such that a user initially
could not see any other reviews of an issue, or whether a bug report had been filed.
Once the user entered a review for a particular issue, this information was provided.
This setup was intended to ensure that reviewers were mostly acting independently
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when classifying issues.
Engineers were not required to complete a certain number of reviews, but in-
centives, such as t-shirts for top reviewers, were provided to encourage more reviews.
Incentives were also used to encourage users to provide detailed comments exploring
the impact of the bug in practice.
Prior to analyzing the data from the fixit, we anonymized certain confidential
details, such as file names, reviewer identities, and any comments provided by en-
gineers. Anonymization was done using one-way hashing functions so that it is still
possible to group issues from the same file or package, or to identify all reviews by
the same engineer.
We also captured the change histories of the files containing warnings, and
information about which engineers owned each file. This information allows us to
compare the reviews from file owners with those from non-owners. Within Google,
any change to a source file requires a code review from someone who is an owner for
the file. In general, all developers on a project are owners for all source files that
comprise that project.
This study enabled us to compare the reviews provided by users for each issue
with the severity suggested by FindBugs. As I mentioned earlier, FindBugs assigns a
priority (high, medium, low) to each warning based on the severity of the associated
problem. The priority allows users to compare two issues of the same bug pattern,
but cannot be used to compare issues across different bug patterns. To facilitate
this latter comparison, we recently started ranking warnings on a scale from 1 to
20, where 1 is assigned to the “scariest” issues. For this study, we only consider
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issues ranked 1 to 12, and we refer to issues ranked 1-4 as being in the Scariest
group, while issues ranked 5-8 are in the Scary group, and issues ranked 9-12 are
in the Troubling group. This bug rank is subjective and based on our experience
reviewing warnings in practice over the last few years. In addition to the severity
and impact of the issue, the bug rank factors in the likelihood that the underlying
mistake may be quickly found when the code is executed. For example, an Infinite
Recursive Loop occurs when a method unconditionally calls itself. We find that in
practice, this bug pattern is either found quickly (because the program crashes with
a meaningful stack trace), or it occurs in dead code. So we give it a reduced bug
rank.
In the end, this study produced a large dataset with many variables. Most of
our analysis focused on looking for correlations between variables, especially with
the user classification. In some cases, we can only imprecisely infer the action we
are trying to measure. For example, to determine if an issue has been fixed we can
confirm that the issue is no longer flagged by the latest FindBugs runs, or we can
search the bug tracking system for a corresponding report that is marked as fixed.
The former approach would contain false positives, while the latter would contain
false negatives.
3.3.3 General Results
The fixit brought many issues to the attention of developers and managers,
and many problems were fixed. Table 3.18 overviews some high level numbers from
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Issues with exactly 1 review 1680
Median reviews per issue 2
Total reviewers 282
Bug reports filed 1746
Reviews of issues with bug reports 6050
Bug reports with FIXED status 640
this review. More than 700 engineers ran FindBugs from dozens of offices, and 282
of them reviewed almost 4,000 issues. There were over 10,000 reviews, and most
issues (58%) received more than 1 review. Engineers submitted changes that made
more than 1,000 of the issues go away. Engineers filed more than 1,700 bug reports,
and 640 of these had fixed status by the time we stopped collecting data on June
25, 2009. Many of the unfixed bug reports were never assigned to an appropriate
individual, which turned out to be a difficult challenge and a key step in getting
defect reports attended to.
The choice of which issue to review was left up to the user, so it is interesting
to see which issues they chose to review (Figure 3.5). Reviewers overwhelmingly
focused on issues in the Correctness category, with 71% of reviewed issues in this
category compared to just 17% for issues from other categories, which matches our
expectations that these are the issues most interesting to users. We identified 288
reviews in which the engineer was identified in the changelist as one of the owners of
the file containing the issue; most users were reviewing code they did not own. We
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Figure 3.5: Recommendations Grouped by Bug Rank and Category
talk more about the differences between code reviewed by owners and non-owners
in Section 3.3.8.
Figure 3.5 also shows the percentage of reviews that received Must Fix and
Should Fix classifications. Over 77% of reviews were Must Fix and Should Fix
classifications, and 87% of reviewed issues received at least one fix recommendation.
Scarier issues were more likely to receive a Must Fix designation, while lower ranked
issues were more likely to receive a Should Fix designation. Meanwhile, Correctness
and Security issues were viewed as the most serious. We explore these trends in
more detail in the next section.
3.3.4 Comparing Reviews with Bug Rank
One of our goals is to compare the classifications users provide for an issue
with the bug rank of the issue. Are the scariest issues more likely to receive a Must
Fix classification? We approach this problem by clustering reviews into groups,
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Figure 3.6: Correlating Bug Ranks with Reviewer Classifications
with all issues in each group having the same bug rank. We can then compute
the percentage of reviews in each group that have a particular classification, and
correlate these percentages with the bug rank of the group. We use Spearman’s
rank-order coefficient because the bug rank is an ordinal variable. This method
converts values into ranks within the variables before computing the correlation
coefficient [27].
We experimented with several approaches to grouping reviews for this com-
parison:
Group By Issue: In this clustering, we can put all reviews of a particular issue in
one group. This provides the finest level of grouping for this method, but
can be very noisy since some issues will only receive one or two reviews. We
can mitigate this a little, by only considering those issues with more than a
threshold of reviews. Grouping at this level is interesting because it separates
out each independent issue, and allows us to identify issues that buck the
expected trend.
Group By Bug Pattern: This clustering groups all reviews of the same bug pattern
and bug rank. Some bug patterns produce issues in different bug ranks, de-
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pending on the variety and inferred severity of the issue. Again, grouping at
this level allows us to identify bug patterns that have unexpectedly strong or
weak user classifications.
Group By Bug Rank: This coarse clustering creates 12 groups, one for each bug
rank. This will give us the high level trends describing how bug rank correlates
with user classifications.
Figure 3.6 presents correlations between the bug rank and the percent of re-
views that received a particular classification when issues are grouped by bug rank,
by bug pattern and by issue. For example, we measure a strong negative correlation
(-0.93) when issues are grouped by bug rank and we compare the bug rank and the
percent of issues in each group that received a Must Fix designation. The results
show that when we cluster issues coarsely (by bug rank), we observe strong and
significant (p<0.01) correlations with different classifications. Specifically, reviews
associated with scarier issues are more likely to contain Must Fix classifications,
while review for less scary issues are more likely to contain Should Fix or Mostly
Harmless classifications.
When we group reviews by bug pattern, we observe similar correlations, but
they are very weak and not statistically significant. This indicates that there must
be some bug patterns that deviate from the expected trend. To explore this deeper,
consider the scatter diagram in Figure 3.7. In this diagram, each marker represents
a bug pattern, its position on the x-axis represents the bug rank assigned to that
bug pattern, and its position on the y-axis represents the percentage of reviews in
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Figure 3.7: Must Fix Classifications By Rank
that bug pattern that were Must Fix. The diagram visualizes a weak negative trend,
with many deviations from the norm. Specifically there are some bug patterns that
have severe bug ranks but low Must Fix rates, and vice versa.
Looking more closely at the individual bug patterns, this trend may be par-
tially explained by a distinction between two types of bug patterns, which we call
Loud and Silent bug patterns. Loud bug patterns manifest as an exception or a pro-
gram crash, and are often easy to detect without static analysis if they are feasible.
So these defects, when found in production software, generally occur in infeasible
situations or dead code; FindBugs generally assigns a less severe bug rank to them.
Silent bug patterns include those mistakes that cause the program to subtly run
incorrectly. Many times, these subtle errors do not matter, but sometimes they do,
and we think they should be reviewed. So FindBugs often gives this patterns a
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Table 3.19: Reviews for Two Silent and Two Loud Bug Patterns
Rank Bug Pattern % Must Fix % Should Fix
1 No relationship between generic parame-
ter and method argument
30% 48%
1 Suspicious reference comparison 15% 68%
5 Null pointer dereference 35% 33%
9 An apparent infinite recursive loop 52% 34%
severe bug rank.
In many cases in our review, engineers were more inclined to give a Must Fix
classification to loud issues than to silent issues. Consider the examples in Table
3.19; the first two bug patterns are severely ranked silent patterns, while the last two
are lower ranked loud patterns. One of the loud bug patterns is the infinite recursive
loop: a method that, when invoked, always invokes itself recursively until the stack
is exhausted. Sun’s JDK has had more than a dozen such issues over its history,
and Google’s codebase has had more than 80 of them. Obviously this bug pattern is
usually detected immediately if the method is ever called, and there are no known
instances of this defect causing problems in production; either the defect is quickly
removed or it occurs in dead code. So FindBugs assigns this bug pattern a less severe
bug rank of 9. On the flip side, a classic silent pattern occurs when the type of an
argument of a generic container’s method is unrelated to the container’s generic
parameter. For example, a program may check to see if a Collection<String>
contains a StringBuffer. Such a check will always return false, and this error usually
indicates a typo has occurred. This bug pattern has the bug rank of 1.
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As Table 3.19 shows, 52% of reviews classified infinite recursive loops as Must
Fix, compared to 30% for the incompatible generic container argument pattern.
Similarly, a suspicious reference comparison (which uses the == operator instead of
equals()) has a low must-fix rate of 15%. But notice that both silent bug patterns
have much higher should-fix rates. This suggests that reviewers were more alarmed
by the loud warnings, giving them severe reviews, but were content to give the silent
issues less severe reviews. I talk more about the distinction between loud and silent
warnings in the next chapter, in Section 4.2, focusing on how they persist in the
code repository.
There is largely no correlation when we group by issue, which is not surprising.
Individual issues may display different characteristics from the bug pattern as a
whole.
3.3.5 Fix Rates from the Fixit
Ultimately researchers and managers at Google would like to see issues get
fixed, and understand which groups of issues are more likely to be fixed. This
information can influence how warnings are filtered or presented to developers. As
we mentioned earlier, it is difficult to get a precise count of the issues that are fixed.
We can count the issues that stop appearing in FindBugs runs, but this leads to an
overcount since some warnings will be removed by code churn. In Section 5.2, we
describe an experimental approach that uses Noise bug patterns to try to separate
significant removal rates from code churn. The noise detectors were not used during
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the fixit, and this technique only applies to our analysis of the Google codebase.
The other approach for computing fix rate is to look for fixes in the bug
tracking system. This only applies to data from the fixit. Unfortunately, not all
issues fixed during the fixit were tracked in the bug tracking system; developers were
not required to use it, and may have quickly fixed simple issues on their own.
In addition to considering the overall fix rate, and the fix rate for individual
bug patterns, we are interested in examining different subgroups of issues that we
suspect are likely to be fixed at higher rates. Specifically, we group issues in the
following ways and consider the fix rates in each group:
By Category: Do issues in the Correctness category have a higher fix rate than other
issues?
By Bug Rank: Do the scariest issues have a higher fix rate than other issues?
By Age: Do newer issues have a higher fix rate than older issues?
The last grouping reflects the fact that older issues are more likely to be in
code that has been battle-tested. Any significant issues in this code are likely to be
removed, and the issues left should largely have little impact on program behavior.
Of course, there is no bright line separating old issues from new issues; we simply
consider any issues introduced in the six weeks before the fixit as being new.
In Table 3.20, we compute the percentage of issues that are fixed for all issues,
and for different sub-groups of issues. In this case, we regard issues that no longer
appear in the nightly FindBugs runs as being fixed (i.e., issues that were “last seen”
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before the end of our study). As we mentioned earlier, this approach over-counts
the number of fixed issues, but since our primary goal is to compare the fix rates of
different sub groups, this over counting is not a factor.
In Table 3.20, each row represents a different subgroup, derived by grouping
issues by bug rank, by age, and/or by category. Specifically, in the category column,
we either consider only Correctness issues (C) or all categories (blank). Similarly
the rank column uses the marker “1-4” to indicate that we are only considering
the scariest issues (and blank for all bug ranks). For this analysis, we treat issues
introduced in the six weeks prior to the fixit (and any issues after the fixit) as
new issues. The choice of six weeks is arbitrary but the results still hold even if
the range is adjusted slightly. The other columns in Table 3.20 starting from the
leftmost column are the fix rate, the number of issues in the subgroup that remain
at the end of our study and the number of issues that have been removed (fixed).
The last row represents the overall fix rate.
The results show that all subgroups have fix rates higher than the overall
fix rate, though only the first four subgroups have statistically significantly higher
values at the p<0.01 level10. This indicates that Correctness issues, the scariest
issues, and/or new issues are more likely to be fixed. The older Correctness issues
do not have a much higher rate, likely because most issues were in this subgroup.
Another way to determine if an issue has been fixed is to look for fixes in the
bug tracking system. We did not observe any significant trends using this approach,
10To measure statistical significance, we used a chi-square test comparing the fix rate for each
subgroup to the overall fix rate.
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% remain fixed rank new category
65.0 295 548 +
64.5 252 457 + C
59.8 227 338 1-4
58.5 225 317 1-4 C
57.9 90 124 1-4 +
56.7 88 115 1-4 + C
53.0 1435 1617 C
52.7 1870 2084
Table 3.20: Last Seen Fix Rate for Issue Subgroups
likely because at the end of our study, many of the issues filed had been assigned but
not yet fixed. The fix rates for each subgroup were much lower than the fix rates
in Table 3.20 (ranging from 34% to 39%), reflecting the fact that this approach
undercounts the number of fixed issues.
3.3.5.1 Comparing Fix Rate to User Reviews
We would like to check if the issues that received many Must Fix and Should
Fix classifications were more likely to be fixed. One approach is to order the classifi-
cations according to their severity and compare this to the fix rate of each classifica-
tion. There is no absolute notion of ordering the classifications, so we experimented
with several, shown in Table 3.21.
We observed strong and significant (p<0.01) correlations, shown in Figure 3.8,
between some of our orderings and the percentage of issues in each classification that
were fixed. In other words, issues with the most severe classifications were more
likely to have been fixed. In this figure, we are using both approaches described
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Figure 3.8: User Classifications versus Fix Rate
earlier to determine which issues have been fixed.
In particular, issues that received I Will Fix classifications were quickly fixed.
Since each issue received multiple classifications, we use the classification that the
plurality of reviewers gave to each issue (called the consensus classification in Section
3.3.6). The results show that 88% of the reported issues marked I Will Fix have
been fixed. Even when we consider those issues marked I Will Fix at least once
(i.e., not necessarily the plurality of reviewers) we observe that over 70% have been
fixed.
3.3.6 Consensus Classifications
We would also like to investigate if there is consensus between independent
reviews of the same issue. Obviously the classifications made by users are subjective,
but if users tend to give similar classifications to each issue, then we have more
confidence in their decisions. In the lab studies discussed earlier, we observed that
independent reviewers generally are consistent about how they review issues. The
issue of consistency is related to the question of whether an organization should
have multiple reviewers for each issue, or just allow individuals to make decisions,
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especially about filtering out or suppressing issues. In our earlier surveys, most
respondents have indicated that their organizations do not have requirements on
how many reviewers should look at an issue before it can be addressed (fixed or
suppressed).
Unlike some of our earlier lab studies we do not control who reviews each issue.
Some issues have only one reviewer, but one issue has 25, and users choose which
issue they want to review. Still the large number of reviews allows us to make some
general observations about how often users agree with each other.
Another confounding factor is that some of the classifications are very close
in meaning and each reviewer may use different criteria to choose between them.
For example Must Fix and Should Fix are close in meaning, and reviewers may
have different opinions about which issues are Mostly Harmless and which are Not a
Bug. Other classifications such as Obsolete code and Needs study are orthogonal to
the primary classifications and do not necessarily signal disagreement. (Fortunately
there are few of these classifications.) Our method for studying consensus accounts
for these problems by grouping the classifications in different ways, using the schemes
shown in Table 3.21. For example, in the Ord3 ordering, we group Must Fix, Should
Fix and I Will Fix classifications into one class, Mostly Harmless into another, and
Not a Bug and Bad Analysis into a third; reviews with other classifications are left
out of the analysis.
Once the reviews are grouped based on their classifications, we count the num-
ber of reviews in each group for each issue. We used two methods to aggregate these
counts and get a sense of the overall consensus. One is to count the number of re-
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Table 3.21: Grouping and Ordering User Classifications
Classification Ord1 Ord2 Ord3 Ord4
Must Fix 1 2 1 1
Should Fix 2 3 1 2
I Will Fix 3 1 1
Needs Study 4 4
Mostly Harmless 5 5 2 3
Not a Bug 6 6 3 4
Bad Analysis 7 7 3
Obsolete code 8 8
views in the largest group for each issue (which we term the Consensus Group),
aggregate this count over all issues, and divide this final number by the total num-
ber of reviews in the analysis. We call this the Consensus Rate (or the rate at which
reviews end up in the consensus group). A second method is to compute the con-
sensus rate for each issue (i.e., reviews in largest group divided by total number of
reviews), and count the number of issues that have a consensus rate above a desired
threshold. In Figure 3.9 we show these two measures, using a threshold of 0.8 for
the second measure and using some of the classification schemes from Table 3.21.
For example, when using the Ord3 scheme described above, we observe a consensus
rate of 0.87 for all reviews, and 73% of all issues have a consensus rate greater than
0.8. The consensus rate increases significantly when we group similar classifications
as is done in Ord3 and Ord4. We use this to infer that users generally agree, but
the subjective nature of the review means they do not always give exactly the same
classification.
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Figure 3.9: Consensus Rates for All and Scariest Issues
3.3.7 Review Times
The review time is an important measure when trying to compute the cost of
using static analysis. In previously discussed lab studies, we observed a relatively
low average review time between 1 to 2 minutes for each issue (Section 3.2.1). A
large study like this one gives us another opportunity to characterize how much time
users spend reviewing issues. Nailing down representative review times is difficult
because review times can vary widely for different issues and our users are not
starting a stopwatch immediately before each review and stopping it immediately
after.
In past studies, we have estimated review time as the time between each evalu-
ation. In this study, this is complicated by the fact that users are not in a controlled
environment and may not use the period between each evaluation exclusively for
reviewing warnings. They may engage in other work activities, take a phone call,
go out for lunch or even go home for the day returning the next day to continue
evaluating warnings. A histogram showing the frequencies of review times shows
many issues have low review times under 30 seconds, and some issues have very long
96
review times. Closer inspection indicates that some users may have reviewed several
issues together, giving their classifications all at once. In the end, we chose to filter
out review times that were longer than 1 hour. This still left us with about 92% of
the review times for analysis.
Another complication is that each time a user selects a classification in the
drop down button or enters a comment, a timestamp is sent to our server. So a user
can change their classification multiple times during one review, either because they
accidentally clicked on the wrong review, or because they genuinely changed their
mind. In the data there were 2001 classifications that were duplicates of existing
reviews (i.e., the same reviewer and the same issue) usually within a few seconds of
each other. To deal with this problem, we filter out many of the duplicate reviews
for each issue and person, keeping only the last review, and any preceding reviews
that have a different classification and occur more than 5 seconds before the review
that immediately follows.
We computed a mean review time of 117 seconds which matches our previous
observations. We also grouped the review times by classifications and observed that
the Obsolete Code classification had the lowest review time at 64 seconds. Closer
inspection confirms that some users quickly dispatched issues that occurred in files
that were obsolete. Removing these reviews from consideration does not significantly
impact the review time however.
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3.3.8 Reviews from Different User Groups
The fixit dataset includes anonymized information about which user conducted
each review and which users are listed as owners of different files. Using this infor-
mation we can infer which users performed the most reviews (the super users) and
we can track how users reviewed issues in files that they own.
The top reviewer examined 882 issues, and 18 out of the 282 users reviewed
more than a hundred issues. We classified these users as super users and compared
the classifications they gave with those of other users. Similarly, we compared the
classifications of owners with that of non owners, focusing just on the issues that
were reviewed by at least one owner. We observed the super users were significantly
more likely to give Must Fix classifications and significantly less likely to say I Will
Fix. On the other hand owners were much more likely to say I Will Fix or Obsolete
code than non-owners, and much less likely to give Must Fix classifications. This
suggests that owners were taking responsibility for fixing serious issues in their code.
It also suggests that most super users were not owners and vice versa. Only seven
of the super users owned any of the files they reviewed.
3.3.9 Summary of Lessons from the Fixit
Overall, the fixit was declared a success, and some managers were impressed
by the high percentage of the reviews that gave a fix recommendation. Researchers
at Google have started improving the supporting infrastructure, including an effort
to integrate FindBugs warnings into the code review process, and some developers
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already run the analysis regularly through their IDEs.
The primary goal of the review was to bring problems to the attention of
responsible parties, but we were also able to collect large amounts of data which
we investigated in this section. We observed that most reviews recommended fixing
the underlying issue. We also observed that the importance placed on warnings by
developers matched the bug ranks in FindBugs, but some bug patterns deviated from
this norm. Specifically, users tended to overvalue some bug patterns that manifest
as exceptions or program crashes (loud bug patterns), but are rarely feasible in
practice, and undervalue more subtle bug patterns (silent bug patterns) that are
often harmless, but should be reviewed because they can cause serious problems
that are hard to detect. In the end, we chose to NOT modify FindBugs’ rankings in
response to these observations. This is because FindBugs’ rankings aim to emphasize
those issues that should be reviewed first, not necessarily those issues that should
be fixed. Since we observe that many loud bug patterns are readily fixed if they
matter, we use the rankings to encourage users to review the subtle issues first.
We also observed that new, correctness and high priority issues are the ones
most likely to be fixed, matching our expectations coming into this study. Users were
also more likely to fix the issues that were classified as Must Fix, Should Fix, or I Will
Fix. Finally, our analysis indicates that there was consistency among independent
reviewers, and that most reviews were completed fairly quickly, validating our earlier
findings from lab studies.
One surprising outcome was that we did not find any problems that were
actively wreaking havoc in production systems, or the proverbial “million dollar
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bug”. We think this has to do with the robust monitoring systems at Google, and
this seems to reinforce our belief that many critical defects are eventually found by
other quality assurance activities, though perhaps at greater expense than if static
analysis is used. I discuss this observation in more detail in the next chapter, in
Section 4.3.
3.4 Summary and Related Work
The user interactions in this chapter indicate that static analysis is well re-
ceived by many users. Users have stated that static analysis has found useful prob-
lems, and is easy to use. And when asked to review thousands of issues flagged by
FindBugs, professional engineers recommended fixing most of them. Still, it is clear
that users face challenges bringing static analysis into their day-to-day activities.
Most research on static code analyzers focuses on creating new analysis meth-
ods, or refining existing ones. As tools proliferate and mature, some researchers
are starting to turn their focus to the interaction between tools and developers or
processes. Layman et al. [84] observe developers directly as they complete program-
ming tasks and introduce faults that cause warnings from a static code analyzer.
They try to determine which factors cause a programmer to interrupt their activity
to fix the fault. They conclude that users are more likely to address warnings if they
are relevant to their current primary task.
Khoo et al. [77] focus on the task of triaging warnings output by a tool to
decide which ones should be fixed. They observe that many static code analyzers
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output lists of program statements (called paths) that may represent the flow of
data or control through program functions, or exception stack traces among other
things. These paths are often difficult to navigate and comprehend, so they provide
a code visualization that concisely displays inlined functions for each element in
the path, allowing users to expand or collapse these functions. They also observe
that inexperienced users do not always ask the right question or know what to look
for when triaging warnings. To solve this problem, Khoo et al. propose providing
checklists for each warning that direct the user to look for specific properties in code
to decide if the warning is valid. They found that the visualization and checklist
combined to make reviewers more efficient without affecting their accuracy.
Other research focuses on helping teams establish the right processes for using




Understanding Why Defects Persist
The user studies described in the previous chapter enabled us to interact with
and observe users, so that we could use their experiences and sentiments to judge the
value of static analysis. But many of the outcomes of these studies are subjective,
and may not generalize to all cases. Fortunately, we do not have to rely only on this
research method. Software developers produce many artifacts as they engineer each
application, and we can use these artifacts to make inferences about the impact of
static analysis, or defects found by static analysis. The benefits of this approach
are that we can analyze large quantities of data, and we are not as reliant on the
engineers that own the code.
In the next chapter, I will describe some studies in which manual and auto-
matic methods are used to mine software artifacts for significant trends. In this
chapter, I present some anecdotal observations from manually reviewing hundreds
of warnings in several code bases.
One of the striking observations is that when we analyze production software,
we often find interesting defects that have been around for a long time. Some look
so obvious that we wonder why they have not been detected, and if they are causing
any problems. An example is the defect in Figure 4.1 which flags a comparison
operation that will always be false. The invocation simpleType.getName() returns
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Source: Eclipse SDK 3.5 | org.eclipse.jdt...debug.eval.ast.engine.ASTInstructionCompiler 
3831 SimpleType simpleType = (SimpleType) type;
3832 if ("java.lang.String".equals(simpleType.getName())){
3833 return Instruction.T String;
3834 }
3835 return Instruction.T Object;  
FindBugs: “Call to equals() comparing different types on line 3832”
Figure 4.1: Long-Lasting Defect in Eclipse
a Name object, not a string. The effect is that line 3833 is dead code, and this
method returns the type id for an object instead of a string. This defect was first
seen when analyzing version 2.0 of the Eclipse SDK, and is still around in version
3.5, 8 years later. Code coverage analysis of this code fragment indicates the all
lines except line 3833 are executed as a result of unit tests, and yet all tests pass1.
We investigate why defects persist as part of a large inquiry into whether static
analysis finds problems that matter in practice. In other words, are defects found by
static analysis valuable? It is not uncommon to encounter projects where a number
of bugs remain unresolved for some time. They are neither fixed, nor suppressed.
On the other hand, many users report that static analysis tools like FindBugs have
“saved” them from embarrassment, by finding potential problems.
In general, manual and anecdotal observation indicates that static analysis
does find consequential mistakes. However, most consequential correctness warnings
1We eventually contacted the primary developer for this code fragment, who confirmed that
this defect does not impact program behavior because problems caused by this issue are mitigated
elsewhere. Still, a fix has been identified and is planned.
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found by static analysis can and will be detected by other good quality assurance
practices such as testing and code review. This explains why warnings left in pro-
duction code often do not matter. The value of static analysis is that it can find
these bugs early in development, when they are cheapest to fix. An exception is
certain subtle defects, such as the security, concurrency, and performance defects
discussed in Chapter 7, which often escape other quality assurance methods, and
are best found using static analysis.
This observation represents a paradigm shift for some developers who wait
until the end of the development process before running static analysis, hoping to
find bugs missed by their quality assurance. Most of those bugs won’t matter, and it
is more expensive to fix bugs at this stage. Running static analysis early is the key
to finding bugs that matter, and fixing them more cheaply. Running static analysis
early may also prevent costly efforts down the road, such as lengthy debugging
sessions or sending out patches.
I start this chapter by returning to the observation that static analysis is good
at finding stupid mistakes made by developers, but not all mistakes are important.
In Section 4.1, I present some software defects that are caused by stupid mistakes,
but that have little or no impact on code behavior. The goal of users is to find the
intersection of stupid mistakes and important ones. Hence many of these true but
low impact defects will persist, even they are flagged by static analysis tools.
Another distinction useful for understanding why some defects persist, is the
distinction between “loud” warnings, and “silent” warnings, which I introduced in
Chapter 3. Loud warnings are caused by defects that result in program crashes or
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exceptions, and are almost always detected, if they matter. Loud warnings that
persist for a long time are often in dead code. Silent warnings are associated with
defects that do not directly cause the program to crash, but may put the program
in an incorrect state, or point to suspicious or confusing code. It may be harder to
predict whether these will be low impact or important. Some silent bug patterns
are often low impact, but sometimes have a real impact on correctness. I discuss
the persistence of loud and silent warnings in Section 4.2.
I conclude the chapter in Section 4.3 by discussing “The Survivor Effect”:
the phenomenon that important defects are often found by other quality assurance
methods, leaving mostly less important ones in production code. I present some
examples of the survivor effect observed in practice, discuss some exceptions, and
argue that static analysis is best used early in the software development process.
4.1 True But Low Impact Defects
We already discussed the risk of false positives back in Section 1.3.1. Static
analysis cannot completely understand the semantics of programs, and hence may
sometimes make incorrect assumptions, leading to false warnings. Early static anal-
ysis tools used naive analysis, and were riddled with false positives, which were
disruptive to developer productivity. Modern tools use sophisticated heuristics and
more rigorous analysis to minimize the number of false warnings. One tool vendor
boasts that fewer than 15% of its warnings are false positives [66].
One problem with this focus on false positives is that it seems to imply that
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the remaining defects are true defects that developers should fix. But when we
review warnings in practice, we are surprised to find a number of true defects that
have little or no impact on program behavior. Many of these low impact defects
are associated with some mistake or bad practice, and the case could be made that
they should be fixed. But correcting software takes up time and resources, and the
fix could have unexpected side effects that lead to more serious problems, especially
if the modified lines are quite old.
In this section, we go over the reasons why true low impact defects occur (with
examples from real software), and discuss the scenarios when these defects should
be fixed.
4.1.1 Deliberate Defects
Sometimes the defects found by static analysis were inserted intentionally by
developers. Figure 4.2 shows two examples where the developers intend to throw Run
Time Exceptions, but instead of explicitly creating and throwing the exceptions, they
insert faulty code. This seems like bad practice, especially if the default messages
generated by the system are not informative. But the program behaves exactly as
intended, and the system messages are at least sufficient to find the line with the
error, so this approach may be seen as a useful shorthand by some developers.
In some cases, a static analysis tool may want to avoid bothering developers
with warnings on intentional defects (by, for example, parsing nearby comments
and suppressing the warning if the comment is “throw error”). But in many cases,
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Source: Sun JDK 6 | com.sun.jndi.dns.DnsName 
345 if (n instanceof CompositeName) {
346 n = (DnsName) n; // force ClassCastException
347 }  
Source: Sun JDK 6 | com.sun.java.util.jar.pack.Attribute 
1042 if (layout.charAt(i++) != ’[’)
1043 layout.charAt(−i); // throw error  
Figure 4.2: Two intentional errors
deliberate defects are attempts by developers to violate some rule or convention
established by the organization. If the developers feel these violations are justified,
then they should be forced to use an explicit suppression mechanism to hide warnings
(especially source level suppression), so that future developers understand why this
violation was necessary. This also enables managers and researchers to find and
investigate these violations by occasionally turning off all suppressions.
4.1.2 Masked Defects
Sometimes the code surrounding a defect prevents it from having any effect on
program behavior, effectively masking the defect. We already discussed one example
back in Section 1.3.2 (in Figure 1.4) where a developer accidentally assumes a value
is an unsigned byte value (from 0 to 255), when in fact it is a signed value (from -128
to 127). Despite this mistaken assumption, the developer’s conditional check still
accepts values in the correct range [32,128] for basic printable ASCII characters.
Developers may not feel compelled to fix masked defects, but they should still
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inspect the warnings closely, because masked defects often imply a misunderstanding
of relevant invariants, and there might be other logical defects or questionable code
nearby.
4.1.3 Infeasible Statement, Branch, or Situation
Sometimes a defect occurs only in a situation that a developer believes is
infeasible, but the static analysis is unable to verify this by examining the code. In
Figure 4.3, FindBugs complains about a possible null pointer dereference on line
171, which will occur if certain checked exceptions are thrown on line 167, leaving
the variable set to null. But the developer is convinced that the exceptions will
never be thrown, and indicates so in the comments.
One way to “fix” this, or at least prevent a static analysis warning, is to insert
a failing assertion in place of the comments. This is good practice in general because
if the developer’s beliefs are incorrect, the assertions will generate an error, usually
during development time, so the problem is quickly found and fixed. But this fix
is not compelling if the code is already in production, where assertions are usually
turned off.
4.1.4 Code that is Already Doomed
Sometimes, a defect occurs in a situation where the computation is already
doomed, and the resulting runtime exception is not a significantly worse outcome
than any other behavior that might result from fixing the defect.
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Source: Sun JDK 6 | com.sun.corba.se.impl.dynamicany.DynAnyComplexImpl 
165 String expectedMemberName = null;
166 try {
167 expectedMemberName = expectedTypeCode.member name(i);
168 } catch (BadKind badKind) { // impossible
169 } catch (Bounds bounds) { // impossible
170 }
171 if ( ! (expectedMemberName.equals(memberName) ... )) {  
FindBugs: “Possible null pointer dereference of expectedMemberName on line 171”
Figure 4.3: Infeasible situation
Source: Sun JDK 6 | com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.security.encryption.XMLCipher 
2224 if (null == element) {
2225 //complain
2226 }
2227 String algorithm = element.getAttributeNS(...);  
FindBugs: “Possible null pointer dereference of element on line 2227”
Figure 4.4: Doomed situations: vacuous complaint
Figures 4.4 – 4.6 shows three examples of doomed situations. In Figure 4.4
the comment indicates the intention of the developer to complain about a null
parameter, but no action is taken and thus a null pointer exception will occur.
Perhaps null is never provided as an argument to this method. But even if it is, it
seems likely that the appropriate remedy for this warning would be to throw a null
pointer exception when the parameter is null. Since the existing code already gives
this behavior, changing the code is probably unwarranted (although documenting
the fact that the parameter must be non-null would be useful).
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Source: XSLT2Runner (abridged) | org.apache...output.TransletOutputHandlerFactory 
116 SerializationHandler result = null;
121 if ( method == null)
123 result = new ToUnknownStream();
125 else if ( method.equalsIgnoreCase("xml"))
128 result = new ToXMLStream();
131 else if ( method.equalsIgnoreCase("html"))
134 result = new ToHTMLStream();
137 else if ( method.equalsIgnoreCase("text"))
140 result = new ToTextStream();
149 result.setEncoding( encoding);  
FindBugs: “Possible null pointer dereference of result on line 149”
Figure 4.5: Doomed situations: missing else clause
Figure 4.5 shows what is effectively a switch statement, constructed using if
.. else statements. This pattern is relatively common, even to the detail of not
having an else clause for the final if statement. Thus, if the final if statement fails,
result will be null and a null pointer exception will occur. While this code is highly
questionable, the appropriate fix would likely be to throw an IllegalArgumentEx-
ception if none of the if guards match, and the impact of a null pointer exception
is unlikely to be significantly different than that of throwing an IllegalArgumentEx-
ception.
Figure 4.6 shows an example where the program has detected an erroneous
situation, and is in the process of creating an exception to throw. However, due to
a programming error, a null pointer exception will occur when node is dereferenced.
While the code is clearly mistaken, the impact of the mistake is minimal.
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Source: Apache Xerces (abridged) | com.sun.org.apache.xerces.internal.util 
78 Node node = null;
79 switch(place.getNodeType()) {
80 case Node.CDATA SECTION NODE: {
81 node = ...
82 break;
83 }
84 case Node.COMMENT NODE:
85 ...
86 default: {
87 throw new IllegalArgumentException("...("
88 + node.getNodeName()+’)’);
89 }  
FindBugs: “Possible null pointer dereference of node”
Figure 4.6: Doomed situations: defect in exception handling
4.1.5 Testing code
In testing code, developers will often do things that seem nonsensical, such as
checking that invoking equals(null) returns false. In this case, the test is checking
that the equals method can handle a null argument. We can’t ignore nonsensical
code in testing code, since it may reflect a coding mistake that results in the test
not testing what was intended.
4.1.6 Logging or other unimportant case
We have also seen a number of cases of a bug that would only impact logging
output, or assertions. While accurate logging messages are important, bugs in log-
ging code might be deemed to be of lower importance. Figure 4.7 shows code in
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Source: Sun JDK 6 | com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.resolver.Catalog 
818 String userdir = System.getProperty("user.dir");
819 userdir.replace(’\\’, ’/’);
820 catalogManager.debug.message(1, "Malformed URL on cwd", userdir);  
FindBugs: “Method ignores return value of String.replace() on line 819”
Figure 4.7: Logging defect
which the call to replace is performed incorrectly. The replace method cannot
modify the String it is invoked on - Java Strings are immutable. Rather, it returns
a new String that is the result of the modification. Since the return result is ignored
here, the call to replace has no effect and the userdir may contain back slashes rather
than the intended forward slashes.
4.1.7 When should such defects be fixed?
Should a defect that doesn’t cause the program to significantly misbehave be
fixed? Defects found by static analysis early in the software development process
are cheaper to fix than those found later on. Since it may not be possible to know
their long term impact at this early stage, users should endeavor to fix all of them.
But if the software system is mature, then additional considerations come into play.
The main arguments against fixing such defects is that they require engineering
resources that could be better applied elsewhere, and that there is a chance that
the attempt to fix the defect will introduce another, more serious bug that does
significantly impact the behavior of the application. The primary argument for
fixing such defects is that it makes the code easier to understand and maintain, and
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less likely to break in the face of future modifications or uses.
When sophisticated analysis finds an interprocedural error path involving alias-
ing and multiple conditions, understanding the defect and how and where to remedy
it can take significantly more engineering time, and it can be more difficult to have
confidence that the remedy resolves the issue without introducing new problems.
Warnings from less sophisticated static analysis may be easier to understand and
fix, but care still needs to be taken to understand the context of the defect, instead
of blindly applying a fix in response to a message from the static analysis. And even
simple defects suggest holes in test coverage; additional unit tests should be created
to supplement defect fixes.
4.2 Loud and Silent Warnings
In measuring the significance of warnings found, I find it useful to make a
distinction between loud and silent warnings. Loud warnings are associated with
exceptions and program crashes, while silent warnings do not generally stop the
program, but may leave it in an incorrect state. As we discussed in the last chapter,
developers reviewing static analysis warnings are more alarmed by loud warnings,
but these warnings usually occur in dead code if they are not found immediately.
Silent warnings, on the other hand, may be connected with serious but subtle or
rare misbehavior.
A classic case of a loud warning is an infinite recursive loop, such as the
one in Figure 4.8. The method widgetDefaultSelected() unconditionally calls
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Source: Eclipse SDK 3.5 | org.eclipse.ui.internal.dialogs.CustomizePerspectiveDialog 
1047 bindingLink.addSelectionListener(new SelectionListener() {
1048 public void widgetDefaultSelected(SelectionEvent e) {
1049 widgetDefaultSelected(e);
1050 }
1051 public void widgetSelected(SelectionEvent e) {
1052 PreferenceDialog dialog = ...  
FindBugs: “There is an apparent infinite recursive loop on line 1049”
Figure 4.8: Infinite Recursive Loop in Eclipse
itself, and hence will always throw a Stack Overflow Exception if invoked. Defects
like this are usually quickly and easily found, if they matter. So when we find
them in production code, we can generally assume that this is dead code. In this
case, we observe that the developer implementing the SelectionListener interface
only really wants to implement widgetSelected(), but is required by the API to
also implement widgetDefaultSelected(). The developer does so with a naive
implementation that simply calls the other method... or at least intends to. The
methods have similar names, and the developer probably selected the wrong one
from a code assist list. Still, the defective method is not intended for use; it was
implemented primarily to satisfy the API.
Some loud warnings only manifest in scenarios that may not be feasible. De-
velopers faced with such warnings have to choose whether to apply a fix immediately,
or defer the fix until the problem manifests itself. This latter option is only available
if the application can tolerate the failure by, for example, restarting itself, or falling
back on some redundancy. In this case, the failure will usually include a stack trace
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Source: Eclipse SDK 3.5 | org.eclipse.core.runtime.Plugin 
544 public void setDebugging(boolean value) {
545 if (bundle == null)
546 this.debug = value;
547 String key = bundle.getSymbolicName() + "/debug";
548 ...
549 }  
FindBugs: “Possible null pointer dereference of bundle on line 547”
Figure 4.9: Possible null pointer dereference in Eclipse
that can be used to track down the source of the problem.
One example of loud warnings that may not be feasible, are the possible null
pointer dereference warnings flagged by FindBugs, such as the one in Figure 4.9. In
this example, the variable bundle is compared to null, and then later unconditionally
dereferenced, leading to the warning. The only scenario in which an exception is
thrown is if bundle is null, and it is not clear if this is possible. In Java, null
pointer dereferences produce informative stack traces, and developers may wait to
see if they are feasible, especially if an immediate fix is unclear. In the case of Figure
4.9, it turns out that the null dereference warning is associated with an error in the
control flow logic of the method. The developers fixed the problem by adding a
return statement to the if-statement that compares bundle to null. Null pointer
dereferences are explored in more detail in Chapter 6.
A classic example of a silent defect is ignoring the return value of a string
operation, as is the case in Figure 4.10. This mistake has been in the code base
since version 1.0, and has gone unrepaired for almost nine years. This defect may
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Source: Eclipse SDK 3.5 | org.eclipse.pde.internal.core.schema.SchemaEnumeration 
26 public void write(String indent, PrintWriter writer) {
27 String description = getDescription();
28 if (description != null)
29 description.trim();
30 if (description != null && description.length() > 0) {
31 ...
32 writer.println(indent3 + "<documentation>");
33 writer.println(indent3 + description);
34 writer.println(indent3 + "</documentation>");
35 ...  
FindBugs: “Method ignores return value of String.trim() on line 30”
Figure 4.10: Ignored Return Value in Eclipse
result in a slightly incorrect string, a relatively low impact problem, but without
static analysis, it would be difficult to detect.
Another silent defect occurs when a developer compares incompatible types.
In Java, the equals() method used to compare two objects receives any object
as an argument. If the two objects are of unrelated types, this comparison is not
expected to throw an exception, but rather to return false. It seems unlikely that a
developer would want to use a condition that is always false as part of any control
logic. So this must be a mistake. Sometimes this defect causes the program to
seriously misbehave, and the problem is eventually detected following a sometimes
lengthy debugging session. Other times, it leads to subtle and silent changes in
program behavior that are hard to detect. We saw one example from Eclipse at the
beginning of this chapter (in Figure 4.1) that has gone unrepaired for many years.
Another example from the Apache Lucene project is illustrated in Figure 4.11. In
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Source: Apache Lucene | org.apache.lucene.demo.html.HTMLParser 
41 StringBuffer title = new StringBuffer();
116 ...
117 void addText(String text) throws IOException {
126 ...
127 if (!titleComplete && !title.equals("")) { // finished title
128 synchronized(this) {




133 }  
FindBugs: “Call to equals() comparing different types on line 127”
Figure 4.11: Comparing a StringBuffer to a String is always false
this case, the developer intends to add a condition to check that the StringBuffer
title is not empty on line 127. Instead, the developer uses a faulty comparison
with a String which leads to the execution of the synchronized block on line 128,
whether the string buffer is empty or not. This code fragment occurred in some
demo code which was distributed with Lucene, and may not have been rigorously
tested. On the one hand, demo or sample code is often not as important as the
rest of the software. On the other hand, sample code like this is often copied into
many projects, and corrections do not propagate to all those projects. Indeed a
Google search indicates that this class has been copied dozens of times, and some
of those copies contain this defect, while others contain a fix that was later applied
(replacing the bad comparison with !(title.length() == 0)).
Sometimes the distinction between a loud and a silent warning is subtle, but
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Source: Eclipse 3.5 | org.eclipse.team.ui.synchronize.AbstractSynchronizeParticipant 
211 public void setInitializationData(...) {
218 ...
219 fName = config.getAttribute("name");
220 if (config == null) {
221 fName = "Unknown";
222 }
225 String strIcon = config.getAttribute("icon");
226 if (strIcon != null) {
227 fImageDescriptor = ...
228 }
229 ...  
FindBugs: “Nullcheck of value previously dereferenced on line 220”
Figure 4.12: Redundant comparison to null where value is previously
dereferenced
the two still exhibit different traits. Consider two variants of a Redundant Com-
parison to Null (RCN) rule in Figures 4.12 and 4.13. In the first RCN example in
Figure 4.12, the variable config is compared to null right after it is dereferenced.
This comparison is useless, or redundant, because if config is ever null, an exception
will be thrown on line 219. This loud warning is like the Possible Null Pointer Deref-
erence discussed earlier (in Figure 4.9) because it is detected quickly if config is
null in practice, or it is typically a harmless2 defensive (but useless) check if config
is never null.
In the second RCN example in Figure 4.13, the variable baseName is compared
to null on line 342, even though it is assigned a value that is guaranteed to be non-
2Actually this example may not be harmless even if config is never null. Can you spot why? I
will return to this example at the end of this section.
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Source: fawkeZ Project (jCoderZ.org) | org.jcoderz.phoenix.cmpgen2.CmpGenerator 
331 private void generateCmpBean (CreateTableStatement stmt) {
340 ...
341 String baseName = stmt.getBeanName() + "Entity";
342 if (baseName == null)
343 {
344 baseName = sqlNameToJavaName(stmt.getTableName());
345 }
346 ...  
FindBugs: “Redundant nullcheck of baseName, known to be non-null, on line 342”
Figure 4.13: Redundant comparison to null where value guaranteed to
be non-null
null on the previous line. (Even if the expression stmt.getBeanName() returns null,
its subsequent concatenation with the string constant would yield the non-null string
“nullEntity”). So the comparison on line 342 is redundant. Since baseName can
never be null, no exception is thrown, and this is a silent warning. Like other silent
warnings, this comparison could be a harmless defensive check, but it could also
contain a serious subtle error that occurs rarely and is hard to detect without static
analysis. If we look closely at this example, we observe that the developer intends to
construct a base name using either the bean name or, if that fails, the table name.
But if stmt.getBeanName() returns null, then baseName is set to “nullEntity”,
which is probably not correct. It appears that the developer really intended to
check if stmt.getBeanName() returned null before concatenating it to the string
constant. Of course, if stmt.getBeanName() is never null, then this mistake is
mostly harmless.
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So in summary, loud warnings often manifest themselves and are detected in
practice if they are serious and feasible. The loud warnings that persist are often
in dead code, or are infeasible. Silent warnings are often low impact, but may be
associated with serious program misbehavior. If this misbehavior is rare, they can
be hard to detect using other quality assurance methods, and can wreak havoc long
after the code is written. Even if the misbehavior is not rare, silent defects can be
hard to debug. Static analysis can provide real value by finding these subtle defects,
though reviewers are often more alarmed by the loud warnings.
Of course, these observations are not hard fast rules, and there are exceptions.
Indeed, looking back to the first (loud) RCN example in Figure 4.12, we observe
that the code may have a subtle defect even if config is not null. The purpose of
the method is to set some initialization data, and on line 226, strIcon is compared
to null right after it is initialized using the getAttribute() method. Since fName
is initialized in the same way, it seems reasonable to assume that the programmer
intended to also compare it to null, but used the wrong variable on line 220. So now
we see that the real defect is that if fName is initialized to null on line 219, it is not
updated to “Unknown” on line 221 as it should be.
4.3 The Survivor Effect
We have seen that some true defects end up having a low impact in practice,
and some defects can silently lurk undetected and pose a danger to the application.
When we review production code, we often find more of the former, and less of
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Figure 4.14: The Survivor Effect: Comparing defects that matter with
defects that do not matter
the latter. It may be that developers just produce more low impact defects than
important ones. But another reason is that the popular quality assurance methods,
such as unit testing and code review, are more geared towards finding defects that
negatively impact application behavior. Hence these important defects are more
likely to be caught before the code goes into production, leaving many of the lower
impact ones behind.
Figure 4.14 illustrates this “Survivor Effect”. The good news is that static
analysis can find both defects that matter, and defects that do not. But the number
of defects that matter drops more quickly as the development cycle progresses. So
if static analysis is used later in the software process, a greater proportion of defects
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will seem unimportant, and the potentially important ones will be drowned out.
Furthermore, all defects are potentially more expensive to fix after the software has
been released. If static analysis is used earlier, it may not be clear which defects
are important and which ones are not. But the key point is that all the defects are
usually cheaper to remedy at this early stage. In addition, static analysis can detect
defects earlier in the process than unit testing and code review; it can detect defects
as soon as the code is written. Hence the best value for static analysis occurs when
it is used early. In addition, avoiding the scenario where developers have to wade
through many unimportant defects late in the development cycle to find the few
important ones may lead to a more positive perception of static analysis.
During the surveys and interviews described earlier, some respondents indi-
cated that they would run FindBugs only at the end of important intervals. Essen-
tially the purpose was to clean out any problems that may have been missed during
the interval. One participant responded: “We run FindBugs before each release of
a Release Candidate”. Another said his team would “Run FindBugs on a project
milestone basis”. Users with this paradigm may not be retaining the most value out
of their use of static analysis. Part of the problem is the perceived cost of weeding
through low impact warnings. Users also reported FindBugs was too slow in the
IDE, and this discouraged them from using it at this, the earliest and most valuable
time. Still, the survivor effect suggests that some of these costs are covered by the
effectiveness of static analysis at finding and resolving problems more cheaply.
One user, who relies on the Agile software development process [42], suggested
running static analysis at the end of each two week iteration. The two-week interval
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is short enough that it is still relatively cheap to fix any problems found. The agile
process encourages test-driven development, and advocates for this note that the
tests find a greater range of problems. This user acknowledges that most problems
are found by testing, but notes that static analysis is still valuable for finding “po-
tential” problems, or defects that may crop up in the future. For example, FindBugs
flagged some cases where the user was calling a non-final method from a constructor.
This can be a problem if the class is sub-classed, and the called method is overridden
leading to potentially unexpected behavior.
Another indication of the survivor effect came during the Google FindBugs
Fixit, described in Section 3.3. Over 77% of the reviews contained a fix recommen-
dation, 87% of reviewed issues received at least one fix recommendation, and many
issues were fixed. However, none of the serious bugs appeared to be associated with
any serious incorrect behaviors in Google’s production systems. Some serious de-
fects were found in code that had not yet been pushed to production, and in code
that was not executed in production systems. The defects that were executed in
production seemed to not result in serious misbehavior, or produced only subtle
effects, such as performance degradation.
One interesting example occurred on the first day of the Fixit, when a defected
was committed into the code base, and picked up in the overnight FindBugs analysis.
That same night, the defect identified by FindBugs caused a number of internal
map reduce runs to fail and an automatic rollback of the change. Hence the defect
never made it into production. This was an example of how Google’s testing and
monitoring practices are effective at preventing misbehavior in productions systems.
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Of course, automatic rollbacks and nightly build failures are often a more expensive
way to address problems. For one thing, the development schedule may be delayed
by nightly build failures. In this case, FindBugs could have prevented the loss of
development cycles that resulted from the overnight failure.
Figure 4.14 also illustrates that not all defects that matter are caught, so static
analysis can find important problems, even when it is used late. Indeed, some classes
of problems are best found using static analysis, and will tend to persist if static
analysis is not used. These includes problems that are not directly linked to incorrect
behavior, such as security, performance and concurrency defects. Applications that
potentially have a high exposure or sensitivity to these classes of defects will benefit
greatly from using static analysis.
In general, users need to tradeoff the cost of static analysis with the benefits of
using it, especially using it early. It is difficult to do an absolute cost-benefit analysis,
but there are scenarios where it is very likely that static analysis is cost effective.
These scenarios depend on the type of defects the application is sensitive to, and the
nature of the application. Organizations can also make static analysis cost effective
by adopting certain best practices, and building the right infrastructure to deploy




Mining Software Repositories for Defects
Software repositories store a wealth of history about static analysis, including
which warnings are introduced/removed and when, and which components have the
most warnings. We can access this history by analyzing older versions of the software
and comparing the warnings in each version. We have to deal with some challenges,
including keeping track of a warning from one version to another, and deciding if a
warning removal represents an attempt to fix it. Despite these challenges, mining the
software repository is attractive because it allows us to observe software development
without bothering developers.
We use manual and automatic approaches to search through this history look-
ing for general trends, or examples of interesting defects found by static analysis,
and explore why these defects persist. The data is quite noisy and these explorations
provide mostly qualitative insights. But given the amount of data involved, we can
also look for statistically significant trends.
In this chapter, I discuss some studies that look into the software repository
in an effort to validate some of the observations in the last chapter, namely the
presence of true but low impact defects (which was discussed in Section 4.1), the
distinctions between loud and silent defects (from Section 4.2), and the survivor
effect (from Section 4.3). In the first set of studies, discussed in Section 5.1, we
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manually reviewed the warning history of several large projects. Specifically, we
examined some defects that have been fixed to evaluate how impactful they were
and how complicated the fix was. In follow up studies described in Section 5.2, we
automatically analyzed some software repository snapshots to identify the removal
rates of different classes of defects. Here we are using “defect removal” as a proxy
for “defect fix”, which is limited because not all defect removals are caused by inten-
tional fix efforts. Still, this study provides a means for reprioritizing warnings and
enables us to understand the characteristics that are associated with high removal
rates.
These two studies are limited by the fact that they only capture warnings
that are checked into the code repository. I discuss some approaches for getting
more fine-grained snapshots of the development process in Section 5.3. We used
one of these approaches to capture regular snapshots of student development at the
University of Maryland. Studying these snapshots enables us to observe the survivor
effect, among other trends.
5.1 Manual Reviews of Large Software Systems
Over the last few years, and throughout our research study, we have under-
taken several manual reviews of warnings in various projects. The manual reviews
are useful for a number of reasons beyond just providing interesting anecdotes about
the value of static analysis. The reviews enable us to characterize the severity of
warnings in different bug patterns, and explore the distinctions between different
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classes of warnings. For example, we can compare loud and silent warnings. We
are not just reviewing defects that persist in the code base; we also consider defects
that have been fixed in earlier revisions and try to characterize them to see how
complicated the fix is.
Through these reviews, we have observed evidence that many FindBugs warn-
ings can be fixed with relatively simple fixes, but we have also observed many
instances of low impact defects for the reasons described in Section 4.1. In the next
two sections, I discuss our reviews of warnings in a code base that was not devel-
oped with FindBugs (the Java JDK) and a code base that periodically ran FindBugs
(GlassFish). In code bases that run FindBugs, we looked for evidence of fixes that
may have been induced by specific warnings.
5.1.1 Review of Sun’s JDK 1.6.0
We analyzed builds b12 through b105 of JDK 1.6.0 (89 builds) so that we
could review a subset of the warnings generated. One of the subsets we reviewed
was warnings that were removed at some point in the build history. Specifically, we
looked at each high/medium priority correctness warning that was present in one
build and not reported in the next version, but the class containing the warning was
still present. To simplify the analysis, we only examined defects from files that were
distributed with the JDK. In the end, we reviewed 53 defect removals; the results
are shown in Table 5.1. Interestingly, 37 of the fixes were small changes that seemed
to directly target the warning. We have no way of knowing how much effort went
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Table 5.1: Classification of Warnings Removed During JDK 1.6.0’s Development
Small change that appears to target the warning 37 70%
Change that only a partial remedy to the underlying problem 5 9%
Substantial code change or refactoring that has a broad scope 11 21%
into detecting these problems with simple fixes, but it is likely that if static analysis
had been applied earlier, this effort would not have been expended. Five of the
changes had the effect of lowering the priority of the warning (according to Find-
Bugs’ heuristics) because they reduced the likelihood of the defects causing software
misbehavior, but they did not eliminate the defects. The developers responsible for
these changes might have made different choices if they were aware of the static
analysis warnings, potentially preventing additional effort down the road to fix the
root defect.
In our next study, we considered the warnings that remained in the last build,
and tried to determine how impactful they were. We reviewed 379 high/medium
priority warnings, as shown in Table 5.2. 10% of the warnings looked serious, and
it was clear that the method containing the warning would behave in a way that
was substantially at odds with its intended function. Another 46% of warnings were
associated with some deviation from intended behavior. Of course, it is possible
that many of these have no real impact in practice, because the method is never
called, or the defect is mitigated by some distant code fragment or process. And we
reviewed a sizable number of warnings (42%) that appeared likely to be true but
low impact defects.
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Table 5.2: Classification of Warnings Remaining in JDK 1.6.0 build 105
Likely infeasible or cause little or no deviation from intended
behavior
160 42%
Likely to cause some deviation from intended behavior 176 46%
Likely to cause substantial deviation from intended behavior 38 10%
Bad analysis by FindBugs 5 1%
So these reviews indicate to us that static analysis can find significant defects
in a well-used production system, but also validate our expectations that many
defects are low impact in practice. We broke down these numbers by bug pattern
in an earlier publication [17]. It is interesting to note that some bug patterns almost
always appeared to be low impact (such as a potential null pointer dereference on an
exception path), while others almost always appeared to be serious (such as integer
shift by an amount in an illegal range). This understanding has partly informed the
way we rank warnings, and can inform the way organizations choose which warnings
to filter out.
5.1.1.1 A Note on Warning Density
We measured the warning density in each of the builds analyzed, to validate
our expectations about the typical density for a large production system. We cal-
culate density as the number of warnings per 1,000 lines non-commenting source
statements1. FindBugs’ heuristics are tuned to produce a relatively sparse density
1We can compute the number of non-commenting source statements accurately using the line
number tables associated with each method in a class file. Statements that span multiple lines
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Table 5.3: FindBugs Warning Densities in JDK 1.6.0 build 105
Build b12 b51 b105
# Warnings 370 449 407
warnings/KLocNCSS 0.46 0.45 0.42
of warnings, particularly high/medium priority correctness warnings. For example,
Table 5.3 shows some densities for early, mid-way, and late builds. This sparse den-
sity (approximately 1 warning every 2,000 lines) reflects the desire to not inundate
developers with too many warnings.
5.1.2 Review of Glassfish v2
Glassfish is an open-source, Java EE Application server, used by many en-
terprises2. Members of the Glassfish project have shown substantial interest in
FindBugs, and have been running FindBugs against their nightly builds for several
years. They have experimented with several approaches to alerting developers about
warnings, including posting warnings on a web page, emailing results to developers,
and including warnings in a continuous build.
At the time we conducted our review, Glassfish had been using FindBugs for
about a year. We analyzed Glassfish v2, builds 09-b33, and looked for warnings that
were present in one version and not reported in the next build. We restricted our
analysis to high/medium priority correctness warnings, ignored defects that disap-
count as one line. Using this measure usually results in a value that is about 25-33% of the total
number of lines in the file.
2http://glassfish.dev.java.net/
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Table 5.4: Classification of Warnings Removed During Glassfish’s Development
Substantial code change or refactoring that has a broad scope 8 14%
Small change that appears to target the warning 50 86%
Mention FindBugs in the commit message 17 29%
peared because the file containing them was removed, and only considered files in the
Glassfish source distribution. There were a total of 58 bug defect disappearances,
as is illustrated in Table 5.4. A significant number of the fixes only required small
edits, and 17 cases included a commit message that made it clear that the fix was
in response to FindBugs. This large number of small fixes does raise the question of
whether users are doing due diligence to make sure the code is correct. It is tempt-
ing for users to simply fix the defect flagged by FindBugs, without considering its
wider implications. Still in this review, it appears most fixes were straight-forward
with few side effects.
Despite the usage of FindBugs, the defect density in Glassfish v2 was equiv-
alent to the density in JDK 1.6.0. Specifically, the defect density for high/medium
priority correctness warnings in build 33 files included in the source distribution was
still 0.44 defects / KLocNCSS (which corresponds to 334 warnings).
5.2 Fix Rate and Code Churn
In addition to user reviews from the fixit discussed in Section 3.3, we collected
and analyzed snapshots of Google’s code repository. This data allows us to com-
pare some of the trends extracted from the subjective reviews in the fixit, to more
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objective measures of which warnings were actually removed, and which ones tend
to persist. These measures have been used as a proxy of the relative importance of
bug patterns [79, 78].
To conduct this analysis, we detected each warning in each snapshot, and
recorded its bug pattern, and the first and last snapshot in which it was observed.
As we mentioned earlier, we do not actually know why issues are no longer reported,
though we can detect the cases where an issue disappears because its containing
source file is deleted. An issue may be removed because it caused a real problem,
because someone used a static analysis tool that reported a warning, because a global
cleanup of a style violation was performed, or because a change completely unrelated
to the issue caused it to be removed or transformed so that it is no longer reported
as the same issue. For example, if a method is renamed or moved to another class,
any issues in that method will be reported as being removed, and new instances
of those issues will be reported in the newly named method. The snapshots used
in this analysis were taken between the shutdown of the BugBot project and the
FindBugs fixit. Thus, we suspect that the number of issues removed because the
warning was seen in FindBugs is small.
To provide a control for this study, we introduced new “noise bug detectors”
into FindBugs that report issues based on non-defect information such as the md5
hash of the name and signature of a method containing a method call and the name
and signature of the invoked method. There are 4 different such detectors, based
on sequences of operations, field references, method references, and dereferences of
potentially null values. These are designed to depend on roughly the same amount
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of surrounding context as other detectors. Our hope is that the chance of a change
unrelated to a defect causing an issue to disappear will be roughly the same for
both noise detectors and more relevant bug detectors. Thus, we can evaluate a bug
pattern by comparing its fix rate to both the fix rate over all issues and the “fix”
rate for the noise bug patterns.
Table 5.5 shows the results from analyzing 118 snapshots of the Google code-
base over a 9 month period. (To protect Google’s intellectual property, we cannot
publish numbers on the size of the analyzed code base, but we can report the num-
ber of warnings found.) For each bug pattern and category, we looked at how many
issues were remove and how many persisted. This dataset was rather noisy and
contained inconsistencies, but the size of the dataset offsets some of the noise. The
snapshots were not all analyzed with the same version of FindBugs, and the code
analyzed wasn’t completely consistent. An effort was made to build and analyze the
entire Java codebase at Google each day. For various reasons, different projects and
components might get excluded from the build for a particular day. In several cases,
we made changes/improvements to FindBugs to improve the relevance/accuracy of
the warnings (e.g., recognizing that a particular kind of warning was being reported
in automatically generated code and was harmless, and changing the detection al-
gorithm to not report the warning in that case).
Before analyzing this history, we applied several steps to “clean” the data.
We didn’t consider issues that went away because the class that contained the issue
was deleted or became unavailable. Also, if more than one third of the reported
issues for a bug pattern disappeared between snapshots (and there were more than
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Table 5.5: Fix rate for bug patterns in Google code base3
chi % const fix max kind
1887 65 1903 3659 321 Correctness
369 70 243 572 126 RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK WOULD HAVE BEEN A NPE
224 88 23 179 25 VA FORMAT STRING EXTRA ARGUMENTS PASSED
187 74 86 245 57 RC REF COMPARISON
128 57 338 450 106 UUF UNUSED FIELD
123 78 38 137 20 EC UNRELATED TYPES
102 93 5 72 19 BC IMPOSSIBLE CAST
102 77 34 117 16 UR UNINIT READ
102 54 365 443 48 NP NULL ON SOME PATH
100 78 30 110 41 UMAC UNCALLABLE METHOD OF ANONYMOUS CLASS
95 76 34 112 10 GC UNRELATED TYPES
87 62 123 206 22 UWF UNWRITTEN FIELD
28 41 2793 1968 485 NOISE NULL DEREFERENCE
0 37 5311 3127 293 NOISE OPERATION
0 36 17715 10225 1192 all noise warnings
0 35 5391 2905 258 NOISE METHOD CALL
0 34 4220 2225 212 NOISE FIELD REFERENCE
0 32 69162 33415 1698 all
0 28 49544 19531 1305 all non-correctness, non-noise warnings
-195 18 3493 767 87 DM NUMBER CTOR
-202 7 904 70 11 UPM UNCALLED PRIVATE METHOD
-209 13 1888 301 74 RCN REDUNDANT NULLCHECK OF NONNULL VALUE
20 such issues), we attribute their disappearance to either a change in the analysis,
or a systematic change to the code, and do not consider those issues. We also didn’t
consider issues that first appeared in the last 18 snapshots (since there wasn’t really
time to observe whether they would be removed). The time period did include the
Google fixit in May 2009.
Overall 32% of the issues considered were removed. We don’t know if this is
3Detailed descriptions of each bug pattern are available online at http://findbugs.cs.umd.
edu/inpractice/
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the “natural” average removal rate, since it is biased by the fact that some detectors
report far more issues than other detectors. Thus, we considered any removal rates
above 37% to be higher than expected, and removal rates lower than 27% to be
lower than expected. Based on those assumptions, we use a chi-square test to
decide whether the removal rate for each bug pattern was significantly above 37%
or below 27%. We use a negative chi value for those issues with a removal rate
below 27%. In Table 5.5, we report the results which had chi value above 70 (or
below -70), all of which are significant at the p < 0.05 level, as well as the noise
bug patterns and the groups of issues by category. The other columns in order are
the percentage of issues that were removed, the number of issues that remained in
the final snapshot (const), the number of issues that appeared in some version but
not in the final snapshot (fix ), the maximum number of issues that disappeared
between any two successive snapshots (max ), and the name of the pattern or group
of warnings (kind).
Note that we are modeling these issues as independent variables, but often
they are not. In some cases, a particular mistake (such as left shifting an int value
by a constant amount greater than 31) will manifest itself multiple times in a class
or method, and the issues will either all be fixed together or not at all. Sometimes,
a single change to the code will resolve a number of warnings that are associated
with the changed code. Furthermore, sometimes there will be a specific effort to
resolve a particular kind of issue. There are many variations on this problem, and
we try to capture some of this by reporting the maximum number of issues that
disappeared between any two successive snapshots. When a substantial fraction of
135
the total number of issues in a bug pattern disappear like this, it is reasonable to
believe that they were removed as part of a single effort or due to a change in the
FindBugs analysis engine. As noted before, we omit any cases where more than one
third of the issues were removed between one pair of successive iterations.
Some of the removed issues (such as unused or unread fields), may reflect the
refinement of incompletely implemented classes rather than fixing of defects. A
number of the bug patterns with significant removals (impossible casts, comparison
of unrelated types) are serious coding mistakes, so it is reasonable to postulate that
they were removed because they were causing problems.
The most significant removal rate was for the bug pattern that occurs when
a value is (redundantly) compared to null even though it has already been derefer-
enced. By contrast, a similar bug pattern (comparing a value to null even though
it is known to be non-null due to a previous comparison) is the most likely to per-
sist in the code. This suggests that this second bug pattern was not causing many
problems and the redundant comparisons in this case were mostly defensive.
Interestingly, noise null dereference warnings had a removal rate that was
significantly higher than the overall removal rate. Noise null dereference warnings
are only generated in cases where the value being dereferenced is not guaranteed to
be nonnull. Perhaps there are some bugs at these dereference sites, and it may be
valuable for developers to review all recently created locations where a dereferenced
value is not guaranteed to be nonnull.
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5.3 Finer-Grained Snapshots
The studies described so far are limited because they only capture defects that
make it into the software repository. But in practice, many defects are found and
fixed (or suppressed) before a developer checks any code into the repository, espe-
cially if the developer is alerted by static analysis tools in the IDE or build system.
We need to include these transient defects in our studies to more accurately under-
stand which bug patterns developers choose to fix, and to determine if developers
are wasting energy debugging problems that can be identified more quickly by static
analysis. Transient warnings may refer some of the more important defects that oc-
cur during development, since users often do some quality assurance activities before
committing any code into a repository, and certainly before issuing a release.
The primary challenge when capturing these transient defects is keeping the
data capture lightweight so that it does not interfere with development activities.
Some static analysis frameworks store all warnings in a central database for all
users in an organization, and hence already capture some of this information. Other
frameworks only record warnings locally, and hence need to be instrumented to save
this local information in a persistent location.
Another challenge is inferring the state of warnings. Specifically, we would
like to know when a defect gets fixed, causing the warning to disappear, or when a
warning is suppressed using source-level suppression or some other mechanism. We
may need to modify static analysis tools to get access to information about which
warnings are suppressed.
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In this section, I describe two approaches that attempt to collect more fine-
grained snapshots of development activities, to more accurately measure the comings
and goings of static analysis warnings. In Section 5.3.1, I describe and analyze fine-
grained snapshots which have been captured from student development activities
at the University of Maryland. To capture these snapshots, a copy of the student’s
workspace was saved to a CVS repository every time the student saved a file. In
Section 5.3.2, I describe the ATMetrics system—which I worked on at Microsoft—to
instrument a heterogenous pool of static analysis tools through the IDE. ATMetrics
is going to be deployed to thousands of developers at Microsoft [18].
5.3.1 The Marmoset Project
The Marmoset project was started at the University of Maryland to enable
students to submit programming assignments to a central server and get instant feed-
back about their performance [130]. A research component of this project also cap-
tured snapshots from students learning to program in Java, persisting their source
files to a CVS repository everytime they saved a change. Students exhibit different
behaviors from professionals, but this dataset can still reveal or confirm expected
trends about how warnings are added and removed during development.
We can use this dataset to investigate which defect classes are introduced
during development, and which ones are eventually fixed. In addition some defects
may be removed quickly, while others may persist, affecting the behavior of the
program until they are fixed. In addition to quantitative trends, we can also inspect
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the code looking for anecdotes that reveal some aspect of the user’s interaction
with defects. In particular, we may be able to identify cases where students are
“spinning their wheels” trying to make the program work, when the core defect is
something that can be identified by static analysis. If a study like this is conducted
in a commercial environment, these anecdotes could be used to estimate the cost of
NOT using static analysis, i.e., the effort wasted by developers trying to find defects
that can be detected almost instantaneously by static analysis.
5.3.1.1 Methodology
To conduct this study, we selected a few projects from two semesters, and
attempted to compile every snapshot available4. Of course, not every snapshot
compiles, because students sometimes save incomplete source files. Indeed, one of
the limitations of this approach is that we will get a different granularity of snapshots
from each student (see discussion on threats to validity in Section 5.3.1.5). We then
analyzed the compilable snapshots using FindBugs, and used FindBugs’ historical
analysis features to aggregate the results for each student, allowing us to measure
the number of compilable snapshots between when a warning is introduced and
when it is removed.
One immediate observation from our analysis is that some warnings were al-
ready present in the initial project code templates that were provided to students
at the start of each project. These mostly lower ranked warnings were duplicated
for each student, and hence accounted for about 25% of all warnings seen. We ex-
4Snapshots were available for students who formally provided consent.
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Table 5.6: Overview of Analyzed Marmoset Data
Semester 1 Semester 2
Number of Students 118 38
Number of Projects 2 3
Number of Warnings5 3,894 2,398
Warnings Fixed 2,750 (71%) 1,759 (73%)
Correctness Warnings 832 (21%) 722 (30%)
Rank 1-4 Warnings 187 (5%) 171 (7%)
clude these warnings from our analysis, and focus on warnings introduced during
development.
5.3.1.2 Overview of General Trends
Table 5.6 presents some high level facts from this study. When we exclude
warnings present in the templates provided to students, we observed over 6,000
warnings, and about 72% of them were fixed before the students’ final submissions.
Closer inspection of the warnings reveals that some of the most common bug
patterns refer to low impact defects that are only visible because of the fine gran-
ularity of this study. Table 5.7 lists the top 10 bug patterns. Five of the top six
(marked with an asterisk) are likely to be very transient, and occur frequently only
because students often save incomplete code. For example, Dead Local Store defects
occur when a value is saved in a local variable which is never used; this occurs often
as the student is writing the method and is always eventually fixed. Unsurprisingly,
these five bug patterns have high fix rates, above 89%. Other bug patterns may
5Excludes warnings present in the first revisions
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Table 5.7: Top Bug Patterns
Rank Bug Pattern Total Fixed
1 *DLS DEAD LOCAL STORE 1,298 1,180 (91%)
2 *URF UNREAD FIELD 985 913 (93%)
3 SBSC USE STRINGBUFFER CONCATENATION 611 90 (15%)
4 *UUF UNUSED FIELD 465 424 (91%)
5 *NP UNWRITTEN FIELD 355 317 (89%)
6 *UWF UNWRITTEN FIELD 240 235 (98%)
7 SIC INNER SHOULD BE STATIC 157 103 (66%)
8 GC UNRELATED TYPES 157 137 (87%)
9 NP NONNULL RETURN VIOLATION 128 63 (49%)
10 OS OPEN STREAM 126 39 (31%)
12 RV RETURN VALUE IGNORED 119 105 (88%)
16 NP ALWAYS NULL 62 57 (92%)
have some transient instances like this, but these five bug patterns are the most
dominant, and they skew our results. Hence we exclude them from the rest of our
analysis. Doing so reduces the number of warnings to 2,949, and the number fixed
to 1,440, or 49%.
The rest of the top bug patterns exhibit two general trends. Some bug patterns
with high fix rates (marked with a ) appear to be serious defects that are fixed
often. The remaining bug patterns are low impact bug patterns that have lower fix
rates. We manually inspected some of the bug patterns in these two groups to see
if the high impact defects are being fixed because they are causing problems, and
the low impact defects are being ignored because they have no effect. We discuss
our observations in Section 5.3.1.4.
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Table 5.8: Fix Rates for Different Subgroups
% remain fixed category rank priority
86.0 50 306 C 1-4
85.8 51 307 1-4
81.5 47 207 C 1-4 H
81.3 48 208 1-4 H
78.4 207 752 C
75.5 164 506 C H
66.0 317 615 H
48.8 1,509 1,440
5.3.1.3 Bug Patterns with High Fix Rates
Interestingly, once we exclude the highly transient defects described in the
previous section, the most severe bug patterns tended to be the ones with the highest
fix rates. Table 5.8 illustrates what happens when we group defects by bug rank, by
priority, or by category. It shows that any combination of high priority, correctness,
or Rank 1-4 (scariest) issues results in a fix rate that is statistically significantly
higher than the overall fix rate. These are the bug patterns we are most interested
in inspecting manually to see what sorts of problems they are causing for students.
This high fix rate also partly confirms the survivor effect discussed earlier in Section
4.3, i.e., that the most serious defects are generally fixed, even if the user is not
using static analysis. Of course, in some cases, it is possible that students may have
run FindBugs and fixed the defects in response to an alert. But, particularly for
the defects that persist for many snapshots, it appears that the student was often
fixing the defect as they were trying to make the program work correctly.
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5.3.1.4 Manually Inspecting Defects that Persist
Sometimes a student would notice the problem soon after introducing it, and
fix it immediately. About 37% of resolved issues were fixed after just 1 snapshot
(28% if we exclude the highly transient bug patterns flagged in Table 5.7). Other
times, the problem would persist for several snapshots before being fixed. A manual
investigation of some of these scenarios reveals that in many cases, the student is
advancing the development of their project, oblivious to the problem because they
have not tried to run it yet. At some point, they may run local tests that fail; this
leads to a period of debugging and the student needs to make a context switch to
edit the older code.
An example of this sequence of events is shown in Figure 5.1. Here the student
ignores the return value of String.substring(). The student continues develop-
ment for about an hour, then takes a break and returns the next day without noticing
the bug. At some point, it is likely that the student ran local unit tests, and would
have noticed that two of them were failing. The process of debugging these failures
would have revealed that a critical string contained the wrong value. After iterating
through some fix attempts, the student recognizes the problem, almost 24 hours
after FindBugs could have flagged it.
The other part of the survivor effect is that defects that do not matter remain
undetected and unresolved. We observed some cases of seemingly serious defects that
remain in the last revision and do not prevent students from passing the assignment.
An example is shown in Figure 5.2. Here the student checks if a container of Edge<E>
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August 3, 12:55pm: adds buggy code





12:55 to 1:37 pm (42 minutes): adds code to other methods. Project is failing two local tests.
Takes a BREAK for 22 hours.
August 4, 11:59am: attempts to fix. Local tests still failing.
- vertices.substring(0, vertices.length()-2);
+ vertices.substring(0, vertices.lastIndexOf(","));
12:01pm: fixes the bug. Local tests now passing.
- vertices.substring(0, vertices.lastIndexOf(","));
+ vertices = vertices.substring(0, vertices.lastIndexOf(","));
Figure 5.1: Bug: Ignoring the Return Value of String.substring()
elements contains a Vertex<E>. This check will always return false, but it appears to
be purely defensive since the student throws a runtime exception when the condition
is true.
5.3.1.5 Threats to Validity
The analysis of student snapshots is limited by the fact that we can only ap-
proximately infer students’ activities; we do not know when they run tests or see
exceptions. In addition, the granularity of snapshots may be very different for differ-
ent students, because we can only analyze compiling snapshots, and some students
save often (including incomplete code fragments with syntax errors), while others
make substantial code changes between saves. Ultimately, the student projects pro-
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 
1 private LinkedList<Edge<E>> edges;
2 public int getAdjEdgeCost(Vertex<E> endVertex) {
3 if(edges.contains(endVertex)){
4 throw new IllegalArgumentException("Edge already in graph");
5 }
6 ...
7 }  
FindBugs: “Vertex is incompatible with expected argument type Edge on line 3”
Figure 5.2: Bug: Unrelated Types in Generic Container
vide an opportunity to illustrate the introduction and removal of warnings, which
we would be unable to do with confidential commercial data.
Another threat to internal validity is that since students are working on the
same programming assignments, they are likely to make the same kinds of mistakes.
So some warnings may occur disproportionately often. Because this threat, we do
not draw too much significance from the absolute number of defects that occur, but
instead focus whether they are resolved, and make qualitative observations about
whether they matter. Finally, some observations in this study may not generalize
because student development and debugging skills are not equivalent to professional
skills.
5.3.2 ATMetrics: Instrumenting Static Analysis on the Desktop
The Analysis Technologies team at Microsoft manages a number of static anal-
ysis tools and provides support to thousands of developers who use these tools.
ATMetrics (Analysis Technologies Metrics) was an effort to better understand how
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developers are interacting with these tools, and learn from their experiences, with
the ultimate goals of improving the tools and associated processes, and demonstrat-
ing the value of using tools. In particular, ATMetrics focused on getting previously
unavailable information: the developer’s activities on the desktop. Microsoft de-
velopers likely fix or suppress many issues before the code is checked in because
they are alerted by the build system, and because some warnings can prevent code
integrations.
To capture this missing information, ATMetrics setup lightweight instrumenta-
tion on developer workstations to capture metrics on which warnings occur, which
ones are fixed or suppressed, and other details about user interaction with static
analysis. The primary challenges of putting together a system like this in an in-
dustrial context were correctly and robustly inferring the actions of developers with
very little overhead, and supporting many heterogeneous static analysis tools. In
addition, the IDE containing much of the instrumentation was still under develop-
ment during this effort. In this section, I present an overview of the key questions
driving the design of ATMetrics, and the implementation challenges I encountered.
I do not include any results because they are not yet available.
5.3.2.1 Key Questions
The most basic question is: which warnings occur on the desktop, which ones
are fixed and which ones are suppressed? If a warning occurs often but is generally
suppressed or ignored, then this may indicate that the associated analysis needs to
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be tweaked or the warning deprioritized.
Another question is: how do static analysis tools impact developers? We ex-
pect developers to modify their coding styles as static analysis tools alert them of
best practices or code conventions they were previously unaware of. We can validate
this expectation if we observe that certain warnings are introduced at lower fre-
quencies as the developer becomes more experienced. Alternatively we may observe
different patterns in different teams or at different parts of the software development
cycle. All these trends can inform the policies we recommend to groups and the way
we promote tools.
One possible impact of tools on developers comes from the presence of issues in
legacy code. When a developer makes even small changes to a legacy file, they may
be confronted with many old warnings. One way to deal with this is to baseline old
warnings, i.e., to temporarily hide them from view. The rationale is that warnings
in older code are less likely to be serious since this code has undergone extensive
quality assurance testing. We expect that developers will fix more issues sooner
if they are only shown new ones. Using our instrumentation, we can compare the
fix rates of developers that hide old issues with those of developers that keep them
visible.
The ultimate goal is to understand how usage of static analysis affects the
quality of the final software product. This is in general a hard question to answer
since there are many factors that may affect component quality. Hence our goal is
simply to look for trends and correlations between static analysis usage patterns and
existing business metrics. We can use internal metrics about components such as the
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number of reported crashes or security flaws, and compare these metrics with data
from our instrumentation including fix and suppress rates, new issue introduction
rates, and whether baselining is used or low priority issues are filtered out. We can
also compare our instrumentation data with the policies and practices we observe
in different groups.
5.3.2.2 Implementation and Challenges
The ATMetrics implementation builds upon existing platforms and processes
used in Microsoft. Specifically, the instrumentation was designed to be a lightweight
add-on to a static analysis viewer, and the custom data points are transmitted
and aggregated using Microsoft’s Software Quality Metrics (SQM) [101], a platform
for collecting remote data from thousands of volunteers, used in many Microsoft
products.
One of the primary challenges in constructing this instrumentation was infer-
ring whether issues are being fixed, suppressed or ignored. We are not parsing the
source code or even monitoring every key stroke as this would be too much over-
head. All we can see is when issues appear and disappear. Based on this, we have
to classify issues into one of the three groups: Fixed, Suppressed or Ignored.
Any issues displayed in the viewer are moved to the Ignored group. The
exception is baselined issues, which can appear in the viewer if the user changes
appropriate filters.
If an issue that was previously displayed in the viewer disappears, there are
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several inferences that we could make. An issue could disappear because it was
fixed, because it was suppressed, because code churn put the issue out of reach of
the analysis or even because the containing source file was not analyzed. We do not
have enough information in the viewer to make all these inferences, so we need to
refer to the static analysis tools to get more information. This is another example
of information that is only available to us on the desktop.
To detect which issues have been suppressed, we query the static analysis tools
for the full list of all issues generated before suppression is applied. Any issues in
this full list that do not appear in the viewer can be inferred to be suppressed. This
strategy is limited by the fact that we have many heterogeneous tools and is not
implemented for all tools.
Any issue that does not appear in the viewer and is not suppressed is considered
fixed, unless its containing source file was excluded from the most recent analysis
run. A file could be excluded because it is not actively checked out, or because
the developer chose to build only a subset of files. If we can determine that the
containing source file was excluded, then we allow the issue to retain its existing
classification.
More details about the implementation have been included in a technical report
[18].
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5.4 Summary and Related Work
Through my research mining code repositories, I have observed evidence that
important defects are fixed early, while those that do not matter are left behind.
This reinforces the notion that static analysis should be run early to be most useful.
And some of those defects fixed early may have been a pain to resolve. In my study
of marmoset data, I observed students expending effort to address problems that
they could have found and fixed easily using FindBugs.
To handle the noisy nature of the data in the repository, I have experimented
with using noise warnings to represent code churn. Noise warnings are designed
to depend on some aspect of the surrounding context, and their presence does not
signify a real defect. Hence their addition and removal should be unrelated to the
actual effort to fix any defects, and should track closely with the natural changes
in the code. So it is interesting to observe the classes of defects that are fixed
significantly more often than noise defects, even if the project is not using static
analysis. Equally interesting is that some defects are fixed significantly less often
than noise. In addition, some subgroups of issues (high priority, or issues in the
correctness category) are fixed significantly more often than other defects, validating
the effort in FindBugs to classify these warnings accordingly.
Some researchers have started mining software repositories to capture informa-
tion about the density of static analysis warnings, which can be used in subsequent
studies and projections. Nagappan and Ball [106] studied the pre-release defect
densities for Windows Server 2003 and found a strong correlation between the den-
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sity of static analysis warnings in different components and the pre-release defect
density identified by testing. Buse and Weimer [30] found a correlation between the
presence of FindBugs warnings in components and a custom metric for readability.
Other researchers have focused on predicting important bug patterns based on
which warnings were fixed in the past. Ruthruff et al. [125] used logistic regression
models to predict which warnings will be fixed based on factors associated with
warnings that were fixed – factors such as the age of the source file containing the
warning, the number of warnings in this file, and the file churn. Kim and Ernst
predicted which warnings should be ranked high based on how long they remained
in the code base [78] and which warnings were fixed [79]. They did not assume
developers saw the static analysis warnings but correlated the removal of a warning
to its importance, and they increased their confidence in this removal by emphasizing
warnings removed during bug fix commits. Our studies are similar to these except
that we introduce noise detectors to help us identify what portion of the removal
rate may be due to the natural code churn of software development.
Some of these studies depend on the identification of “fix commits,” or changes
in the repository that resolve a defect. Usually fix commits are identified by high-
lighting the commit messages that link to a report in a separate bug tracking system.
These fix commits are then used to flag significant warning removals, or to track
down and study the bad changes that precipitated the need for a fix in the first
place, so called “fix-inducing” commits. But there are pitfalls to this approach for
identifying fix commits. In related earlier work, I reviewed potential fix commits
(and associated source code) from two Java projects and one Python project [14].
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I observed that not all bug reports are associated with a defect; a sometimes sub-
stantial number are requests for enhancements or reminders of needed tasks. So
associated source code changes may not be fix commits. Even when the bug reports
are related to a defect, the associated source code changes may include other activ-
ities such as adding test cases, or refactoring code. And even when the source code
changes are fixing defects, the fix may not be located near the actual defect [14].
The question of finding fix-inducing commits has been explored and refined
by researchers focused on creating a link between the bug report database and
the code repository using commit messages [127, 138, 80, 11]. Kim et al. [80]
and Williams et al. [138] manually reviewed the source code of fix commits to
decide if they were true fixes, but did not review the bug reports to distinguish
between defects that refer to incorrect behavior and those that are enhancements.
Antoniol et al [9] distinguished between enhancements and bugs in bug reports using
automatic classification techniques which could be instructive to future research
efforts to identify bug fix commits.
Other projects have explored instrumenting software development activities,
though I am not aware of any other work that instruments static analysis tools in
a commercial environment to capture developer interactions on the desktop. One
popular framework for instrumenting software development activities is Hackystat
[73, 72], a general purpose framework that enables software projects to define, col-
lect and analyze a wide variety of metrics. The data collection system I used at
Microsoft—SQM—was designed for robust lightweight collection from millions of
customers, not just software teams. I chose to use SQM because it is supported
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within Microsoft and widely used in many products. But I still had to make many
of the same considerations and tradeoffs Hackystat users make including assuring
data correctness, distinguishing files and projects, making the system configurable,
and scaling to potentially millions of data points.
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Chapter 6
Null Pointer Bugs in Practice
Much of the focus of static analysis tools in Java is on detecting potential
null pointer dereferences (NPDs). Within FindBugs, significant effort has been
devoted to tweak the numerous bug detectors that are associated with null pointer
errors. And many publications from the research community focus on null pointers
[63, 107, 16, 112].
This focus is not surprising, because null pointer exceptions (NPEs) seem to
show up regularly in Java executions, and can be difficult to debug. This is in
part because many API methods (including many in the Java language) return null
to represent “no answer,” rather than throw an exception or some other action.
For example, Map.get(K key) returns null if the key is not associated with any
value, File.listFiles() returns null if the target file does not represent a readable
directory, and Queue.poll() returns null if the queue is empty. The presence of
null in languages like Java is the source of some controversy, with one observer
describing null as a billion dollar mistake [61], and others regarding null return
values as dishonest [111] or evil [7].
So static analysis tools seek to make a positive contribution by finding potential
NPDs, and throughout this thesis, I have presented numerous examples of successful
finds. But there are pitfalls in practice; enough to encourage us to investigate the
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ways NPDs occur in real software, and the types of problems found by static analysis.
One pitfall is that in memory-safe languages like Java, potential NPDs do not
necessarily signal defective code. Sometimes potential NPDs occur only in scenarios
where expected preconditions or invariants are violated, and the only reasonable
action is to throw some kind of runtime exception. Of course, it may be more
informative in some of these cases to throw an exception that enables debuggers to
better understand the source of the problem, but always doing so would make the
source code more complicated, and hard to read and maintain. It makes sense to
throw an NPE when a null value is supplied to a parameter that is required to be
non-null. But doing so by way of an explicitly constructed exception is only slightly
more informative than doing so by dereferencing the null value.
Another pitfall is that NPEs are often the conspicuous side-effect of more
subtle logic errors. Static analysis is good at directing developers to the site of a
potential NPD, and even in some cases to the site of the source of the null value.
But this may not be sufficient aid in cases where a more inconspicuous problem is
at fault.
Finally, static analysis tools are limited in their ability to correctly infer the
nullness of values, and sometimes flag cases that are impossible. Even when the
analysis is correct, we observe some cases where the circumstances that would lead
to a null value assignment are highly unlikely in practice.
In this chapter, I explore null pointer defects in practice, highlighting some of
these pitfalls, and discussing the pros and cons of API design choices that lead to
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the spread of NPDs1. In Section 6.1, I review reasons why a potential NPD may
not signal defective code. In Section 6.2, I describe a study in which we inspected
dozens of real NPEs reported in bug tracking systems, to understand what caused
them and how they were fixed. This study indicated that many errors were not
associated with mishandled null values, but rather were unrelated logic errors which
manifested as null pointer exceptions. In Section 6.3, I present a comparison of
different null pointer analysis tools, identifying how often they found cases that were
impossible, or implausible, and highlighting some of the challenges of the analysis.
Tools included in this review were XYLEM [107], Coverity Prevent [66], Fortify
SCA [128], Eclipse TPTP [48], and FindBugs. Finally, in Section 6.4, I discuss API
design considerations and the challenge of making static analysis effective for null
pointer defects.
6.1 When is it a Defect?
Recall that we define a defect as a problem that developers would generally
choose to fix. One would assume, then, that any feasible potential NPD must be a
defect. But in managed languages like Java, a reasonable developer may choose to
pass when faced with concern about NPDs, by assuming certain preconditions are
met.
Consider the example in Figure 6.1, which attempts to delete a directory. The





2 ∗ Deletes the directory at dirName and all its files.
3 ∗ Fails if dirName has any subdirectories.
4 ∗/
5 public static void deleteDir(File dir) {
6 File[] files = dir.listFiles();




11 }  
Figure 6.1: A potential null pointer dereference if dir is not a directory
resented by dir. But this call can also return null, which it does if dir does not
represent a directory. The value returned is unconditionally dereferenced on line 7,
without any check to confirm that dir is a directory. Some researchers consider this
a defect [112], but FindBugs does not. This is because there may be an unstated pre-
condition to the deleteDir() method that dir should refer to a readable directory,
and if this precondition is violated, then a runtime exception should be thrown. If
this is the case, then the most significant defect is outside the deleteDir() method.
Within the deleteDir() method, the only reasonable “fix” is to throw a more infor-
mative runtime exception, such as an IllegalArgumentException, which would make
the problem slightly easier to debug.
If deleteDir() is a public utility method in a library, then throwing an NPE
because of an invalid argument is confusing and undesirable behavior. In the next
section, we document some cases where developers do resolve a potential NPD by
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throwing a different runtime exception. If, on the other hand, deleteDir() is a
private method used only within a specific application, then developers may choose
to ensure that it is never called with an inappropriate argument, and fix any un-
expected exceptions by tracking down the fault outside the deleteDir() method.
Constructing explicit exceptions makes the code more verbose and hard to read,
and some situations call for establishing and enforcing preconditions instead.
To clarify, I am not suggesting that an analysis which flags this case as a
potential NPD is technically incorrect. Indeed, some developers may want to see
warnings that point to problems like this. But the question of whether the flagged
code should be modified is subjective, and depends in practice on the priorities
and constraints on the organization. Remember that every code change raises the
possibility of introducing a new error, and takes time away from other software
quality activities.
In fact, there is an issue with the deleteDir() method in Figure 6.1 that is
potentially more serious than the null pointer issue. The delete() method returns
false if the deletion was not successful, and the deleteDir() method ignores this
return value. As a result, the deleteDir() method might delete some but not all
files in the directory, and not provide any warning, or signal that the deletion was
incomplete.
Figure 6.2 illustrates another example. The createTask() method is used
frequently in the Apache Ant project2 to create a new instance of a specified task.
As the documentation in the figure indicates, if the task name is not recognized, then
2http://ant.apache.org/
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Source: Apache Ant | org.apache.tools.ant.Project 
1172 /∗∗ ...
1173 ∗ @return an instance of the specified task, or <code>null</code> if
1174 ∗ the task name is not recognised. ...
1175 ∗/
1176 public Task createTask(String taskType) throws BuildException {
1177 ...
1178 }  
Figure 6.2: Method in Ant that sometimes returns null
a null value will be returned. If this return value is unconditionally dereferenced,
a potential NPD could occur. A number of static analysis tools issue dozens of
warnings for these potential NPDs [107] (also see Section 6.3). However, it seems
unlikely that developers will often use an unrecognized task name, since usually only
a few standard and some custom tasks are used within each project. Some standard
task definitions may be unavailable if Ant is started with a corrupt properties file,
but developers may not find this a compelling enough reason to insert explicit null
checks everywhere createTask() is called.
One common thread through these examples is that they involve standard
API calls (from Java and Ant) that sometimes return null, but usually return a
non-null value. Developers may choose to deal with these APIs by checking for null
every time they are used, or enforcing logical rules and policies to ensure they are
never used in a way that returns null. If developers choose that latter approach,
then static analysis warnings about potential NPDs involving these API calls are
not useful. However, there may be some opportunity for developers to customize
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the static analysis and use it to enforce the logical rules and policies. I talk more
about custom bug detectors in Chapter 8.
6.2 Mining Bug Reports for Null Pointer Exceptions
One way to better understand how NPEs impact code quality in practice is to
examine bug reports from real projects. We manually reviewed some bug reports and
associated source code changes from the Apache Ant project to better understand
why NPEs occur and how developers deal with them. This gives us an opportunity
to assess how much the different static analysis techniques might help with the tasks
of finding and resolving problems. This also gives us an opportunity to speculate
on the helpfulness of tools that enable developers to track down the source of the
null value. Specifically, we examine some of the bug reports highlighted in previous
research to use static analysis to assist developers debugging NPEs [126].
During the review, we observed that many problems were not due to mishan-
dling null values, but a logic error which manifests itself as an NPE. Usually the
developer has to fix this root logic error, but in some cases it was more convenient
to fix the dereference site by anticipating null and recovering.
A review like this is necessarily subjective, but we restrict ourselves to ques-
tions that can generally be answered objectively3.
3Detailed results from this review are available at http://findbugs.cs.umd.edu/inpractice/
160
6.2.1 Procedure
We identified candidate bug reports by searching Ant’s Bugzilla database4 for
Null Pointer Exceptions. We reviewed 50 reports including all the issues that were
unresolved (two), and six issues that are referenced in [126], with the remaining
issues selected randomly. During the review, we examined the bug report comments
and the associated source code changes looking for trends and answers to specific
questions we had.
We used a number of strategies to identify the relevant source code. Most bug
reports included a stack trace which we used to identify the source line where the
exception occurred. In addition, many source code changesets associated with bug
reports included a bug report number in the commit message, following a convention
used by the project’s developers. We were able to find most of the relevant source
changes by searching the code repository5 for this number. Where these strategies
did not work, we relied on the bug report comments to understand and find the
problem. In some cases, it was helpful to search duplicate issues for a stack trace.
In our final results, we excluded 5 cases for which we could not find enough
information to make our classifications with confidence, often because the developers
were making many refactoring and design changes not necessarily related to the
reported problem. We also excluded 4 reports that were not relevant because they
did not contain NPEs, or in one case, the NPE was in the reporter’s test case. In





We looked through a number of bug reports to decide what classification
schemes might lead to the most objective results, while also providing useful in-
formation. In the end, we settled on the following primary classifications which do
not capture all the trends we observed but allow us to be fairly objective during our
review.
6.2.2.1 Dereference Site Classification
This classification helps us decide if the original developer made incorrect
assumptions at the dereference site or if their assumptions were correct. We use this
to indicate whether the problem was due to mishandling of null values at the point
where the NPE occurred or due to a logic error elsewhere.
Local logic error: The code handles a potentially null value in inconsistent ways. For
example, a variable may be unconditionally dereferenced, and then checked
for null a few lines later without writing to it in between. In this case, the
developer first assumed the value was not null, then assumed it might be null.
Should have checked for null: The code should have anticipated null and handled
it. For example, we use this designation if the unconditionally dereferenced
value was returned from a method that specifies that it can return null.
Unrecoverable null: Code correctly expects the value to be nonnull. For example,
many methods explicitly indicate in the comments that a given parameter
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should not be null. This designation represents the scenario where a null
value reaching the dereference site probably indicates a problem somewhere
else in the code.
In each review, particularly when deciding between Should have checked for
null and Unrecoverable null, we may have to look at surrounding code for evidence
before assigning the issue to one classification or the other.
6.2.2.2 Local Analysis Check
Is it obvious from local information the circumstance under which the value is
null? Here we use two classifications:
Local check suffices: We can determine the source of the null value by just looking
at the local method, or reading the specifications of methods called in the local
method.
Nonlocal search needed: It is not obvious from the local information why the value
is null.
This classification gives us some idea of how easy it is to understand the
problem and how often an analysis technique would have to search deeply to find
the null source.
6.2.2.3 Corrective Action
What was done to resolve the problem? This classification only applies to
those issues that have been resolved and where we can identify the corrective source
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code or changeset. Our classifications are:
Fix local logic error: Correct inconsistent handling of a value within the method
containing the dereference site
Anticipate null, recover: Introduce a guard in the local method to check for null
and handle it specially, or avoid dereferencing it.
Throw better exception: Detect the null value and throw a more appropriate excep-
tion. This can done in the local method containing the null dereference or in
a preceding method. Like the previous classification, this fix anticipates null,
but it does not recover. Rather it causes the program to fail more gracefully.
Prevent null occurrence: Change code logic so that null does not occur at the deref-
erence site. This fix can either prevent the original null assignment from
occurring or avoid calling the method containing the NPD in a way that leads
to an exception.
Extensive refactor: In some cases, developers make many changes to refactor the
code, or add or remove features as part of the fix. This could even involve
removing the method which contained the null dereference.
6.2.2.4 Other Classifications
In addition to the primary classifications mentioned above, we also made some
basic observations about each issue:
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Local Should Check Unrecoverable
Fix Local Logic 0 0 0
Anticipate Null 0 9 8*
Throw Exception 1 3 4
Prevent Null 1 3 9*
Refactor 0 0 3
*For two reports the corrective action was to both anticipate and recover from null, and to prevent null from
happening. We split each of these cases, adding 0.5 to each row for each case.
Table 6.1: Corrective Action Classification
Dereferenced Value: From the perspective of the dereference site, the dereferenced
value can be a parameter, a field, a value returned from a method, or a local
variable
Where is the fix? The corrective action can be near the dereference site (i.e., in the
same method), near the null source, near both or near neither.
6.2.3 Observations
In Table 6.1, I cross-tabulate each Dereference Site classification with each
Corrective Action. I observe that 24 reviews received an Unrecoverable null classi-
fication (or 59% of the issues that received classifications). Only a third of these
issue were resolved by anticipating null and recovering. For many of these issues,
the appropriate solution was to change the way a value was initialized to prevent
null from occurring in the first place. Usually this involved replacing null strings
and null containers with empty strings and empty containers respectively.
By contrast, 15 reviews (37%) received a Should have checked for null classifi-
cation and 12 of these were resolved by anticipating null (3 threw a better exception,
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while 9 anticipated null and recovered). In many cases, the developer simply forgot
to check the value returned from a Java API or other API call that is known to
return null.
In the following sections, I present some examples that illustrate these obser-
vations, and provide more observations from the review.
6.2.3.1 Handling “Unrecoverable null” issues
For most of the Unrecoverable null issues, the corrective action was to prevent
the null value from reaching the dereference site or to throw a different exception.
These represent the cases where it did not make sense to check for null at the
dereference site, and the developer had to instead dig out the root problem. Often
unrecoverable null situations occur when a developer unconditionally dereferences
a parameter expecting it to be non null. There may also be cases where a devel-
oper unconditionally dereferences the return value of a method like Map.get(key)
because the developer expects (or needs) the key to be in the map at that point in
the code.
For example, in issue 173966 the reporter observes an NPE when redirecting
inputs from a file to an Ant task. The NPE occurred when the setNewProperty()
method passes its parameters to a Java Hashtable (which does not accept null
values). Developers were not expecting null values to be passed to any of the pa-
rameters because they were reading from a stream. Developers concluded that a
BufferedReader in the input handler was reading more from the input than nec-
6Available at https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=17396.
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essary and replaced it with a DataInputStream (see changeset 2741857). In this
case, simply checking for null near the dereference site would not have fixed the root
problem.
Another example is issue 5980 in which the reporter observes that the process
for executing shell commands is broken on Windows XP. After digging into the
problem, the reporter notices the following code fragment is missing a reference to
Windows XP: 
if ( osname.indexOf("nt") >= 0 || osname.indexOf("2000") >= 0) {
...
}  
This inadequate code fragment occurs in a number of places, and is updated
(in changeset 271003) to include a reference to XP: 
if ( osname.indexOf("nt") >= 0 || osname.indexOf("2000") >= 0 ||
osname.indexOf("xp") >= 0) {
...
}  
Table 6.2 provides more descriptions of the cases we observed in which an
unrecoverable null issue was resolved by preventing the null assignment. In many
cases, the solution was to change the way the value was initialized. Issue 38056 is a
good example of a null string initialization that was replaced with an empty string
initialization.
Table 6.2 also describes some of the cases where an unrecoverable null was fixed
by throwing a different exception, or refactoring the code. In all the cases where a
7Available at http://fisheye6.atlassian.com/changelog/ant/?cs=274185.
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Table 6.2: Some “Unrecoverable null” issues fixed by Preventing Null, Throwing
Exception, or Refactoring
Issue # Change-set Corrective Action Comments
5980 271003 prevent-null-occurrence Ant process for executing shell commands is
broken on Windows XP, because the code that
initializes the “shell launcher” fails to account
for XP.
9069 272715 prevent-null-occurrence The command line for an Execute task was ac-
cidentally left uninitialized prior to executing
the task.
9138 272826 prevent-null-occurrence The cleanup() method in AntClassLoader
sets some fields to null. Unfortunately, the
instance of AntClassLoader is reused after
cleanup() is called. Fixed by removing the null
assignments from cleanup()
17396 274185 prevent-null-occurrence A method which expects non-null parameters
is receiving null from an input stream, causing
the exception. Fixed by changing the type
of the input stream from BufferedReader to
DataInputStream.
38056 359329 prevent-null-occurrence A string parameter is allowed to be null,
though it is dereferenced later in a method
that expects it to be non-null. Fixed by re-
placing null initializations with empty string.
11833 273253 throw-better-exception NPE thrown if websphere.home property not
set. Fixed by throwing BuildException
with message instructing user to set web-
sphere.home property.
25826 275854 throw-better-exception NPE thrown if DestDir attribute not set.
Fixed by throwing BuildException with mes-
sage instructing user to set DestDir property.
2442 269834 extensive-refactor Did not anticipate that two tests could be
run concurrently. Fix makes many changes to
make code more thread safe, including elimi-
nating a field that was causing race conditions.
15994 273546 extensive-refactor A Buffered reader was returning null, which
was passed into a method that uncondition-
ally dereferenced. The fixer deleted both the
source and dereference site, opting to use a
completely different and more robust method
to fix the problem.
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different exception is thrown, the developers recognized that the root problem was
that some external prerequisite had not been satisfied. For example, an environment
variable or property may not have been set, resulting in an unwanted null value.
Since the developer cannot advance without this prerequisite, the code is updated
to throw a more appropriate exception, with a message to users on what they need
to do to remedy the problem. The extensive refactoring cases represent situations
where the root problem is more complicated than the apparent NPE. In some sense,
the developers may be grateful for the NPEs which exposed underlying design flaws.
6.2.3.2 Anticipating null to resolve unrecoverable null issues
The number of cases where an Unrecoverable null issue was fixed by antici-
pating null was surprisingly high. This seems like a bad practice because a null
value in these cases usually indicates a problem elsewhere in the code. Upon closer
inspection, we observed that this practice was probably harmless, or the developers
accounted for the possibility of a problem elsewhere in the code.
Bug report 5637 is an interesting example of this. The reporter observed
an NPE in XMLJunitResultFormatter whenever he threw anything from a Test
Setup wrapper. The problem was in the endTest() method where a dereferenced
variable, currentTest, could be null. This surprised developers because one would
expect that currentTest would always be non null when a test ends. After some
investigation, developers determined that an exception in the Test Setup wrapper
could lead to endTest() being invoked even though startTest() had not been
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called. Since the Test Setup wrapper is a JUnit extension and not a part of Ant,
they could not investigate or resolve the problem there. They decided to fix the
code by calling startTest() if currentTest is null (changeset 270512). This did
not solve the root problem (calling endTest() without calling startTest()) but it
appeared to be adequate, and one of the commenters added:
“I think your patch is OK, however it would be nice to add a little comment
in the code to explain why it is necessary.”
Hence the solution explains this fix, including a comment that has persisted
for eight years through the current version of ANT: 
// Fix for bug #5637 − if a TestSetup is used and
// throws an exception during setUp then startTest
// would never have been called
if (currentTest == null) {
startTest(test);
currentTest = (Element) testElements.get(test);
}  
Table 6.3 lists some of the other cases we observed that were classified like
this. Many of these represent unusual corner cases, and perhaps simply anticipating
null was a convenient solution.
6.2.3.3 Anticipating null and Preventing null
As Table 6.1 indicates, there were two cases where the corrective action was to
both anticipate null, and to prevent null from happening. We interpret this as the de-
velopers programming defensively in case their efforts to prevent null from happening
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Table 6.3: Some “Unrecoverable null” issues fixed by Anticipating and Guarding for
Null
Issue # Change-set Corrective Action Comments
5637 270512 anticipate-null-recover NPE occurs in endTest() because
the currentTest field could be
null. This unusual behavior oc-
curs if the test setup fails, and
startTest() is not called. Fixed
by calling startTest() from inside
the endTest() method.
6871 271748 anticipate-null-recover A change to a super class causes
a field that was previously as-
sumed to be non-null to be null.
Fixed by adding a guard to check
for null.
24344 275602 anticipate-null-recover Two API methods return null
when called from a forked task.
Fix by only dereferencing return
value if not null.
24440 275615 anticipate-null-recover A parameter is unexpectedly null
with certain inputs to an Ant
Task. Fixed by returning from




The root problem is that a string
attribute “antlib” is never set, so
the fix is to set this attribute.
However as a defensive measure
at the dereference site, an empty
string is used if value is null.
44009 704496 prevent-null-occurrence
anticipate-null-recover
A Vector field is not initialized
by some users. Fixed by using
an empty Vector to initialize, but
also guard against null at the
dereference sites.
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were unsuccessful. These cases are included in the descriptions in Table 6.3. One ex-
ample of this is bug report 44009 where an NPE occurred in the MimeMailer.send()
method because the headers field could be unexpectedly null. Developers expected
all users of this class to initialize the headers field but this was not happening in all
cases. They resolved this by fixing the classes that failed to initialize headers, but
then as a precaution they added a guard to the MimeMailer.send() to anticipate
null and recover.
This fix illustrates a principle which I will discuss more in Section 6.4.1: it is
usually better to use an empty container to indicate the exceptional or uninitialized
case, than to use null. In this example, headers is a Java Vector that was initialized
to null by default to indicate “no value.” The fix changes this default initialization
to an empty vector, which leads to more robust code.
6.2.3.4 Handling “Should check for null” issues
Table 6.4 describes some of the issues that were classified as Should have
checked for null. In many cases, the developer simply forgot to check the value
returned from an API call that is known to return null. Hence the solution is
usually to insert a guard and skip the offending code.
For example, issues 23320 and 26222 refer to calls to the getClassLoader()
method in the Java Class type. This method returns null for any classes loaded by
the “bootstrap class loader,” which is the loader for the initial set of classes. Usually
this set includes just core classes like String, but in various IDEs it may include
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some Ant classes. Developers check the return value of this method in some other
places in the Ant code, but in these two cases, they neglected to do so.
In some cases, the method returning null is another Ant method which in-
dicates in its specification that it can return null. Sometimes due to inadequate
documentation, the called method does not explicitly say it can return null, but
it clearly does so in the first few lines. For example, in issue 40847, the reporter
observes an NPE at the following statement:
 
StringTokenizer tok = new StringTokenizer(classpath.getValue()," ");  
The problem is that classpath.getValue() can return null; indeed its first
three lines are:
 
if (values.size() == 0) {
return null;
}  
The developers fix this by adding a guard to avoid the string tokenization if
null is returned (in changeset 474481). Here part of the blame probably belongs to
the getValue() method, which does not explicitly specify that it can return null.
And it may be better for this method to return an empty string but developers
cannot change this behavior because of backwards compatibility8.
Table 6.4 also lists two interesting cases where developers choose to prevent
the null occurrence, instead of guarding for null. In issue 43292, the null value
8One interesting note is that the original reporter found this problem with Parasoft’s Jtest
BugDetective, which uses interprocedural static analysis to “explore execution paths” [54].
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Table 6.4: Issues classified as “Should have checked for null”
Issue # Change-set Corrective Action Comments
10360 273214 anticipate-null-recover Dereferences the return value of a method that
returns null through a condition in its first 2
lines. Fixed by continuing to next loop itera-
tion when returned value is null.
14232 273483 anticipate-null-recover Method passes the value returned from Sys-
tem.getProperty() into a File object, neglect-
ing that the value returned could be null if the
property is not defined. Fixed by guarding for
null, and returning immediately.
23320 275280 anticipate-null-recover SplashTask.class.getClassLoader() returned
null when called from JBuilder9, and was un-
conditionally dereferenced. Fixed by guarding
for null, and using alternative method to get
class resources.
26222 275899 anticipate-null-recover Locator.class.getClassLoader() returned null
when called from Eclipse, and was uncondi-
tionally dereferenced. Fixed by guarding for
null, and using alternative method to get class
resources.
34878 278239 anticipate-null-recover Dereferences the return value of a method that
indicates that it returns null in its specifica-
tion. Fixed by adding null-check to a subse-
quent guard.
40847 474481 anticipate-null-recover Dereferences the return value of a method
that returns null for certain inputs. Fixed by
adding null-check to a surrounding guard.
38622 377166 throw-better-exception Dereferences the return value of
Project.getReference(), which indicates
in its specification that it can return null.
Fixed by throwing a BuildException to inform
user to call another method first.
42179 531575 throw-better-exception Either a file or dir attribute are required for
a fileset, but if both are missing, then File-
Set.getDir() returns null. Fixed by throwing
BuildException informing user that file or dir
attribute needs to be set.
43292 572302 prevent-null-occurrence The return value from the API method FileU-
tils.readFully() is dereferenced even though it
can be null. Problem Fixed by changing the
API method so that it returns an empty string
instead.
43659 572363 prevent-null-occurrence The fix to Issue 43292 is problematic due to
backwards compatibility. Developers revert
this fix, and choose instead to introduce an-
other API method, FileUtils.safeReadFully()
to replace the old method in the future.
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originates in an API method, FileUtils.readFully(), which is known to return
null, and other calls to it check for null. Initially, the developer chooses to fix the
API method, so that it returns an empty string instead of null. The developer
comments:
“I would rather change FileUtils.readFully() rather that have all the clients
do the null check stepdance... I fixed FileUtils.readFully to do the right
thing.”
Later, while addressing issue 43659, the developer has a change of heart, citing
backwards compatibility concerns, and chooses instead to introduce an alternative
API method, FileUtils.safeReadFully(). This new method simply wraps around
the old one, and returns an empty string instead of null.
6.2.3.5 Local logic errors
There were only two cases classified as a local logic error. This may explain
why an intraprocedural analysis tool like FindBugs (i.e., one that does not track
values across procedure boundaries) finds so few warnings. This may also be a
product of the survivor effect, which I described earlier in Section 4.3, and which
suggests that many of these local errors will be weeded out by the quality assurance
process before the code is released. Static analysis would be more valuable during
development, where it can find and fix such issues more quickly and cheaply.
In one issue (bug report 3394), an NPE is thrown in a “Depend” task if a cache
is not specified. Careful inspection of the method reveals that when the cache field
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 
String value = null;
int posEq = name.indexOf("=");
if (posEq > 0) {
value = name.substring(posEq + 1); ...
} else if (i < args.length − 1) {
value = args[++i];
}  
Figure 6.3: Snapshot of code that processes Ant arguments
is null, the dereferenced local variable is never initialized.
The other issue was more subtle, but still within the scope of a static analysis.
In issue 22065, the reporter observes that an NPE is thrown if the user specifies the
command line argument “-Debug” instead of “-debug”. The problem is that while
“-debug” is a recognized argument, “-Debug” is treated as a “-D” property with
name “ebug” and no value. A snapshot of the code that processes the value is in
Figure 6.3.
The if-statement accounts for the possibility that there might be an “=”
between a name and a value, but not for the possibility that there is no value!
When value is dereferenced later on, a static analysis can determine that there is
a path in which a null value is guaranteed to be dereferenced. Of course, since the
“-Debug” argument is incorrect anyway, the fix was to throw a more descriptive
BuildException when no value is specified. This issue was detected by FindBugs.
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6.2.3.6 Finding the source of the null value
Static analysis algorithms can potentially assist users debugging null pointer
exceptions by identifying the source of the null value that was later dereferenced
citesinha-issta-2009. However, it is not clear how useful this assistance is because
in many cases, the source of the null value is easy to find, or the NPE is the result
of an unrelated logic error, and knowing the source of the null value is not helpful.
In this review, only 2 of the Should have checked for null issues and 5 of the
Unrecoverable null issues had fixes near the source of the null value. Unrecoverable
null issues tended to have fixes at locations unrelated to both the null source and
dereference, so information on the source of the null value may not be as helpful.
Should have checked for null issues tended to have fixes near the dereference site,
so just having a stack trace might be sufficient, though developers might need to
search around to determine if, for example, there are other places where they should
be checking for this null value.
Sinha et al [126] identify 6 Ant issues for which their analysis is able to find
a definite or possible source for the null value. In our review of those 6 issues, we
found one issue (bug 34878) for which identifying the source of the null value was
difficult. The attribute value for a DOM element was null, and tracing back where
the attribute was defined to have a null value was tricky. Since it doesn’t really
make sense for DOM element attribute values to be null, it might have been better
to catch the problem at the point where the attribute was set to have a null value.
In the other 5 cases, the null value was returned from a method that returned
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null under some circumstance. In 3 of the 5, the null was dereferenced in the same
method that invoked the null returning method, and in 2 of the 5 methods, the
null value was passed as a parameter that should never be null, and subsequently
dereferenced. In the 5 different cases, there were varying degrees of clarity as to why
the methods returned null. Three of the methods were well documented and clearly
explained the circumstances under which they return null. One (bug report 34878)
had minimal Javadoc that mentioned that the method could return null but didn’t
explain the circumstances under which null was returned. The other (bug 34878)
didn’t explain the null return in the method documentation, but the method was
very short, and the circumstances under which it returned null were obvious from
examining the code.
6.2.3.7 Other Observations
For our Local Analysis Check question we observed that 30 of the 41 issues
(73%) required a nonlocal search to identify the source of the null value. All the
Unrecoverable null issues required a nonlocal search, while all the Local logic errors
only required a local search. A local search suffices for 9 of the 15 Should have
checked for null issues. These results suggests that many of the reviewed issues
might have been hard to resolve with just a stack trace. On the other hand, most
bug reports contained much additional information about the context in which the
problem occurred and this simplifies the task of resolving them.
In both Local logic errors, the dereferenced value was a local variable. In most
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Should have checked for null issues, the dereferenced value was returned from a
method, while the most popular type of dereferenced value for Unrecoverable null
issues was a parameter, followed by a field.
We also observed that many Unrecoverable null issues had fixes that were
neither near the dereference of the null value nor its source, while many Should have
checked for null issues had fixes near the dereference site.
6.3 Null Pointer Dereferences found by Static Analysis
We reviewed potential NPD warnings from several static analysis tools which
were used to analyze Ant 1.6.5. During each review, we decided if the issue was
impossible, or implausible. Warnings were classified as impossible if surrounding
code logic made it impossible for the highlighted value to be null as reported by the
tool. Warnings were classified as implausible if a NPD could theoretically occur, but
it seemed unlikely that a null value would be generated in practice. These included
several instances where the return value of createTask() was unconditionally deref-
erenced, as discussed earlier (Section 6.1, Figure 6.2). All other issues were classified
as plausible. Of course, some of this review is subjective, and classifying an issue as
plausible does not mean that it is — it just means we were unable to determine if
the null value was unlikely.
The tools included in this study were Coverity Prevent 4.5.0 [66], Eclipse
TPTP 3.5.0 [48], FindBugs 1.3.8, Fortify 360 SCA 2.1.0 [128] and XYLEM (Novem-
ber, 2009) [107]. For consistency, we only report issues where a value thought to
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Table 6.5: Null dereferences reported in Ant 1.6.5
Tool Total Plausible Implausible Impossible
Coverity 46 17 15 14
Eclipse 31 11 1 20
FindBugs 11 11 0 0
Fortify 44 14 1 29
XYLEM 57 35 15 7
be null is later dereferenced. Some tools also report other kinds of null pointer is-
sues, such as redundantly comparing a value to null after it has been dereferenced.
Fortify SCA reports the combined results of FindBugs and its own analysis engine.
On the recommendation of Andy Chou of Coverity, we enabled an undocumented
and unsupported effects analysis feature in Coverity Prevent. Without this feature,
significantly more results, all impossible, were reported for Coverity Prevent.
FindBugs relies on an intra-procedural analysis and simple heuristics to find
potential NPDs [63]. In particular, FindBugs seeks to minimize false positives,
and chooses to turn the dial towards reporting warnings for which there is some
confidence, over reporting all possible issues. Other static analysis tools adopt
different philosophies and use more sophisticated analysis, including some inter -
procedural analysis. So it is interesting to compare the outcomes of FindBugs with
other tools.
Table 6.5 shows the results of this study. FindBugs reports the fewest warn-
ings of all the tools, but all of them were classified as plausible. XYLEM uses
a sophisticated interprocedural analysis and reports the most warnings, including
twice as many plausible warnings as any other tool. But it and the other tools
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Table 6.6: Review of XYLEM warnings in Ant 1.6.5
# review why
15 plausible clear coding mistakes
7 plausible plausible error condition not handled
13 plausible seems plausible, but not clear what situation
would cause it to arise
15 implausible calls to Project.createTask() with well known
String constant
4 impossible coupled variables
1 impossible call context guarantees nonnull return value
2 impossible value previously dereferenced and thus can’t be
null
reported a significant number of warnings that seemed implausible, or impossible.
None of the plausible issues in Table 6.5 are known to have caused any field failures.
(One reported by XYLEM in Ant 1.5.0 is known to have caused a field failure: Bug
10360).
Table 6.6 breaks down the reviews of XYLEM warnings in more detail, includ-
ing reasons why warnings were classified as they were. All the implausible warnings
were calls to createTask() with a well known string constant, making it unlikely
that a null value would be returned if the properties file is not corrupted. Again,
some developers see these are potential defects, and choose to modify the code to
include checks. But Ant developers seem to have made the choice to enforce the
precondition that createTask() only be called with valid parameters. One heuris-
tic used by some static analysis tools is to consider how often the return value is
unconditionally dereferenced, and how often it is compared to null. This heuristic
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coupled with statistical analysis could inform the static analysis tool of the intent
of developers.
Many of the issues classified as impossible involved Java API methods that
sometimes return null, but that we could show did not return null because of the
surrounding program logic. Figure 6.4 presents some examples from warnings re-
ported by Coverity Prevent. The first two examples illustrate scenarios where
the calling context guarantees the flagged value will not be null. In part (a),
getParentFile() returns null if the File does not contain any instances of the
File.separator character, but the line above it guarantees that it does. In part
(b), zf.getInputStream(ze) can return null if there is no matching entry in the
ZipFile. This value is then passed into extractFile(), which unconditionally
dereferences it. But since the ZipEntry (assigned on line 120) is an element of the
same ZipFile, we are guaranteed a non-null input stream.
The next two examples illustrate coupled variables, which make a NPD im-
possible. In part (c), we are guaranteed that loader.getResource() returns a non-
null value on line 729, because an earlier call to loader.getResourceAsStream()
on line 726 returned a non-null value. Similarly, in part (d), we are guaranteed that
getParentFile() returns a non-null value on line 382, because an earlier call to
getParent() on line 381 returned a non-null value. Static analysis can be more
effective if it understands these couplings, but this property is not always obvious
for methods that are not part of large standard APIs.
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(a) Warning that getParentFile() might return null (JonasDeploymentTool.java) 
587 File f = new File(outputdir + File.separator + key);
588 f.getParentFile().mkdirs();  
(b) Warning that zf.getInputStream(ze) might return null (Expand.java) 
117 zf = new ZipFile(srcF, encoding);
118 Enumeration e = zf.getEntries();
119 while (e.hasMoreElements()) {
120 ZipEntry ze = (ZipEntry) e.nextElement();
121 extractFile(..., zf.getInputStream(ze), ...);
122 }  
(c) Warning that loader.getResource() might return null (XMLCatalog.java) 
726 InputStream is = loader.getResourceAsStream(location);
727 if (is != null) {
728 source = new InputSource(is);
729 URL entryURL = loader.getResource(location);
730 String sysid = entryURL.toExternalForm();
731 ...  
(d) Warning that getParentFile() might return null (JJTree.java) 
381 while (root.getParent() != null) {
382 root = root.getParentFile();
383 }
384 ...
337 if ((root.length() > 1) ...  
Figure 6.4: Impossible dereferences reported by Coverity Prevent
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6.4 API Design and Null
6.4.1 API Choices
Many API designers run into the challenge of trying to decide what value to
return from an API method when no appropriate response is available. Designers
would ideally like to return a special value that can be handled naturally, but often
have to resort to returning null, or throwing an exception, and both of these options
have serious drawbacks. Part of the problem is that in many languages, return
values can only have one type; so, for example, if the return type is an integer, one
cannot return a string with the value “No Answer Available.”
Sometimes, a designer can choose to explicitly limit the range of allowed return
values (e.g., all positive numbers), so that a value outside this range can be used to
signal an exceptional case (e.g., returning -1). But this strategy does not work if the
range of allowed return values includes all values in the domain of the return type.
A special case of this strategy—one that API designers often forget—is when the
return type is a string, an array or collection. In some languages, like Java, designers
have the choice of returning an empty string, array or collection, to indicate that no
answer is available. The advantage of this approach (over returning null or throwing
an exception) is that most callers do not have to do any special handling or checks;
their code can ignore the problem of exceptional cases altogether. For example,
if the API method returns an array of integers, and the caller wants to compute
their sum, then the caller can simply write a loop that iterates over all values in
the array. In the exceptional case, the array length is zero, and the loop is never
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executed. Of course, sometimes the empty string, array or collection is one of the
possible non-exceptional return values, and API designers need some other solution
to indicate “no answer” or other exceptional cases.
We have already discussed some of the tradeoffs between throwing an exception
and returning null. Choosing to return null often makes the calling code simpler,
especially when the caller is confident the exceptional case will never happen. For
example, Map.get(K key) returns null if the key is not associated with any value.
Often Map.get(K key) is called in contexts where the developer knows the key is in
the map—the developer may verify the key’s presence using Map.containsKey(),
or may be iterating through the map’s keys when get() is called. If developers in
this situation had to handle an exception, it would require additional boilerplate
code, and make the resulting software harder to read. In Section 6.4.2, we do a
more detailed case study of the uses of Map.get() and conclude that the decision
to return null, rather than throw an exception, is a wise one.
On the other hand, sometimes null is an unexceptional return value, and the
designer needs to find another solution to indicate that no answer is available. For
example, in the case of Map.get(K key), a null return value could mean that the
key is not in the map, or it could mean that the key is mapped to null. So, a null
return value is not sufficient to indicate the exceptional case; developers need to use
Map.containsKey().
Other API methods throw exceptions, instead of returning null, to indicate
the no-answer case. Exceptions allow the designer to differentiate between multiple
no-answer cases, and provide information to the caller that makes the program easier
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to debug. In particular, null return values can be stored (unchecked) into a field or
database, only to be discovered unexpectedly at some later point, when it is much
harder to understand the source of the error. By contrast, every exception includes
a stack trace that enables the debugger to find the source of the error, and the name
and message associated with the exception provides more context.
The downside of exceptions is that developers need to add verbose boilerplate
code to handle special cases, and this can make the software hard to read and main-
tain. Designers can avoid requiring boilerplate code by using runtime exceptions9,
but this can lead to unexpected program crashes if the caller forgets to handle the
exceptional case. This is comparable to the scenario where the caller fails to check
a null return value before dereferencing it.
In summary, API designers should seek to use a special return value (such as an
empty string or array) to indicate the no-answer case, wherever possible. Where this
is not possible, designers may need to make tradeoff decisions between null return
values and thrown exceptions. One useful rule to help with this decision is provided
by Effective Java: “a well-designed API must not force its clients to use exceptions
for ordinary control flow” [25, Item 57]. Furthermore, when an API method is used
frequently, in situations where the caller does not expect an exceptional value, then
requiring the caller to always handle the exceptional case would annoy them. On
the other hand, if the designer wishes to differentiate between multiple exceptional
9Runtime exceptions are automatically propagated up the stack, and do not need to be handled
in anyway by the caller. Other exceptions (called checked exceptions) must be handled by using a
try-catch block, or explicitly passing the exception up the stack.
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Table 6.7: Invocations of Map.get
Software invocations null checked unconditional dereferences
JDK 1.7.0 2516 1040 325
JBoss 5.1.0 3095 1680 105
Glassfish v3 1225 1672 90
cases, so that callers can handle each appropriately, then thrown exceptions are
usually the best approach.
Another option available to API designers is to couple the API method with
a guarding method, as is done with Map.get() and Map.containsKey(). This
way, developers can avoid calling the API method in the exceptional case. Another
benefit of this approach is that static analysis tools can be extended enforce the
rule that the API method must be guarded by the partner method, as described in
Chapter 8. But this approach makes the API method call non-atomic, and is more
expensive since it requires two calls.
6.4.2 Case Study: Uses of Map.get()
We reflect further on the design choices made in Map.get() by considering
the ways it is used in practice. Map.get() is an example of a frequently used API
method that is often invoked in situations where the caller does not expect a null
return value. Thus, it seems reasonable to study how the many invocations of
Map.get() handle the possibility of a null return value.
Specifically, we would like to evaluate the quality of the results of a static
analysis tool that generates a warning every time a Map.get() return value is un-
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conditionally dereferenced. In reviewing these warnings, we are sometimes able to
decide if the program logic surrounding the dereference makes a NPD impossible.
We also discover heuristics that can make such a static analysis tool more effective.
Ultimately, we conclude that the API design choice of using null to indicate an
exceptional case seems wise, and a static analysis tool that flags potential NPDs
associated with Map.get() may be undesirable.
We used FindBugs to examine the invocations of Map.get() in several software
projects, and counted the number of times its return value is compared to null, or
unconditionally dereferenced. Our results, reported in Table 6.7, suggest that about
half of invocations are null checked, and about 8% are unconditionally dereferenced.
We manually reviewed the 325 places in the JDK where the return value of
Map.get() was unconditionally dereferenced. We observed three common idioms in
the surrounding program logic that guaranteed the presence of the key in the map:
• The code contained a loop over the keys in the map, and for each key was
calling Map.get.
• The code contained an earlier call to Map.containsKey
• The code contained an earlier call to Map.get with the same key.
Of course, the presence of the key does not guarantee that the value will be
non-null—the key could be mapped to null. But the unconditional dereference does
seem to imply that the developer expects the value to be non-null, and is only
concerned about guarding against the no-answer case. In addition, these idioms are
useless if another thread might remove keys from the map.
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Table 6.8: Idioms used to ensure key present for Map.get() call
Surrounding Program Logic Idiom Count
Iterating through KeySet 91
Guarded by call to containsKey() 55
Previous check of Map.get() != null with the same key 46
No obvious common idiom; NPD might be feasible 133
Table 6.8 presents the number of instances classified into each idiom. A static
analysis tool could be enhanced to recognize these idioms to reduce false positives.
But over a third of the cases reviewed contained no obvious idiom, and many of
these could be false positives since they have been in the code for a long time. And
there are many other methods like Map.get() which have common cases in which
the return value is never null. (Some cases were presented in Section 6.3 and Figure
6.4.) Constructing static analysis for all these idioms, with few false positives, may
not be feasible.
Even though flagging unconditional dereferences of Map.get()’s return value
will yield many false positives, it is worth noting that many of these unconditional
dereferences were associated with questionable or inefficient code. For example,
Figure 6.5 part (a) contains three calls to Map.get() and one to Map.containsKey()
(and two of the calls are in a loop). The developer unconditionally dereferences the
calls to Map.get(), and is confident that the key is in the map because they are
all guarded by the call to Map.containsKey() on line 295. But this arrangement is
inefficient, and could be improved by making one call to Map.get() and comparing
its return value to null, as is done in part (b).
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Source: Sun JDK 5 | com.sun.codemodel.internal.JFormatter
(a) Inefficient repeated calls to Map.get() 
295 if(collectedReferences.containsKey(id)) {
296 if( !collectedReferences.get(id).getClasses().isEmpty() ) {
297 for( JClass type : collectedReferences.get(id).getClasses() ) {







305 }  
(b) Single call to Map.get() 
ReferenceList refs = collectedReferences.get(id);
if ( refs != null ) {
for( JClass type : refs.getClasses() )






Figure 6.5: “unchecked” dereferences of Map.get()
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6.4.3 Sometimes, an NPE is Better
Finally, despite all this focus on preventing NPEs, we should note that some-
times, a developer would wish to have a NPE if the alternative is a subtle but
cataclysmic defect. In particular, many times a potential NPD is associated with
a subtle defect which manifests if the NPD does not occur. Even though NPEs
are annoying, they do alert developers of a problem and provide a stacktrace for
debugging. By contrast, subtle defects may silently lead to undesirable behavior,
such as memory leaks or performance degradation, that is hard to debug.
Consider the following code fragment: 
if (out == null) out.close();  
If out is null, a NPE will be thrown. However, the real worry is what happens
when out is non-null; no exception will be logged or reported and the resource will
not be closed, potentially leading to a variety of serious problems. Variations on
this mistake have shown up in a number of software projects, including in Ant 1.6.5
(MAudit.java, line 303).
Another example is shown in Figure 6.6. FindBugs complains about the call
to insertDocument() on line 249 because its second argument is not allowed to be
null (i.e., it is unconditionally dereferenced), but doc is guaranteed to be non-null
in the branch that calls this method.
A more sophisticated static analyzer might detect that at the one place where
replaceDocument() is called, the second argument is always non-null, and thus
the potential NPD is infeasible. However this observation reveals a potentially
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Source: Sun JDK 5 | ...apache.xalan....xsltc.dom.DocumentCache 
246 private synchronized void replaceDocument(String uri, CachedDocument
doc) {
247 CachedDocument old = (CachedDocument) references.get(uri);




252 }  
FindBugs: “Method call passes null for non-null parameter on line 249”
Figure 6.6: Mistake in Xalan DocumentCache
more serious problem: if doc is never null, then insertDocument() is never called.
Instead every execution of this method will accesses the _references map directly
on line 251. This is significant because insertDocument() contains logic to cap the
size of _references, and hence the current implementation could cause it to grow
without bound. It turns out that the mistake is that the developer used the wrong
variable in the comparison on line 248; it should have been: if (old == null).
So it is useful for static analysis to raise a potential NPD in cases like this
where some other subtle bug may lurk. Fortunately in this case, it turns out that
the variable old is also likely never null because the singular caller of this method
ensures that _references already contains an entry for uri. So the fact that the
developer is null-testing the wrong value will have no impact.
Some of these observations, and others we have made in this chapter, seem
to fly in the face of recent calls for a move towards “failure-oblivious computing”
[124], which seeks to ensure programs never fail. But in fact, one does not need
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to prevent exceptions to make a program robust. Exceptions can be caught and
logged, allowing the program to continue. Or redundancy can be built into the
system, so that failing programs are quickly restarted. This is particularly relevant
for server-based applications.
6.5 Summary and Related Work
Through these reviews of potential NPD defects in practice, I have observed
that static analysis without careful heuristics may flag many potential NPDs that
developers do not want to fix. Often these potential NPDs involve standard API
calls that sometimes return null, but usually return a non-null value. If developers
choose to enforce logical rules and policies to ensure these API methods are never
used in a way that returns null, then there are pitfalls for a static analysis that tries
to flag potential NPDs. FindBugs aims to reduce false alarms, and does not flag
many of the potential NPDs discussed in this chapter, but some other commercial
vendors currently adopt a more aggressive approach. Ultimately, control should be
passed to the user to match the aggressiveness of the analysis with the needs of their
application.
Meanwhile, API designers can help the cause by making informed decisions
about how to specify exceptional return values. Using checked exceptions elimi-
nates most of the concern surrounding potential NPDs, but makes the calling code
more verbose, difficult to maintain, and frustrating to write. API designers should
endeavor to use empty strings, arrays and containers where possible, or provide
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coupling methods which can be used to guard the null-returning API methods.
Through this research, I have also made some qualitative observations about
the occurrence of NPEs in practice. NPEs are often manifestations of separate
problems and logic errors. It may be that a property has not be set, or a component
is incorrectly initialized, or a prerequisite has not been met. And receiving an NPE
soon may be preferable to having the incorrect values stored in data structures,
only to cause errors further down the pipeline. During my review of NPEs in Ant,
I observed that in many cases, the preferred solution was to prevent the null value
from reaching the dereference site (by correcting initialization code, for example),
but sometimes developers chose to anticipate null values and insert guards to address
them.
An open question is whether errors involving NPEs are easy to diagnose and
resolve. Many of the cases I reviewed were relatively straight forward, and often the
original bug report contained enough contextual information to identify the cause
of the problem. In addition, many of the errors followed common patterns such as
forgetting to initialize a property, or dereferencing the value returned from an API
call that is known to return null. But at the same time, many bugs involved multiple
methods, and users may still sometimes benefit from having tools that enable them
to track null values to their source.
Several researchers have described analysis techniques for detecting potential
NPDs [64, 63, 107, 71, 136], and many commercial analysis tools provide some detec-
tors for this purpose, including the tools evaluated earlier in Section 6.3. A number
of researchers have explored techniques to assist developers debugging NPEs. Sinha
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et al. combine information from the stack-trace with a static backward data-flow
analysis to find the null value assignment [126]. Bond et al. use a dynamic approach
to keep track of null values, so that if they are dereferenced, the runtime system can
provide information to help developers pinpoint the source of null [26].
Other researchers, focused on creating reliable systems, have explored tech-
niques for preventing NPEs altogether. Dobolyi and Weimer present a system that
transforms Java code at compile time by inserting null checks and error-handling
code around all potential null dereference sites [38]. They rely on various policies
to decide what object to insert in place of null, and allow the program to continue
running with limited overhead.
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Chapter 7
Cost Effective Static Analysis
So far we have seen that static analysis can find important defects, and users
have provided positive feedback about the value of the warnings they receive. At
the same time, some warnings are not considered defects by users, some defects have
a low impact in practice, and many of the important defects are also captured by
good quality assurance practices. Users appreciate static analysis for its educational
value, and for finding subtle defects that are otherwise hard to detect. But users
have also found that they need to make a nontrivial investment in static analysis to
deploy warnings to developers early without impeding their productivity, baseline
or triage warnings in old code, integrate the results of multiple tools into a common
interface, and filter out unwanted bug patterns. With these benefits and pitfalls in
mind, organizations ultimately need to know if using static analysis is cost effective.
It is difficult to measure in absolute terms the cost benefit of static analysis,
because many factors affect its utility and the way it is used. I have found it more
helpful to ask: “When is static analysis cost effective?” This question directs orga-
nizations to deploy static analysis into the scenarios and contexts where it is most
cost effective first, before expanding usage into other scenarios. For example, some
types of defects—including certain security, concurrency and performance defects—
are cost effective to find using static analysis, because they are difficult to detect
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using other methods. In addition, some applications are much more sensitive to
defects than others. For example, a defect in a flight control system on an airplane
is far more likely to have calamitous consequences than a defect in a productivity
support tool for programmers. Cost effectiveness is also influenced by the infras-
tructure used to deploy static analysis within an organization, and the practices and
policies governing developer activities.
In this chapter, I discuss in more detail how these four factors—the defect’s
type, the defect’s context, the static analysis infrastructure, and best practices—are
related to cost effectiveness.
7.1 Cost Effective Defects
Some subtle defects are best found using static analysis, because they are
hard to detect using other methods. These include certain security, concurrency
and performance bug patterns. Organizations should evaluate the exposure of their
applications to these classes of defects when deciding if static analysis is worthwhile.
For example, if the application is web-based and accessible to the general public,
then it is usually cost effective to review security-related warnings. If the applica-
tion is running in an embedded environment or is sensitive to timing issues, then
performance-related warnings should be reviewed. Similarly, applications running
in distributed environments can suffer from pernicious concurrency bugs that occur
rarely or are hard to replicate in test environments, and would benefit from having
tools point out some of these problems.
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These classes of defects may not exhibit the survivor effect we discussed in
Section 4.3. In other words, both defects that matter and those that do not may
end up in production code, and persist for a long time, because they are missed by
other quality assurance methods. The defects may even be causing serious problems
in production, and the software team may not be aware of this, or may not be able
to debug the problem.
Static analysis is not a panacea for these classes of defects, and much research
needs to be done to improve the state of the art for all of them. But organizations
who are exposed to any of these classes of defects are usually grateful to have any
kind of assistance minimizing their number.
7.1.1 Secure Programming with Static Analysis1
Security vulnerabilities include coding mistakes that enable a malicious user to
use an application in ways not intended by its developers. Security defects are only a
problem if an attacker finds them and exploits them for gain. Hence, a security bug
can persist for years without problems, only to be later exploited, with devastating
consequences. This is why security defects do not generally exhibit the survivor
effect we discussed earlier—any defect flagged by a static analysis tool, including
those in old production code, could potentially be very serious.
One of the reasons why security defects are hard to find is that the popular
methods for quality assurance—code review, and especially software testing—focus
on making sure an application has all required functionality. But security defects
1Title taken from book by Chess and West [33]
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Figure 7.1: Buffer overflow vulnerability if input is arbitrarily set by user
are not always violations of the requirements, but are sometimes unintended “func-
tionality.” As one technology executive puts it: “Reliable software does what it is
supposed to do. Secure software does what it is supposed to do, and nothing else”
[33]. Static analysis is a valuable aid because it can search for code patterns that
are known to be associated with this unintended functionality.
The classic example of a security defect is the buffer overflow vulnerability,
illustrated in Figure 7.1. Well informed programmers know that strcpy is consid-
ered unsafe; this example contains a buffer overflow vulnerability if the value being
copied (input) can be set by an attacker to any arbitrary value. In this case, since
buffer is defined on the stack, an attacker could provide a string that overwrites
the contents of the stack, including the return address of the calling function. This
means that after the function completes, program control will return to whatever
address the attacker wishes (e.g., an address inside buffer) and start executing the
exploit. Buffer overflow exploits are also possible if buffer is allocated on the heap.
Static analysis can detect defects like the one in Figure 7.1, and others that
result from using “untrusted” input in unsafe ways. Even in memory safe languages
like Java, incorrect handling of input vectors provided by a malicious user can lead
to security exploits, including SQL injections, and cross-site scripting among other
199
problems. For example, SQL injection vulnerabilities occur when untrusted input
is used (without validation) to construct SQL commands, enabling an attacker to
execute commands on the database, and possibly gain access to unauthorized data.
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities occur when untrusted data is displayed on
a webpage, again without proper validation, enabling an attacker to send compro-
mising scripts to other users.
All these vulnerabilities give malicious users the power to harm an organiza-
tion in various ways, both loud and subtle. An attacker might find a vulnerability
using brute force methods to throw all kinds of inputs at a system to see what hap-
pens. An organization might use the same techniques—called penetration testing—
to proactively find these vulnerabilities before the attacker does. But the odds are
stacked against the organizations because, whereas an attacker need only find one
vulnerability to get to work, organizations need to find all of them. Static analysis
is appealing because it is exhaustive. In our interviews, one security consultant
informed us that his team does not mind weeding through false positives output by
a static analysis tool, because some may be associated with potentially exploitable
defects.
Securing software is one of the major factors driving the adoption of static
analysis tools. Recall the anecdote from Chapter 3 about the user in our inter-
views who admitted that a past security attack had led his organization—a state
department of health—to turn to static analysis. Specifically, static analysis was
made mandatory by an external security team as a first layer of defense, causing
some frustration among developers, who felt forced to address minor issues to sat-
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isfy upper management. Still, the developers found static analysis to be a useful
enhancement to their code reviews.
Security concerns have gained prominence over the last decade as more appli-
cations are exposed to the network, and many developers are still not educated about
writing secure code. As Paul Kurtz, a security expert, said in a recent interview,
“The talent coming out of schools right now doesn’t have the security knowledge
it needs,” [141]. Organizations trying to get a handle on the problem are adopt-
ing new security processes and frameworks like the Building Security In Maturity
Model (BSIMM) [97, 99], Software Security Assurance (SSA) from Fortify Software
[44], the Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) from Microsoft [104], and others
(discussed in more detail in Section 7.4). Tool vendors are trying to take advantage
of this opportunity to automate some of these processes [141]. Static analysis is a
big part of this automation, because it helps to educate developers, making them
aware of code patterns and practices that are likely to be insecure, so that they can
improve their practices, and avoid problems in the future.
7.1.2 Concurrency Defects
Like security defects, concurrency defects can be hard to detect using test-
ing, because the underlying problems often occur only rarely. Researchers have
developed a variety of tools and strategies to support testing concurrency. Sev-
eral frameworks enable users to run large tests thousands of times in an attempt
to nondeterministically generate as many interleavings of threads as possible, and
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hopefully find any rare interleavings that are defective [6, 39]. Other frameworks
enable users to exercise specific interleavings, but use timers to coordinate between
the threads, which introduces an unnecessary timing dependency [90, 89, 137, 57].
In an earlier work, I developed MultithreadedTC, a Java framework which
enables users to construct deterministic and repeatable unit tests for small concur-
rent abstractions [119]. This framework uses a clock to coordinate the activities of
multiple threads, even in the presence of blocking and timing issues. The clock ad-
vances to the next “tick” when all threads are blocked, and test designers can delay
operations within a thread until the clock has reached a desired tick. A framework
like this is helpful for ensuring that a concurrent abstraction meets its requirements,
but does not generally find rare defects that result from unlikely interleavings.
Concurrency bugs are also difficult for static analysis, because some defects
result from the unusual and unlikely interplay between different parts of the code,
running in different threads and processes. But active research is advancing the state
of the art, and producing new static analysis that can detect potential deadlocks [5]
and data races [116], mismatched API calls (e.g., lock without unlock), and bad uses
of concurrency APIs. And static analysis can search the code exhaustively, finding
problems that would be otherwise hard to find.
Static analysis may be especially good at catching bad practices that are likely
to affect multi-threaded correctness. FindBugs provides bug detectors to find incor-
rect or dubious uses of thread-related calls like Thread.start(), Thread.sleep(),
and the synchronize keyword. It also flags some instances where static fields are
used in ways that are not thread-safe, or when API types that are unsafe for multi-
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threaded use (like Calendar or DateFormat) are used in multi-threaded situations.
The new Java concurrency library (java.util.concurrent) introduced in
Java 5 is supposed to encourage users to relegate many concurrency management
tasks to standard constructs and utilities, and focus on the business logic [55].
But one side-effect is that many users mix up the new APIs with the existing
Java constructs, in ways that can be incorrect. For example, we have observed
users calling the wait() monitor on a java.util.concurrent.locks.Condition
object, instead of using one of the await() methods defined by the Condition
interface. Some users have also attempted to synchronize on instances of classes in
the java.util.concurrent package, like ConcurrentHashMap. These classes use
a different (and incompatible) concurrency control mechanism from other classes,
and should not be used with the synchronize keyword. FindBugs can detect these
infractions.
Also like security warnings, concurrency warnings can be very educational,
teaching users the correct way to use API constructs. One interesting defect that
results from misunderstanding an API (or neglecting to follow it) is ignoring the re-
turn value of the putIfAbsent() method in a ConcurrentHashMap. putIfAbsent()
is designed to ensure only one value is associated with a key. So if the key is already
in the map, then the value passed to putIfAbsent() may not match the value in
the map. If the user continues to use the value passed into the map thinking the
put operation was successful, then they might be using the incorrect value. Issues
like this may be widely misunderstood within an organization, and static analysis
can help standardize the practices of different development teams.
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7.1.3 Performance Defects
Some performance defects are the side effect of confusing control logic, and
as such are difficult to detect through testing or static analysis. Static analysis
can helpfully flag confusing or dubious code, which often has little or no impact
on program correctness, but may be associated with a performance defect, however
minor.
Static analysis can also inform developers of inefficient APIs, the careless use
of language features, and inefficient memory use. For example, FindBugs can de-
tect when an Integer object is created using its constructor (new Integer(int))
instead of the more efficient static factory method (Integer.valueOf(int)) which
enables caching. FindBugs can also detect when a Java primitive is boxed into its
corresponding object, only to be immediately unboxed back to a primitive—this can
occur when developers do not understand where boxing and unboxing is occurring.
FindBugs can also highlight obscure language features that lead the unsus-
pecting developer to write inefficient code. For example, a developer may initialize
a static final field with a huge String constant, not realizing that this field will be
inlined (copied into the classfile) for any class that references it. Or the developer
may use java.net.URL instances in a HashMap or some other collection, not realizing
that URL.equals() and URL.hashCode() are blocking operations, and can be very
inefficient because they connect to the internet to perform domain name resolution.
If performance is an important constraint for the application, then static anal-
ysis is a cost effective way to find these problems, because many warnings can be
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reviewed and fixed quickly. In many cases, the static analysis may suggest an alter-
native API that provides identical behavior but increased efficiency. In fact, some
situations may call for using static analysis to automatically fix the code, when it
can be proven that the modifications do not change the correctness properties of
the program. Many automatic performance optimizations have already been built
into compilers. Some static analysis tools support automatic fixes [113], and many
IDEs use lightweight static analysis to provide automatic fixes at the user’s direction
[2, 70, 109].
As we have seen, many performance defects are associated with recognizable
code patterns that are known to be inefficient, and there are likely to be many pat-
terns that are project-specific or API-specific, and hence not encoded into standard
static analysis tools. Organizations have an opportunity to increase the value they
get from static analysis by extending tools with custom bug detectors to find these
inefficient patterns (more discussion on this in Chapter 8).
7.1.4 Other Subtle Defect Classes
There are other defect classes—including some bad practice and correctness
bug patterns—that affect program behavior, but in subtle ways, and hence may not
be detected without static analysis. For example, FindBugs detects instances where
users repeatedly create new Random objects, using them only once each time. This
can lead to low quality random numbers. FindBugs also detects various instances
where users compare unrelated types, or query a generic container with an argument
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whose type does not match the generic parameter. These checks always return false,
allowing the program to continue, but potentially with subtle bugs. Incorrect results
may be buried in tables and databases, and escape detection without static analysis.
Another interesting class of problems is internationalization defects, which oc-
cur when software does locale dependent operations (like string transformations)
without taking into consideration the locale of the user. These defects only affect
those applications that expect to run in multiple locales and process international
characters. Static analysis is particularly effective at tracking down international-
ization defects, and some tools, such as Globalyzer [67], are focused on just this
problem.
Other low priority defects—including violations of naming conventions, con-
fusing method names, incorrect capitalization, etc.—are easy to detect with static
analysis. Organizations which place a high value on long-term software maintain-
ability should use static analysis to enforce coding standards like these across the
organization, and enhance the value of code reviews.
In summary, organizations need to know which types of defects they care
about. Some of these defects are best found with static analysis—in some cases,
it does not make sense to expend resources to find them any other way. For these
defects, it is generally cost effective to use static analysis, though other factors like
process and infrastructure (discussed in later sections) can make static analysis even
more effective.
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7.2 Applications and Contexts
In addition to the type of defect, the nature of the application can also affect
the cost effectiveness of reviewing defects. Some applications are mission or safety
critical, and very sensitive to any kind of defect. These include airplane control
systems, certain medical devices, software on the space shuttle, and so on. Other
applications handle sensitive information that needs to be kept private, or support
critical infrastructure that needs to be robust against failures. These include the
NASDAQ stock exchange, software controllers for the power grid and railway sys-
tems, and various government and bank databases. The above applications rely
on a variety of substantial, redundant and expensive quality assurance activities
including rigorous testing, redundant code reviews, detailed annotations, formal
specifications and formal verification. Static analysis can be used to eliminate de-
fects as early as possible, thereby reducing the amount of work needed later on by
the more expensive quality assurance activities.
On the other extreme, some applications are insensitive to all but a few correct-
ness defects. These include prototypes that are only intended as a proof of concept,
or quick scripts written to perform tasks on the local machine. In these applications,
any correctness defects that matter are usually noticed quickly, because the devel-
oper is also the user. Of course, short scripts written quickly often grow over time,
and become maintenance nightmares. Hence these developers would be well-served
by lightweight static analysis tools that do not interfere with their need for speed,
especially tools that integrate seamlessly into their workspace or IDE. Some static
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Table 7.1: Responses to survey question on use of FindBugs Filters
Use FindBugs Filters 337 32%
Use another process to filter warnings 37 4%
No filtering 458 44%
No response, or other 213 20%
analysis tools have been developed for Python [88], Perl [133], and Ruby [50, 51].
Of course, as we discussed in the previous section, there is often a strong link
between the nature of the application, and the type of defects that matter, or do
not matter. Static analysis tool builders need to be more aware of this, and provide
preset configurations (or a setup wizard) that are based on the application context.
Otherwise users have to take the time to filter out bug patterns one at a time. Our
experience with FindBugs, as indicated by the survey results in Table 7.1, is that
most users do not do any filtering, but run the tool as is out of the box.
Finally, in addition to the standard bug patterns, there are project-specific,
or library-specific, or API-specific bug patterns that are only relevant to a small
set of applications. Organizations can make static analysis more cost effective by
extending tools to find these bug patterns, but they are unlikely to do so unless it
is easy to extend tools, as we will see in Chapter 8.
7.3 Developing Effective Infrastructure
Many static analysis tools are initially built with a strong focus on the analysis
engine, and little focus on the user interface. Tool creators push to find more warn-
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ings, reduce false positives, and improve performance. The user interface is a simple
GUI, or a simple plugin for an IDE, or a batch process invoked from the command
line, or a web application that allows users to upload files for analysis. But if tool
creators want to maximize the return on investment for users, they must provide
features that allow tools to fit seamlessly into software development processes, and
enable users to easily review warnings and act on them. In addition, many users
and organizations find that they have to setup some custom infrastructure to sup-
port the nuances of their particular process, or integrate the warnings from multiple
tools into a consistent interface. To bring this about, organizations may need to
have a static analysis champion who is enthusiastic about the tools and promotes
their consistent usage.
One of the key challenges is enabling users to run tools automatically. As we
observed during our surveys, many users who do not run tools automatically, do not
use them regularly or consistently. We have observed many different approaches to
this problem, including running the analysis as part of continuous or nightly builds,
running the analysis before code check-in or branch merges, or running the analysis
in the background of a build and displaying alerts in an IDE or through popup
notifications.
Other features enable developers to interact with and manage warnings. When
static analysis tools are first run on old code, they often produce thousands of warn-
ings, far more than developers care to handle. Left unchecked, these old warnings
can actually drown out newer more relevant warnings. Developers need facilities to
establish a baseline, so that old warnings are hidden, and only warnings that occur
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after the baseline are visible. Beyond this, developers also need facilities to review
or comment on warnings, suppress specific warnings, and to filter out entire classes
of warnings that are not considered relevant. Relatedly, tools need to be able to
keep track of warnings as the software changes from version to version. This is a non
trivial task as the line numbers, and other contextual information can change over
time, and a tool needs to remember if a warning has been suppressed or commented
on. I will return to the broader challenge of consistency in a moment, in Section
7.3.2.
7.3.1 Advanced Features
Beyond the important features that enable automation and warning manage-
ment, advanced users also seek to support collaboration between multiple develop-
ers, integrate static analysis with other software management tools, and study the
historical trends associated with warnings in each project.
Collaborative features are useful when multiple users are responsible for each
warning. One user could provide a review indicating that an issue should be fixed,
but action on the issue needs to be taken by another user. Collaborative features
enable multiple users to share reviews, or filter warnings that have not been reviewed
by anyone, and ensure that when one user suppresses a warning, this information is
passed on to everyone.
Organizations may prefer to build on existing software management tools such
as issues tracking systems and source repositories to enable collaboration. Since or-
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ganizations use a wide variety of software management tools, and often customize
them for internal use, this integration may need to be developed internally intro-
ducing a high initial cost. But once seamless integration between the static analysis
interface and these tools is established, users can benefit from static analysis with
limited additional cost to use it.
Once organizations have used a tool for a while, it is important to go back and
analyze the history of their usage to determine which bug patterns are consistently
fixed, and which ones are consistently suppressed. Organizations can use this infor-
mation to reprioritize defect classes, or modify their filters. Historical data can be
captured by analyzing every release or revision of a project, as we do in Chapter
5. Organizations may perform even more fine-grained analysis by instrumenting the
developer’s desktop to capture information about fixes and suppressions that never
make it into a persistent repository. This enables organizations to make inferences
about developer habits and determine, for example, if developers are learning new
coding best practices from static analysis [18].
7.3.2 The Challenge of Consistency
One challenge for static analysis tools is producing consistent results, meaning
that unless there is a good reason for the results to change, the same issues should
be reported from run to run, and there should be a clear correspondence between
individual issues reported in different runs. A number of factors conspire to make
consistency difficult:
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• As the context surrounding the warning changes, it is challenging to maintain
consistency across different versions of the software artifact.
• As the analysis engine is tweaked and improved, static analysis needs to main-
tain consistency across different versions of the tool.
• Some static analysis tools perform effort-limited analysis to improve perfor-
mance. This means that each bug detector does not necessarily search exhaus-
tively. Instead they only search inter-procedural paths up to a certain depth,
or until a timer expires. This makes it challenging to maintain consistency
across different runs of the tool on the same version of the artifact and an-
alyzer. For example, trivial changes in memory layout or timing can change
the order in which hash table entries are enumerated, causing inconsistency in
what the analysis does.
Since many organizations choose to baseline (or hide) older issues, it is impor-
tant for tools to clearly identify new issues. Inconsistency could cause some older
issues to be marked as new issues. Furthermore, when a user suppresses an issue
using any method other than source level suppression, it is important that the anal-
ysis does not change the way it identifies warnings. Otherwise previously suppressed
issues may resurface and have to be redundantly addressed in the future. Similarly,
when users review issues communally, and provide comments, the analysis needs
to consistently keep track of the link between this information and the warning,
otherwise reviews are lost.
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A number of static analysis tools including FindBugs, Fortify SCA, and Cover-
ity Prevent maintain consistency by use variants of a method that computes a hash
value for each warning. The hash value depends on some of the context surrounding
the warning, but is intended to be invariant and robust to some changes, like line
numbers [129].
7.3.3 Enhancements to FindBugs
Early versions of FindBugs supported a command-line mode, and a stand-
alone GUI. Over time, plugins have been built to integrate FindBugs into various
IDEs, into continuous build servers, and into the Maven and Ant build processes.
These enhancements enable users to run FindBugs automatically. FindBugs also has
features to enable users to keep track of warnings from version to version of their
software, to filter out unwanted bug patterns, and to suppress individual warnings.
It supports source level suppression (using annotations), and also provides a filter
file format that can be used to suppress individual warnings or groups of warnings.
Advanced users are able to extend FindBugs with new bug detectors, and to
do a historical analysis of the fix and suppress trends in their projects. New bug
detectors are written using pure Java extensions of the appropriate classes, and ex-
tenders have access to many facts from the FindBugs analysis, including information
about the type hierarchy, the types of values (from the dataflow analysis), and the
sequence of statements (from the control flow analysis). We discuss the process of
extending FindBugs in more detail in Section 8.3.1.
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To perform a historical analysis, FindBugs provides some batch scripts that
operate on its XML database format, and compute information about how many
warnings are added or removed after each analysis, which additions/removals are
caused by a change to a source file, and which ones are caused by the creation/dele-
tion of files, and how many warnings are active in the latest version. Users can also
compute code churn information (similar to that in Figure 5.5), breaking down the
fixes for each bug pattern, and comparing this to the overall fix rate.
Additional enhancements have been made to FindBugs, motivated by results
from our research, and particularly by the engineering fixits described in Section
3.3. The key enhancement is the introduction of a cloud infrastructure to enable
FindBugs to store warnings in a remote database, not just in a local XML database.
This enables multiple reviewers to collaboratively access the same warnings, and
share reviews. We have also tweaked the way FindBugs ranks warnings, to reflect
the fact that many loud warnings are not that important in practice, and subtle
warnings may be more pertinent to reviewers (see Section 4.2). The new FindBugs
GUI also provides facilities to connect users to various issue tracking systems, so
that warnings can be filed as bug reports and assigned to appropriate individuals
to be fixed.
7.4 Best Practices and Policies for Cost Effective Static Analysis
The practices and policies organizations put in place when they adopt static
analysis affect the return on investment they get from the tools, and whether they
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will stick with the tools in the long term. In our surveys (in Chapter 3), we observed
that many FindBugs users had not yet implemented formal processes for using static
analysis. So understanding what practices work, and how they help, is an important
need.
Many of the infrastructure features discussed in the previous section naturally
facilitate good practices, even without any specific policies. For example, facilities
that run tools automatically and regularly alert developers increase the chance that
important issues will be noticed and addressed. In addition, features that enable
developers to consistently track warnings and to suppress or baseline some warnings
ensure that old warnings do not drown out more pertinent recent (and cheap to
fix) warnings. But even with these facilities, effective practices and policies are still
needed. For one thing, developers may not feel any external pressure to deal with
static analysis warnings, the way they feel when a customer reports a problem [58].
In addition, the absence of clear policies can lead to inefficiencies, such as having
multiple developers redundantly review a warning, or failing to bring warnings to
the attention of the right person.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for all organizations, but rather teams
employ different policies depending, in part, on some of the context discussed earlier,
in Section 7.2. Some teams adopt a zero-tolerance approach that seeks to eliminate
all warnings, or blocks code check-in if there are unresolved problems. Others feel
this is too heavy-handed, especially if the focus is on getting new features to market
in time, and instead focus on controlling defect density. Whatever the context, the
consensus is that having well thought out policies is better than an ad hoc approach.
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In addition, with all the additional pressures on developers to meet deadlines, or
to utilize other quality assurance activities, static analysis can easily be left by the
wayside. Hence, it is helpful to have a champion, who encourages tool usage and
highlights the successes and return on investment from using static analysis.
In this section, I discuss various best practices currently promoted in the re-
search community, and review the experiences of a number of organizations that
have integrated static analysis in various ways, sometimes through trial and error.
7.4.1 A Focus on Security
Much of the research and thinking on practices and policies for using static
analysis have come from sources that were focused on security. A number of organi-
zations have made security-focused modifications to general software development
processes (including the Waterfall model and Agile development), and most of these
modified processes include a significant role for static analysis. These security-
focused models include Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) [104],
OWASP’s Comprehensive Lightweight Application Security Process (CLASP) [110],
Gary McGraw’s Touchpoints [98], Fortify’s Software Security Assurance (SSA) [44],
and the Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) [99, 97] created by a group
of experts.
Microsoft’s SDL includes requirements about how input/output data should
be handled, how memory should be managed and other constraints. Within some
of these requirements, SDL requires that static analysis be used to detect some of
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the vulnerabilities, including cross-site scripting (XSS), memory overflows, banned
APIs and other problems [29]. Specifically, SDL recommends several tools produced
by Microsoft, including PREfast [83] (also known as the /analyze option in Vi-
sual Studio) and the Code Analysis Tool for .NET (CAT.NET) [92] to detect XSS
vulnerabilities in managed code projects.
CLASP is a more lightweight process than SDL, with fewer requirements.
It identifies some best practices, including the recommendation that teams should
“Integrate security analysis into (the) source management process” [117]. CLASP
recommends using both static and dynamic analysis to conduct this security analy-
sis, and advocates doing the static analysis automatically by integrating it into the
check-in or build processes. In addition, CLASP calls for “using efficient but less
accurate technology to avoid most problems early, and deeper analysis on occasional
builds to identify more complex problems” [117].
Similarly the other processes cited above all have some role for static analysis.
They recognize that it should be used early, and acknowledge that users will have
some challenges integrating static analysis into their software development life cycle
(SDLC), especially if it is not run automatically.
One helpful resource for developers is a detailed checklist of possible security
vulnerabilities, which helps them know what to look for. A report from IBM includes
such a detailed checklist, which includes vulnerabilities associated with security-
related functions, incorrect input/output validation and encoding, improper error
handling or logging, insecure components and coding errors [22]. Static analysis can
find many of the problems in such checklists and, in the process, educate developers
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about what they look like.
Once concern is how to transition from a process that does not currently focus
on security to one that does. A report from Ounce Labs (now IBM) identifies
ways to phase in security slowly, and avoid sudden disruptive changes [52]. The
report recommends that teams gradually add security to the SDLC by focusing
on key projects, identifying a champion, developing coding standards, continuously
informing all key stakeholders of progress made, and developing indicative metrics.
Another perspective on successful adoption, this time from authors affiliated with
Fortify Software, has similar recommendations: start small, address the most severe
issues first, appoint a champion, develop metrics and standards/guidelines [32].
The models and processes discussed so far have a horizontal focus, and can be
applied to software development in any industry. But some vertical industries also
have security standards that motivate the use of static analysis. One key indus-
try is the Payment Cards Industry (PCI), which has a Security Standards Council
that issues security requirements and standards for handling private data of pay-
ment cards, such as credit and debit cards [115]. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
reports that over 356 million data records have been exposed as a result of secu-
rity breaches [118], and application security has been identified as one of the key
culprits. Ounce Labs has produced a report detailing how software teams can use
static analysis to meet PCI compliance requirements [82]. One of the requirements
under vulnerability management is to “develop and maintain secure systems and
applications.” Specifically, applications should be reviewed for common vulnerabil-
ities. Ounce Labs recommends that to support compliance, a static analysis should
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look for coding errors as well as design flaws. Coding vulnerabilities include buffer
overflows, race conditions, poor input validation, and other common defect classes.
Design flaws include poor access control, weak cryptography, and incorrect error
handling and logging. The report concludes that static analysis is the “foundation
of a range of potential options available to organizations to monitor the security and
compliance state of their applications”, and emphasizes that static analysis can find
problems earlier than other options, when they are cheapest to fix [82].
7.4.2 Best Practices Identified by Vendors
A number of popular tool vendors have put out white papers that identify best
practices, culled from their experiences helping users adopt static analysis [58, 81].
Many of these recommendations focus on integrating security into the SDLC [52, 32],
and these were discussed in the previous section. Most of these papers also highlight
infrastructure features of their respective tools that simplify the management of the
recommended practices and processes. Many of these vendors have a “professional
services” group which consists of engineers and consultants who help customers
maximize the return on their investment. Specifically, these consultants visit with
customers, assist with installation and integration, educate developers, and even
build custom features to support specialized customer needs.
Coverity promotes its static analysis offering—Coverity Prevent—as a resource
for objectively evaluating code, and encourages its customers to create a “Defect
Resolution Process” to inspect, prioritize and resolve both old and new warnings
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[58]. While the specific implementation of this process is different for each user, there
are five general steps required for each implementation. Not surprisingly, Coverity
prevent has features to facilitate all the steps below:
1. Determine Goals and Metrics: Teams should identify goals for static anal-
ysis that are measurable and that align with their broader software develop-
ment goals. This is where the context of the application, discussed earlier, is
relevant. Goals can range from resolving all warnings, to establishing thresh-
olds for warnings density (i.e., number of warnings per line), total unresolved
warnings, or total uninspected warnings.
2. Develop a Project Plan: Based on the goals identified, and on the fact
that each of Coverity’s warnings take an average of 5 minutes to review and
an average of 30 minutes to repair, teams should create a project plan that
sets aside some time per week for each developer to address legacy issues, as
well as new issues.
3. Assign Ownership: Establish a (preferably automatic) process for assigning
ownership of each potential defect. For example, ownership may be based
on the component in which the warning is found, or the last person to edit
the line of code containing the defect. In some cases, automatically assigned
ownership will need to be adjusted to a more appropriate owner. Ownership
helps create accountability, and teams should measure progress in terms of the
number of defects resolved so far.
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4. Notify Owners: Owners should be notified (via email) daily for new issues,
with regular monthly reminders for outstanding issues.
5. Integrate with SDLC: Teams should integrate their issue tracking systems
with static analysis, so that ownership, notification and other parts of the
process can be handled in a way that is familiar to all team members.
Another report, this time from Klocwork, focuses on making static analysis
part of an effective peer code review strategy [81]. Klocwork Insight aims to en-
able collaboration with an interface that supports asynchronous reviews, highlights
changes in the code, and displays static analysis results. In the ideal case, static
analysis warnings are reviewed and fixed by the original developer, before any peer
code review is conducted. But in practice, some issues may be unclear to the de-
veloper, or may have unforeseen effects on another developer’s code. In these cases,
Klocwork’s tight integration of static analysis in the peer review process ensures
these issues can still be handled seamlessly [81].
7.4.3 Experiences at Google
I have already discussed some of Google’s experiences using FindBugs to an-
alyze its Java code base (in Section 3.3.1). Early experiences with FindBugs were
mixed. Even though the analysis was run automatically, and warnings were dis-
played on an internal web interface, the tool received limited actual usage from
engineers. Part of the problem was that the analysis and presentation of warnings
was outside the normal workflow of developers, and users were not under any pres-
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sure to review the warnings. Another limitation was that the system did not capture
information about warnings that were fixed, or otherwise removed. Developers were
turned off by stale warnings, and questioned the value of the analysis.
The static analysis champions within Google decided to adopt a “service
model” through which warnings were centrally reviewed and significant defects were
filed in Google’s regular bug tracking system. The team reviewed thousands of
warnings and filed over 1000 bug reports in a six month period. This effort also en-
abled them to reprioritize warnings based on the feedback received from developers.
They established an internal ranking for bug patterns based on the fix rates and
false positive rates they observed.
The service model approach was successful, but did not scale as the size of
Google’s Java codebase grew. In addition, there was still some skepticism about the
overall value of FindBugs. To address these concerns, we organized an engineering
fixit, discussed earlier in Section 3.3, in which hundreds of engineers spent 1 or 2 days
reviewing thousands of warnings and providing feedback. Over 77% of the reviews
contained a fix recommendation, and the feedback was very positive. However, we
observed through this process that many defects were mitigated in some way by
Google’s redundant systems and monitoring practices, or were found in code that
had not yet been pushed into production. This reinforced the idea that we need
to push FindBugs warnings as early as possible for them to be valuable. While
some developers run FindBugs as a plugin in their IDEs, the ultimate goal is to
automatically run static analysis in the background and integrate warnings into
Google’s internal code review system [12]. This approach will allow developers to
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discuss warnings, and provide some accountability about fixing them.
These experiences have indicated that one of the challenges for static analysis
is demonstrating to developers that it is valuable for them to review warnings which,
while definitely mistakes, may not cause software misbehavior.
7.4.4 Experiences at Microsoft
A number of reports have discussed some of the experiences at Microsoft de-
ciding how to integrate static analysis over the last decade [83, 18]. I have also had
the opportunity to interview a number of senior engineers and previously reported
on their experiences and perspectives [18].
Over the last decade, Microsoft has conducted several research projects, which
have produced a wide variety of experimental static analysis tools, each with a
different focus. In recent years, the focus has shifted to pushing these tools into the
regular software development process of the largest product groups at Microsoft,
involving thousands of developers working on tens of millions of lines of code against
strict deadlines.
Some of the tools are inter-procedural and rely on heavyweight global static
analysis, and hence are too time consuming to be used by every developer. These
tools, including PREfix [31] and Global Esp [35], are run periodically centrally, and
the defects identified are filed automatically into the defect database of the product.
On the other hand, intra-procedural tools, such as PREfast [83] based plugins,
are lightweight and more suitable to be run on the developer’s desktop while the
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code is being constructed. A wide range of PREfast plugins have been developed
for tackling critical problem areas such as security, concurrency, performance, inter-
nationalization issues, and device driver issues. These tools typically analyze one
function at a time based on function contracts and field invariants specified using
Microsoft’s source-code annotation language (SAL) [103].
Many of these lightweight tools are enabled by default on the desktop machines
of every programmer in the organization, using the Microsoft Auto Code Review
(OACR) build infrastructure [102]. OACR integrates static tools into a common
and automated build environment which runs the checkers in the background. De-
velopers are notified with a pop up message about the warnings. Warnings are
grouped into warning numbers and warning numbers are classified with severity
levels. When developers review the warnings, they have the opportunity to fix the
code or suppress the warnings.
Another level of quality control is through the “quality gates” that are applied
when moving code from one branch to a higher branch (called reverse integration).
A class of critical checks form the “minimum bar”. Reverse integration is prohibited
until all warnings from the minimum bar are fixed. This mechanism ensures that
the most serious issues can be caught and fixed early in the development process.
For big legacy code bases, adding a new check to the minimum bar may introduce
a large number of warnings triggered by pre-existing bugs. When this occurs, a
baselining mechanism is used to “mask” these warnings in order to avoid a sudden
disruption to the development schedule. Typically these pre-existing bugs are fixed
during a concerted cleanup effort at the early stage of a product cycle.
224
The process in place at Microsoft ensures that serious defects are brought to
the attention of developers as soon as possible, and provides some accountability
by adding messages to the nightly build, or preventing reverse integration. But the
tools used also require developers to extensively annotate their code, a task requiring
non trivial effort. I interviewed six senior developers who each have several years
of experience using Microsoft’s tools, to discover some of the history and challenges
associated with using tools and annotations, and to learn their perspectives on static
analysis.
All the interviewees felt that using static analysis was worthwhile, though most
emphasized the relative importance of code review and testing, recognizing that each
quality assurance activity can find different kinds of problems. Users appreciated
the exhaustiveness of static analysis, and even reported changing their programming
styles to avoid static analysis warnings, leading to more maintainable code. Even
with these sentiments, one user still expressed the importance of reducing the “noise”
or false positives in tools, saying that tools with less noise are taken more seriously.
Most interviewees reported that they usually resolved all the high priority
issues (called errors), and one user working with a security team aimed to fix all
potential defects, including low priority warnings. When working on new code, users
usually fixed issues just before checking code into the source repository. But many
users also worked on code owned by someone else; in this case, they would wait for
issues to be flagged by the overnight build and focus on those issues, to minimize
changes to someone else’s code.
Some users pointed out that close to milestones, the emphasis is usually on
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minimizing code changes, so only the most serious issues are fixed. Alternatively,
during development cycles dedicated to cleaning up code (often after a major re-
lease), teams usually devote resources to wade through lower priority issues and
warnings flagged in legacy code.
Obviously the type of warnings that interest users depend on the nature of the
code they work on. Many interviewees worked with unmanaged C and C++ code
that often included large legacy components. Hence they were most interested in
problems related to potential buffer overflows. They also reported that many of the
warnings pointed to missing annotations and unused variables.
Users perceived that most issues were worth fixing, though they mentioned
that sometimes it was necessary to suppress issues or rewrite the code to make the
warnings go away. One user mentioned that this would often happen when code con-
ventions in legacy code did not match the expectations of the tools, and refactoring
would be burdensome and potentially error prone. For example, different legacy
components may have different conventions for dealing with error states including
returning status codes or throwing exceptions.
In general, care was needed to effectively use tools on legacy code. One user
reported that anytime a legacy routine was touched, the developer was expected to
clean up any old warnings that may be present. But in general, users preferred to ad-
dress issues in legacy code as part of a dedicated cleanup cycle. Some users credited
an “auto-fix” feature in some tools (used to automatically correct some problems)
as one property that made the cleanup process feasible. One user cautioned that
assigning the task of cleaning up issues in legacy code to junior developers or con-
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tractors can sometimes lead to regressions because they are not as familiar with the
code. Outside the cleanup cycle, any new legacy issues (i.e., issues found by new
or modified static analysis techniques) need to be added to a baseline so developers
can focus on problems in new code.
7.5 Summary and Related Work
In this chapter, I have discussed the experiences, and subsequent recommen-
dations, of some organizations and experts who have wrestled with the challenge of
using static analysis cost effectively. The specific implementation of best practices
varies for each user, depending on the type of defects they care about and the nature
of their application. Some security-focused users review all the low impact issues,
and prefer to receive as many false positives as possible so they can look for possible
vulnerabilities in surrounding code. Some applications are sensitive to any kind of
defect, while others are more sensitive to specific subclasses of subtle defects that
are hard to detect without static analysis.
Sometimes organizations cannot always reach the ideals recommended in this
chapter. For example, one would like to limit costs by having the responsible owner
review a defect as early as possible. But sometimes it is not possible to determine
who should have this role, or the problem may be too complex for one person
to handle alone. Organizations should not allow challenges like this to deter their
adoption of static analysis, or cause their processes to devolve into ad hoc use. Clear
policies can help prevent inefficiencies, and provide accountability for developers who
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do not otherwise feel any external pressure to deal with static analysis warnings.
Other researchers have described their efforts to integrate static analysis into
commercial processes, and the feedback they received from developers. Researchers
at eBay experimented with enforcement-based customization policies, through which
bug patterns are filtered and reprioritized, and developers are required to fix all
resulting high priority warnings [69].
Practitioners from Coverity review defects with customers to encourage them
to see the benefits of using static analysis [23]. They observed one interesting out-
come from their reviews: sometimes reviewers misunderstand a bug and mislabel it
as a false positive, despite the best attempts of Coverity’s team to convince them
otherwise. This has led them to turn off some detectors that are easily misunder-
stood, so that developers do not develop a negative impression of the tool.
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Chapter 8
Finding Bugs By Example
Static analysis can be seen as a sophisticated search for code fragments that
are thought to be defective. This search is guided by patterns of code components
that are deemed to be defective by experts. Many patterns are general, and can
occur in any program written in a particular language, or even in programs in
multiple languages. But some bug patterns are limited to only a few projects,
driven by the idiosyncrasies of the projects, or the software libraries and APIs that
are used. These bug patterns are not likely to be included in off-the-shelf static
analysis tools, because they do not apply widely. If project teams do not extend
tools to include these patterns, then they are only detecting a proportion of bugs
that can be detected, and are not retaining the full value of static analysis.
Indeed, some of the value of static analysis is tied to the ability of developers
to notice their mistakes, that may be repeated by others within a particular project,
and formally capture the offensive code pattern. Otherwise, the effort and frustra-
tion that went into debugging the problem may be experienced by others on the
team. However, whenever I ask developers if they can think of potential bug pat-
terns, they often cannot. Part of the problem may be that respondents are looking
for bug patterns that will apply widely, rather than issues that are only applicable
to the four or five developers they work with. Indeed, if the effort to construct a
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Source: Gallery (SourceForge.net) |HTTPClient.AuthorizationInfo
(a) fields with different casing requirements 
110 /∗∗ the host (lowercase) ∗/
111 private String host;
115 ...
116 /∗∗ the scheme. (e.g. ”Basic”)
117 ∗ Note: don’t lowercase because some buggy servers use a case−sensitive
118 ∗ match ∗/
119 private String scheme;  
(b) constructor that follows casing scheme 
193 public AuthorizationInfo(String host, int port, String scheme,
194 String realm, String cookie)
195 {
196 this.scheme = scheme.trim();
197 this.host = host.trim().toLowerCase();
203 ...
204 }  
Figure 8.1: Rule informally specified by comments indicates how field
contents should be cased
bug detector is too difficult, then it does not make sense to invest in creating one,
if it is only likely to be used once or twice. It may be better to send out an email to
local team, leave a comment in a conspicuous part of the code, or look out for the
problem during a code review.
Figure 8.1 illustrates this with some code fragments from the open source
Gallery project on SourceForge.net1. Here the developer uses comments to indicate
that the scheme field should not be lowercased, because this could lead to buggy
behavior (a). Sure enough, every place fields are initialized, the lowercase method is
1http://sourceforge.net/projects/gallery/
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applied to the field host but not the field scheme (b). However, if a new developer
joins the team and attempts to update this class, he or she may not notice the
comments, and may break the rules. A simple bug detector could be used to flag
any inappropriate assignment of a lowercased string to scheme, but only if the effort
to write such a detector can be justified. In this case, since both fields are private,
and are likely only set from constructors, it appears unlikely that a problem could
(a) note on line 388 indicates formatting constraints 
382 /∗∗
383 ∗ retrieves the field for a given header. The value is parsed as a
384 ∗ date; if this fails it is parsed as a long representing the number
385 ∗ of seconds since 12:00 AM, Jan 1st, 1970. If this also fails an
386 ∗ IllegalArgumentException is thrown.
387 ∗
388 ∗ <P>Note: When sending dates use Util.httpDate().
394 ...
395 ∗/
396 public Date getHeaderAsDate(String hdr)
397 throws IOException, IllegalArgumentException
398 {
399 String raw date = getHeader(hdr);
400 if (raw date == null) return null;
422 ...
423 }  
(b) example of rule application: Util.httpDate() is used whenever a date field is set 
627 public void setIfModifiedSince(long time)
628 {
629 super.setIfModifiedSince(time);
630 setRequestProperty("If-Modified-Since", Util.httpDate(new Date(time)));
631 }  
Figure 8.2: Rule informally specified by comments indicates how the
property associated with a parameter (hdr) should be formatted
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arise in the future.
Another example from the same project is shown in Figure 8.2. In this case,
the developer’s comment is part of the documentation for a public API method,
and it indicates that certain strings representing dates should be formatted using
Util.httpDate() (a). In an interesting twist, the date strings we are referring to
here are actually values associated with a key in a separate property map. This
means that callers have to remember to apply this rule when adding values to the
property map (b), not when calling this method. It would be easy for a new developer
to break this rule, especially if they only update the property map, and never call
this method, and hence never see this comment. Still, the cost effectiveness of a
bug detector to flag potential violations depends on how difficult it is to write the
detector, and how often a violation could occur.
So, in summary, organizations are not likely to extend tools to find local
problems unless it is simple to do. Indeed in my survey, most users report that
they have not extended FindBugs with new bug detectors, as shown in Table 8.1.
When asked to comment on their thoughts on custom bug detectors, users indicate
that the current process is too complicated. One user writes:
“It’s a killer to write custom detectors—no good documentation is available.
Especially not when you come from .NET”
Another user, commenting on whether he has written any custom detectors
writes:
“Not yet, but I’m going to. When/if I find the time.”
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Table 8.1: Responses to survey question on use of custom bug detectors
Custom bug detectors, released to the public 31 3%
Custom bug detectors, NOT released to the public 39 4%
Custom bug detectors from a third party vendor 13 1%
No custom bug detectors 641 61%
Do not know how to make bug detectors 308 29%
Other, or no response 236 23%
*Respondents can select more than one response
So are existing techniques for extending static analysis easy to use? My review
of some of the available methods suggests that they all impose a non-trivial technical
burden on users. In particular, they usually require users to learn a new specification
language and/or understand the mechanics of the analysis engine, such as control
and data flow facts.
To simplify the process of writing a bug detector, let’s consider what the
developer knows. The developer is familiar with what the bad code fragment looks
like. “I’ll know it when I see it” could well be the user’s refrain. The developer
is also familiar with the programming language and the project as a whole. So
perhaps we can take advantage of this knowledge, and enable developers to specify
bug patterns without needing to know much else.
In this chapter, I explore an approach to specify new bug detectors by providing
examples of the bug. I will call these examples “Mock Bugs.” Using these mock
bugs, an automatic process can then try to infer what the bug detector should
look like. The mock bugs should be written in the target language, and the user
should not need to learn many conventions or annotations. In addition, the mock
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bugs should compile, and may use relevant project or API features. One advantage
of these features is that the project team can apply existing software engineering
techniques and infrastructure to develop and maintain mock bugs. For example,
they can be developed in the IDE without needing special plugins, and refactoring
techniques that update the API will also affect the bug detector. However, mock
bugs are not intended to be executed.
One useful metaphor is that these bug detectors are like unit tests, except
instead of executing them repeatedly, an inference engine pulls them in, and creates
a bug detector that is then run on the entire code base, raising alerts when problems
are found.
Through this research, I have observed that a user will usually have to provide
multiple examples, as well as some counter-examples to reduce false positives and
false negatives. All this is highly dependent on the decisions made by the automatic
inference engine. One possible feature to enhance the user experience, is to make the
development of mock bugs interactive. As the developer produces more examples
and counter-examples, the inference engine presents the user with a snapshot of the
kinds of problems found by the generated bug detector, so the user can identify
potential false positives or false negatives and can add more examples accordingly.
Another consideration is how custom bug detectors should be deployed. Since
the bug patterns have a narrow focus – within a single team, for example – the
resulting bug detectors may not be appropriate for all projects in an organization,
and need to be deployed only for local use. Furthermore, as these bug detectors
evolve, different teams may place different requirements on them, and they need to
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diverge to serve the various needs.
We discuss these and other considerations in this chapter. The discussion in
this chapter will be highly conceptual, and should form the basis for future research.
The ideas discussed have not been implemented yet. I start by investigating project-
specific and API-specific bug patterns in the wild. These patterns are culled from
bug repositories, and best practices surrounding specific APIs, and are discussed in
Section 8.2. In Section 8.3, I go over some of the existing methods for writing a bug
detector, and compare them with a specification that uses mock bugs. I also discuss
related work in Section 8.4. But first, I go into more details about how a user may
iteratively use examples to instruct a static analysis tool to find a custom bug.
8.1 Mock Bug Detectors
8.1.1 A Simple Example
Imagine a scenario where a Java developer forgets to assign the return value
of the string trim() operation back to itself. Since Java strings are immutable,
the operation does not modify the string, and is effectively useless. Let’s say our
developer notices the mistake, and now wants to write a mock bug detector to flag
other instances of this mistake. What is the simplest code fragment the developer
could write as an example of the bug? Perhaps the following:
 




Here we are using the convention that a method prefixed by the name “bug”
contains a mock bug (we can call this a Mock Method), and its String parameter
can refer to any string, not just a string that was passed in as a parameter.
There are several ways an inference engine could interpret this mock bug de-
tector. It could create a detector that flags any call to the trim() method, or it
might notice that the return value in this case is not used and hence only flag in-
vocations in which the return value is ignored. Let’s assume the inference engine
chooses the former interpretation; this means that even cases where the return value
is correctly assigned back to the string would be flagged as a defect. Our developer
will need to provide more examples to refine the mock bug detector. Here’s the
simplest example to exclude this false positive: 
void notBug(String any) {
any = any.trim();
}  
Here we have introduced another convention: a method prefixed by the name
“notBug” contains a counter-example, that should not be flagged as a bug.
In response to this counter example, the inference engine should refine its
output bug detector to flag any call to trim(), except those that assign the return
value back to the string variable. But this refinement may not be sufficient, because
the bug detector would still incorrectly flag cases where the returned value is assigned
to another string. What we really want to say is that if the return value is used in
any way, then this is not a bug. Let’s try introducing a new convention that if a




class UNUSED TRIM DETECTOR {
void bug(String any) {
any.trim();
}




Figure 8.3: A mock detector to detect an unused value returned from
String.trim()
provide another counter example:
 
void notBug2(String any) {
return any.trim();
}  
So now, the inference engine flags any call to trim(), except when the return
value is used in any way. This second counter-example, makes the first counter-
example redundant. The two mock methods are sufficient for us to specify our
mock bug detector, which we do in Figure 8.3.
8.1.2 Benefits and Challenges
This example highlights some of the benefits and challenges of using this ap-
proach. One benefit is that the mock detectors are basically examples and counter-
examples of the rule, and hence are simple to write. They are also pure compilable
Java, and hence can be written in any IDE, deployed in jar files, and refactored
237
with the rest of the program. However they are never executed; the inference engine
reads the examples and constructs the real bug detectors.
One limitation is that some conventions are needed to make the mock meth-
ods more expressive, and hence minimize the number of examples that need to be
provided. As we design this approach, we have to keep in mind the tradeoff between
the number of conventions the user needs to learn, and the expressiveness of each
mock method. This tradeoff is heavily influenced by the choices the inference engine
makes. There is always more than one way to interpret an example, and sometimes
there is no obvious choice. More research in the form of experiments and user studies
is needed to decide which choices are best.
Another challenge is that the developer should not have to understand the
choices the inference engine will make. Instead, the developer should be able to rely
on an iterative workflow in which they provide the simplest example or counter-
example, run the detector to identify false positives, and false negatives, and then
provide more examples. This actually mirrors the way experts write bug detectors.
They often run the detectors against real code bases or sample test cases2 to ensure
that there are not too many false positives or negatives.
Note that we can provide a convenient interface to show the developer all
the warnings found, so she can identify any false positives, but we have no way of
showing the developer a list of false negatives. She has to figure this out on her own
by checking to see if the source she was targeting is included in the list of defects
2A convenient repository of test cases for static analysis tools has been compiled by NIST’s
SAMATE Reference Dataset (SRD) project, and is online at http://samate.nist.gov/SRD/
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found. We can aid this effort by keeping track of warnings that disappear as the
mock detector is refined; some of these may be false negatives.
Simplifying this interactive user workflow is critical to ensuring that users
are willing to use this approach for writing custom bug detectors. Much of our
research so far has focused on writing dozens of examples for various bug patterns
to determine if this workflow is reasonable.
8.1.3 Generalizing and Specializing
Going back to our working example in Figure 8.3, one limitation is that right
now the mock detector is limited to only the trim() operation on a string. But
really, we want a rule that applies to any method that returns a modified version of
the string. We have several choices here:
1. We could require the user to explicitly create examples for all the methods
affected. This would probably put too much burden on the user.
2. We could introduce a new convention that would correspond to any method.
The obvious choice — any.anyMethod() — does not work in a pure Java
solution because the String class does not have such a method. An alternative
is use an annotation, such as: anyMethod(any).
3. We could task the inference engine with figuring out when the developer is
using additional examples to generalize or specialize. For example, if the user
provides two examples, one for trim() and one for substring(), the inference
engine could conclude that this bug pattern must apply to any operation on a
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Figure 8.4: A sample lattice for deciding how to generalize or specialize
different types
string that returns a value. If the user then provides a counter-example that
violates this rule, the inference engine could revert to assuming the rule only
applies to the specified methods.
The third option is very attractive, but making it effective would require careful
construction of an internal lattice which the inference engine could use to decide how
to generalize or specialize. Let’s crystallize this with another example rule: “do not
call the hashCode() method on a Java array”. In Java, the hashCode() method
on an array ignores the length and content of the array when computing a hash
value. The recommended approach to construct a hash value for an array a, is to
call java.util.Arrays.hashCode(a). Our developer may start building a mock
detector by writing the following:
 




This will flag any invocation of hashCode() on an int array. But this produces
many false negatives, since we want this rule to apply to other kinds of arrays. Let’s
say our developer adds another mock method, this time using a long array:
 
void bug(long [] any) {
any.hashCode();
}  
We can generalize these two examples in several ways. One is to conclude that
this rule applies to any array. Another is to decide that an int[] and a long[]
generalize to any primitive-typed array, including boolean[] and double[]. Yet
another way is to generalize an int[] and a long[] as an integral -typed array,
thereby excluding floating point numbers. These decisions would be driven by a
lattice, like the one in Figure 8.4. If we use this model, then our developer would
need to add one more example to generalize the rule to any array:
 
void bug(Object [] any) {
any.hashCode();
}  
Of course, for this bug pattern, it may make more sense to apply another con-
vention: that a generic type parameter refers to any type. Then we can parameterize
our mock detector class with a generic type, T, and write just one mock method:
 




Used appropriately, this paradigm of generalizing and specializing the inference
may be a powerful way to make mock bugs expressive without needing too many
conventions. In my early designs for mock bugs, I found myself constantly adding
new conventions until mock bug detectors were beginning to resemble an entirely
new specification language. Handing more responsibility over to the inference engine
enabled me to focus on writing simple examples for many bug patterns, though it
may limit the scope of problems that can be detected using mock bug detectors.
8.1.4 Other Considerations
We need to make some additional considerations to make this approach useful.
One is that a good bug detector should include a descriptive message about what
the problem is and how it might be fixed. We would have to supply our developer
with some convention for providing this message. Another consideration is that
since the final bug detector depends on the choices made by the inference engine,
we are limited in the ways we can update the engine. We would not want the bug
detector to change unexpectedly, long after the developer has written the mock bug
detector. Such a change could introduce new false positives or new false negatives.
One way to deal with this is to use versioning, so that each mock bug detector is
tied to a particular version of the inference engine.
Finally, despite our best efforts to make this as expressive and general as
possible, we recognize that some complicated bug patterns can only be written by
experts who understand the underlying analysis and/or use a custom specification
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language. In the next section, we explore the kind of custom bug patterns that
occur in projects, and that can be targeted by this approach. It turns out many of
them are quite simple, and an example-based approach with few conventions might
provide the right balance of expressiveness and simplicity.
8.2 API-Specific Bug Patterns
8.2.1 Searching for API-Specific Rules
Before establishing a framework for mock bug detectors, we need to charac-
terize API-specific bug patterns. Regular bug detectors can be quite complicated,
requiring the analysis to keep track of facts across procedure boundaries. By con-
trast, the API-specific rules we are targeting are quite simple, and consist of various
constraints on how a developer should use an API. The scope of complexity of
these bug patterns should drive our design choices, including how many and what
conventions are included in the framework.
To help us characterize API-specific bug patterns, we chose to search for real
examples in the wild. We searched a variety of resources to find examples, including
existing API-specific rules in various static analysis tools, coding standards estab-
lished by industry organizations, API documentation, and open source code.
Existing API-specific rules in static analysis tools usually target popular and
widely used libraries such as the Java APIs (including J2EE and Java Beans), JUnit
[1], Ant [45], Apache Commons [46], and popular logging APIs [47]. We are not
necessarily expecting that mock bug detectors will be used to target these libraries,
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since they are widely used and hence are already supported by many static analysis
tools. However, we expect that the properties and considerations which pertain to
the rules made for these libraries, will also apply to other more obscure APIs. In
addition to the rules built into the static analysis tools, we also searched for third-
party bug detectors which are often API-specific. In particular, many third-party
bug detectors for FindBugs are collected in an open source project called fb-contrib
[28].
Another source of custom bug patterns is coding standards from industry
organizations like Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)3, MITRE4, and
the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)5. These institutions
provide best practices, anti-patterns, and reference datasets that focus on security
defects.
OWASP develops and maintains the Enterprise Security API (ESAPI), an
open source, multi-language, web application security framework that provides a
standard set of APIs for developers to use for authentication, session management,
access control, input validation and other security-related features. ESAPI comes
with detailed secure coding guidelines that include a list of banned Java API meth-
ods, and rules about how URLs should be handled, and how data should be pro-
tected.
MITRE maintains a detailed dictionary of anti-patterns known as the Common





index of software flaws that can lead to security vulnerabilities, and it includes some
API-specific flaws included a category of weaknesses called “API Abuse” (CWE-
227). Many of these weaknesses can be targeted by mock detectors.
NIST sponsors a project (with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security)
called Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation (SAMATE)6. Among other
activities, this project has produced the SAMATE Reference Dataset (SRD), which
is a repository of “test cases” that contain security flaws. The test cases are culled
from production code, student code, and synthetic examples. Many of the examples
were contributed by commercial static analysis vendors, and they cover a wide range
of languages and security flaws.
Another approach for finding API-specific bug patterns is to search API doc-
umentation and source code for keywords that may indicate an informally specified
rule. Keywords include “required”, “must”, “follow”, “buggy” etc. The examples
presented earlier in this chapter in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 were found by using Google
Code Search7 with some of these keywords.
8.2.2 Characterizing API-Specific Rules
After reviewing dozens of candidates for API-specific rules, we sought to con-
struct a classification that can be helpful when making design decisions for the mock
framework. We found it instructive to characterize each rule based on the constraints




popular constraints—occurrence constraints, ordering constraints, type constraints,
value constraints, and usage constraints—that apply to many rules. Often a rule
may be composed of more than one of these constraints. Additional, less frequently
used constraints include naming constraints and cardinality constraints.
Occurrence constraints basically state that in a specified context, a given pat-
tern must occur, or is prohibited. Given the metaphor of mock bugs, a user can
specify the must-occur constraint by writing a bug-method that does not contain the
desired pattern in the appropriate context, and writing a notBug-method that does
contain it. The opposite arrangement would be used for the prohibited constraint.
An example of this constraint was the earlier example of rules to prohibit calling
hashCode() on an array, discussed in Section 8.1.3. Another example is rules that
require overriding methods to call the corresponding super class method.
A more complicated example is found in the documentation of the saveState()
method for the StateHolder interface in the JavaServer Faces Specification8:
If the class that implements this interface has references to instances that
implement StateHolder (such as a UIComponent with event handlers, val-
idators, etc.) this method must call the saveState(...) method on all
those instances as well. This method must not save the state of children
and facets. That is done via the StateManager.
This specification requires that implementing methods must call the corre-
sponding saveState() methods on any other state holders referenced by the class,
8http://java.sun.com/javaee/javaserverfaces/
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except those designated as children or facets. Already with this example, we notice
that a mock method will not be enough for the user to fully specify the context.
Users will need several mock classes—they could be anonymous implementations
of the StateHolder interface—to provide examples of saveState() methods that
follow or violate the specification, so that the inference engine can construct an
appropriate bug detector. We also notice that it is important for users to use the
same context for each example, only changing the lines that relate to the pattern or
anti-pattern. The inference engine can then focus on the differences when deciding
where to raise alerts.
Many examples of the occurrence constraint are simple API bans. For example,
some Java projects ban calls to System.out.println(), and the OWASP ESAPI
project has a list of Java API methods that should never be used, but should be
replaced with methods in its API [49]. Given the prevalence of this rule template, it
may be beneficial to provide a shorthand or convention for specifying banned APIs.
Ordering constraints state the relationship between two or more patterns.
This could include simple sequencing relationships (pattern-A must follow/precede
pattern-B), or more complicated domination relationships (e.g., pattern-B must be
guarded by pattern-A).
Type constraints place some requirement or restriction on the types used in a
specified context. An example is the rule that loggers should be created with a type
parameter that is restricted to the class that they belong to. Another example is
rules that require a group of classes to implement the Serializable interface.
Value constraints place some requirement or restriction on the range or nature
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(a) Rule: No hard-coded passwords 
1 void bug() {
2 ESAPI.authenticator.createUser(username, "password", "password");
3 }
4 void notBug(String password) {
5 ESAPI.authenticator.createUser(username, password, password);
6 }  
(b) Rule: logHTTPRequest() should ignore any parameters named “password” 
1 void bug(Request any, Logger anyLogger) {
2 ESAPI.httpUtilities().logHTTPRequest(any, anyLogger, null);
3 }
4 void notBug(Request any, Logger anyLogger) {
5 String[] ignore = { "password" }
6 ESAPI.httpUtilities().logHTTPRequest(any, anyLogger, Arrays.asList(ignore));
7 }  
Figure 8.5: ESAPI Rules that have value constraints
of a value. This include rules requiring numeric values to be within a specified range,
or string values to match a specified regular expression. Philosophically, one would
expect such rules to be enforced by the application, but in some specialized or legacy
cases, it may be reasonable to use a mock bug detector. Figure 8.5 illustrates some
examples from OWASP’s ESAPI. The first rule specifies that the createUser()
method should never be called with a string literal. The second rule specifies that the
logHTTPRequest() should always be called with a filter to exclude the “password”
field. This second example suggests the need for parameterized mock bug detectors,
so that other users could use this rule even if their password field has a different
name, by just providing the name of the password field.
These examples also further illustrate how the behavior of the mock bug detec-
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tor will depend on the decisions of the inference engine. If we design the inference
algorithm to interpret literal strings as “any literal string”, then rule (b) would
need to be extended with additional examples to clarify that we only mean the lit-
eral string “password”. Alternatively, if we design the inference algorithm to only
match the value of the literal string specified, then rule (a) would need to be ex-
tended to clarify that we mean any literal string. These choices in our design of the
inference engine should be driven by empirical and user studies.
Usage constraints indicate if, and how a value is used. The String.trim()
examples presented earlier in this chapter (in Figure 8.3) are an example of usage
constraints. As we saw in those examples, there are many ways a value might be
used, and often the usage constraint is that it be used in any way. Hence it seems
reasonable to introduce some convention for any usage. Earlier we used a return-
value convention, but this would not be sufficient if the usage constraints are to
apply to multiple values. Other options include returning a collection of values that
are used, or annotating the values.
Naming constraints simply limit the names that can be given to classes, meth-
ods, or variables, usually to match some preferred style. Cardinality constraints are
needed for a few rules that limit the number of occurrences of certain instances or
types. For example, PMD9 has a rule that each class should only define one logger.
Finally, looking through the constraints we have identified, it seems clear that
mock bugs are not the most effective way to express some of them. For example, the
9PMD is a popular static analysis tool for Java that has many lightweight rules, and is online
at http://pmd.sourceforge.net/
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banned APIs mentioned in the discussion of occurrence constraints would probably
be best supported by an XML or form-based interface, through which a user can
simple enter the fully qualified names of all banned methods. Naming constraints
could be specified using annotations with regular expressions, or using XPath-like
queries to target a group of classes, as is done in PMD (see discussion in Section
8.3.2). But despite the convenience of some of these approaches, mock bugs ap-
pear to be the right combination of simplicity and generality for a wide range of
defects. In the next section, we compare mock bugs with other existing approaches
for specifying custom bug detectors.
8.3 Writing a Bug Detector
Existing approaches for writing bug detectors generally aim to give users al-
most as much power as the experts that implement the core bug detectors. In fact,
most static analysis tools feature core rules that are written using the same spec-
ification framework that users can use to write additional rules. This paradigm is
handy for expert users who specialize in extending tools, but does not appeal to
our target audience: regular developers writing simple rules. In particular, this
paradigm requires the user to understand the underlying analysis and/or learn a
new specification language. In this section, we discuss a representative set of sam-
ple rules from various tools. This is by no means an exhaustive list of all tools, but
aims to cover the range of styles available.
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8.3.1 FindBugs Bug Detectors
FindBugs bug detectors are implemented in Java using the visitor pattern
[41] to walk through a bytecode classfile looking for matching patterns. A user can
provide custom bug detectors by constructing a class that implements the Detector
interface and adding the resulting jar file to a plugin directory. The user will also
need to provide some XML configuration files so that FindBugs can find the new
detector.
Figure 8.6 illustrates the basic scaffolding code needed by a simple FindBugs
bug detector. Each detector is initialized using a BugReporter (line 3) which is
later used to generate warnings (line 10). Users override the visitClassContext()
method to search for the desired pattern. From this context, users can examine the
classfile’s metadata for its methods, fields and other characteristics, or access the
dataflow analysis, or traverse the abstract syntax tree to get to deeper contexts.
Since many detectors have similar setups, FindBugs provides a wide variety of base
classes that can help simplify the user’s task.
This plugin infrastructure has some advantages. Since the plugins are written
in Java, users do not need to learn a new language, and many developers are familiar
with the visitor pattern that serves as the basic metaphor for writing a plugin. In
addition, the user has all the power that the experts have, since all bug detectors
are written this way10.
However this plugin infrastructure is difficult for casual users to learn. For
10Of course, some bug detectors inspire the experts to modify the internals of FindBugs, and
custom detector developers may not be at liberty to make such modifications.
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 
1 public class BasicDetector implements Detector {
2 BugReporter bugReporter;
3 public BasicDetector(BugReporter bugReporter) {
4 this.bugReporter = bugReporter;
5 }
6 /∗∗ Visit the ClassContext for a class which should be analyzed. ∗/
7 @Override public void visitClassContext(ClassContext classContext) {
8 // use ’classContext’ to access metadata and search for patterns
9 // if a match is found ...
10 bugReporter.reportBug(





16 /∗∗ Invoked after all classes have been visited. Used by any detectors which
17 ∗ accumulate information over all visited classes to generate results. ∗/
18 @Override public void report() { }
19 }  
Figure 8.6: A Basic Bug Detector for FindBugs
one thing, users are searching for patterns in the byte code, not in source code.
Hence users may need to inspect the byte code to know what the reference pattern
they are searching for actually looks like. In addition, users need to understand
any analysis facts they intend to use, and provide lots of scaffolding code, some of
which is shown in Figure 8.6. Indeed, FindBugs detectors can become quite verbose.
Finally, users have to manually configure the detector, editing XML files to provide
a name, description, and other metadata about the detector.
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8.3.2 XPath Queries for PMD
Like FindBugs, PMD also allows users to write new rules using Java code and
the visitor pattern to navigate over the abstract syntax tree (AST) representation
of a source file. But PMD targets many rules that are simple enough to be specified
by searching for the relevant node in the AST, and performing some simple checks.
This is particularly true of rules that enforce a coding style, or naming convention.
For example, one rule is that the package name should not contain uppercase letters.
A Java implementation of this rule would simply walk down the AST until a package
declaration is found, and generate a warning if it does not use the correct casing.
Since the AST is a structured document, an analogy can be made with searching an
XML document to find key nodes or attributes. XPath is a powerful language for
searching XML documents [68], and it makes sense to try and apply it to the rules
in PMD.
PMD allows rule writers to treat the AST as an XML document, and search
for nodes using XPath. For example, the package-name casing rule above could be
specified using the following XPath query: 
//PackageDeclaration/Name[lower−case(@Image)!=@Image]  
The only nodes which match this query are package declarations where the
name has some uppercase letters. With this rule, such nodes will be flagged and
a warning will be generated. The clear advantage of this approach is that it can
be very concise for simple rules. However, XPath queries can get very complex for
more difficult rules, making them hard to understand or maintain. In addition, rule
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writers need to understand the AST structure, including metadata such as node and
attribute names. The AST structure is not obvious from looking at the source code,
because the parser may insert many redundant nodes. Recognizing this difficulty,
the PMD team has provided a Rule Designer which enables rule writers to visualize
the AST, and experiment with different XPath queries.
8.3.3 The Metal Language
Metal is a high-level, state-machine language used to write compiler extensions
that can be used to check software for rule violations [40, 19]. It is a predecessor
to Coverity Extend, Coverity’s software development kit for writing custom bug
detectors. It allows rule writers to combine patterns written in an extended version
of the target language, with a state-machine whose transitions can be used to specify
whether a rule is matched or not.
Figure 8.7 illustrates a state-machine (taken from [19]) that checks to see if
the return value from a string method is used. In this case, the target language
is Java and the pattern language is an extension of Java. The rule specified is
that, since Java strings are immutable, it does not make sense to ignore the re-
turn value of a string operation. The example starts by declaring and initializ-
ing some meta-variables on lines 2-4: str will represent the return value and is
used in multiple states; tracking is a hash map used to temporarily store values
that have been returned, but not yet used. The state-machine contains two states
defined on lines 5 and 10. Starting from the start state, whenever the pattern
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 
1 sm stringchecker {
2 state decl { java.lang.String } str;
3 { public HashMap tracking = new HashMap(); }
4 init { tracking = new HashMap(); }
5 start:
6 { str = java.lang.String.anymethod(...) }




11 { str } ==> { // matches any use
12 tracking.remove(str.getDefinition());
13 };
14 final { bugs.addAll(tracking.values()); }
15 }  
Figure 8.7: A Metal-style rule for tracking unused values returned from
String operations
java.lang.String.anymethod(...) is matched, the state-machine updates the
tracking hash map, and transitions to the next state str.tracked (lines 6-8). In
this state, any usage of the return value will result in the meta-information being
removed from the tracking hash map (lines 11-12). As a final action, any values
left in the tracking hash map are flagged as bugs on line 14, because they are never
used.
The Metal approach is very elegant and powerful, and many core rule checkers
have been written, primarily for C and C++. But this approach requires rule
writers to learn two specifications: the state-machine syntax and semantics, and the
pattern-matching language which is an extension of the target language.
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8.3.4 Comparing to Mock Bugs
The frameworks presented in this section have many strengths and weaknesses,
and generally have to tradeoff between power and ease of use. Mock bugs aim to
emphasize ease of use, but may also be quite powerful because they rely on the rule
writer being able to express the rule using a few examples. In addition, mock bugs
aim to enable users to write rules without having to learn a custom specification
language or understand the underlying analysis.
8.4 Summary and Related Work
A framework for specifying static analysis rules by providing examples and
counter-examples may encourage more organizations and users to write more project-
specific rules and increase the value they get out of static analysis. In this discussion
of such a conceptual framework, my main design goals have been simplicity and
ease of use, with few requirements on the rule writer to learn a new language, or
understand the internals of the analysis engine. But there are limitations because
examples may not capture all the intent a rule writer wants to express, or because
some rules may require too many examples to be sufficiently unambiguous. Still,
the examples I have explored indicate that this approach has some promise.
It remains to be seen whether mock bugs will be both convenient enough, and
powerful enough to be useful. Practical implementations and subsequent user studies
are needed to indicate if this paradigm puts too much burden on users to provide
many examples, or if the lack of conventions makes this approach too constraining
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for the rules users want to specify.
There is actually some earlier work on using code patterns, or “examples”
to search for corresponding code patterns. Paul and Prakash [114] introduce a
pattern description language for searching for code patterns, but use additional
syntax to extend the target language to make their search more expressive. Their
target audience is software maintainers who need to find code fragments that exhibit
certain properties. Devanbu later comments on this work by pointing out that
this kind of search can be performed by traversing abstract syntax trees (ASTs)
[36], as is done by many modern static analysis tools. Indeed, traversing the AST
may be the preferred mode for general search tasks, but for our goal of matching
simple defective fragments, code patterns are more effective. The pattern description
language presented by Paul and Prakash was later extended by Matsumura et al.
to search for “bug code patterns” [96]. They provide new syntax for specifying the
absence of a statement, and other constructs that enable them to search for implicit
code rules, which I call project-specific rules.
A number of researchers have focused on the problem of finding and flagging
project-specific rules [131, 139, 140, 135, 134]. Spinellis and Louridas provide a
method for augmenting APIs so that static analysis can later verify that invocations
of the API methods use them correctly [131]. They wrote some augmentations for
some Java API classes, extended FindBugs to understand their augmentations, and
searched large code bases finding hundreds of potential defects. Other researchers
have attempted to automatically discover custom bug patterns in various projects by
mining the history in their source repositories. Williams and Hollingsworth search
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for specific patterns of function invocations, such as “called after” or “conditionally
called after”, to come up with system-specific rules that can then be used to search
for defects [139, 140]. Thummalapenta and Xie use data mining techniques such
as association rules to find exception handling rules [135] and rules that involve
alternative patterns (that may be substituted for each other in practice) [134].
Finally, there are numerous specialized languages for specifying bug patterns
from research community [121], as well as from commercial enterprizes like Coverity




Through this research, using numerous studies, I have explored the nuances
of static analysis in practice. On the one hand, static analysis is clearly useful for
finding defects early, and vital for subtle subclasses of defects that are otherwise hard
to detect. In addition, users laud its educational value, and its ability to exhaustively
reach into the dark corners of the code and shed light on rare bugs. On the other
hand, static analysis carries some costs that need to be understood and managed.
Spurious warnings and low impact defects may eventually lead many to abandon
tool adoption, unless users create effective strategies to run tools automatically, alert
the right people early, deal with issues in legacy code, and other challenges.
Researchers and tool vendors should continue to focus on finding more bugs,
more accurately, more quickly. But it is also clear from my research that other
equally important factors determine whether static analysis tools are used success-
fully, and these factors can be understood by studying the practice of real users
dealing with real defects. This kind of research exposes the varying expectations
and contexts of different users. For example, some users want tools to output many
warnings, including false positives, so they can investigate the surrounding code for
security vulnerabilities, while many other users decline to fix true defects that do not
impact software behavior in practice. This research also enables vendors to factor
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in the practices of users when making tweaks to their heuristics, such as deciding
how loud and silent warnings should be ranked, and whether a potential null-pointer
dereference is a defect.
Our motivation to conduct this research comes from wondering why static
analysis is not used more. If it can find serious defects, surely everyone will want
to adopt it. Part of the limitation may be that many do not realize the benefits
of static analysis. But a big part is the perception that the effort users spend on
static analysis does not payoff. These users judge warnings in isolation, and often
do not run the analysis until the code is moderately mature. These users need to
understand that the value comes from running it early, and utilizing infrastructure
that makes it easy to use.
In summary, static analysis is well received by the users we studied, and many
have begun taking steps to introduce infrastructure and practices that will maximize
their return on investment. Many tools have also started adding features to enable
software teams to integrate static analysis with existing issue tracking databases
and code repositories, and to collaboratively resolve issues. As tools continue to
develop, they will become better at figuring out when a defect really matters, and
alerting developers using convenient modes. Feature rich tools will make it easier
for organizations to introduce static analysis into their process, integrate them with
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